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      This article empirically examines democratic participation in three different regulatory 
proceedings, involving financial privacy, nuclear regulation, and campaign finance.  It then uses that 
analysis to critique -- and suggest alternatives to -- existing mechanisms to achieve public participation 
in the regulatory state.  The current mechanism for structuring public participation in regulatory 
decisions (or “regulatory democracy”) relies on demand-driven procedures like the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s notice and comment process.  Organized interests and others who decide they have 
sufficient resources and interest to do so comment on regulations.  While some observers consider this 
process close to ideal, others instead seem to accept the current approach only because it appears to be 
a reasonable compromise adequate for an imperfect world.  Under this “compromise acceptance” 
view, current procedures seem easier to accept in light of certain empirical suppositions, such as that 
regulatory problems can be resolved through application of technical, scientific expertise, that 
individual members of the public tend to lack interest in participating in regulatory policymaking, and 
that even if they had such interest, they would add little to a process already informed by the views of 
organized interests. Drawing on an empirical analysis of thousands of public comments in these three 
regulations, as well as a rich empirical literature in political behavior, I show many of these 
suppositions to be questionable. (1) Comments from individual members of the public make up a 
substantial proportion of total comments about some regulations, showing at least some potential 
public demand for participation.  (2) Dramatic differences exist in the sophistication of comments from 
organized interests and those of individual members of the public.  (3) That deficit in sophistication 
independently affects the probability an agency will accept suggestions in public comments even when 
controlling for differences in commenter identity. (4) Interest groups do not always raise the range of 
concerns raised by comments from the lay public.  (5) The larger public’s interest in a particular 
regulation and sophistication to take part in discussing it are both themselves shaped by the process 
used to consult that public.  All this hints at a rich set of possibilities for alternative institutional 
designs to achieve regulatory democracy.  I discuss two such approaches here.  Both involve 
constituting a small group of people whose discussions can inform the regulatory process, and 
appointing a lawyer to serve as a “regulatory public defender” responsible for articulating their views 
to the agency.  Participants can be either selected by lot from the entire population (a majoritarian 
deliberation approach), or chosen from among constituencies (such as outside experts) who may be 
especially impacted by the regulation but are essentially unrepresented (a corrective approach).  Given 
that neither the public’s sophistication nor its interest in an issue are fixed, the new approaches can 
generate valuable information about what informed citizens think of regulatory proposals.  These 
mechanisms can provide regulators with valuable information about what makes a new law acceptable 
to the public.  Many of the technical challenges could be solved by creating a separate agency to 
implement reforms in regulatory democracy, though questions arise about sampling to select 
participants, framing the issue, and providing representation to the views of the group.  Instead, the 
larger challenge to the reform of regulatory democracy is a political economy that strongly -- though 
not inevitably --  favors the status quo.  I close by discussing three scenarios where reform would be 
easier to achieve.
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INTRODUCTION
Regulatory agencies write twenty times as many new public laws in a year 
as does the federal legislature,1 and in the process make an overwhelming number 
of the nation’s public policy decisions.2  Agencies regulate privacy,3 political 
1 See John D. Graham, Presidential Management of the Regulatory State, Remarks Prepared for 
Delivery to the National Economists Club (Mar. 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/testimony/graham030702.html (last accessed May 14, 
2004)(noting that federal agencies write “over four thousand” regulations a year).  In fact, 
regulatory agencies promulgate more rules in a month (on average) than Congress passes laws in a 
year.  The U.S. Congress passes 198 public laws in 2003, a rate that fluctuated between a low of 
88 (in 1995) and a high of 410 (in 2000) over the last nine years.  See 108th Congress, 1st Session: 
By the Numbers, CQ WEEKLY (February 14, 2004).  These figures obviously do not account for 
qualitative differences in the importance of legal mandates emerging from agencies versus the 
federal legislature.  Nonetheless, virtually every major statute passed by Congress also leads to  
new regulatory mandates, and the accumulation of agency legal authority arising under successive 
statutes allows regulators to issue a considerable number of highly significant regulations (under 
nearly any plausible definition of significance) each year.  States, too, write thousands of 
regulations a year.  For a discussion of the many such rules that have been invalidated by the 
Supreme Court on the grounds that they interfere with interstate commerce, see Michael E. Smith, 
State Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CA. L. REV. 1203, 1257 (1986).  The 
central importance of regulation in modern law is also borne out by developments abroad. 
Developed nations from Switzerland to Korea have forged their own version of the regulatory 
state during the last century.  See, e.g., Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional 
Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications 
Regulations, 10 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 201 (1994); Carl H. Fulda, The Regulation of Surface 
Transportation in the European Economic Community, 12 AM. J. COMP. LAW 303, 304 (1963).  
Transnational regulatory agencies are also becoming common.  See, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett, The 
Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union, 49 INT’L ORG. 171 (1995); John Braithwaite, 
Transnational Regulation of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 525 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 12 (1993). Even reformers in chaotic corners of Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
increasingly train their attention on building effective and legitimate regulatory institutions.  See, 
e.g., Bernard S. Black, Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000).
2
 For perspective, regulatory agencies write nearly as large a number of rules in a year as all the 
non-prisoner civil appeals filed in U.S. courts of appeal in a year.  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. 
CTS., JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES, TABLE 1.1 (2004)(avail. at. http://www.uscourts.gov/
udicialfactsfigures/contents.html)(indicating that there were 13,460 non-prisoner civil appeals 
filed in all federal courts of appeals in 2003). 
3 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 FED. REG. 60579, 60580-82 (September 26, 
2002)(establishing procedures under which federal law enforcement agencies can obtain otherwise 
private information about individuals’ financial transactions).
RETHINKING REGULATORY DEMOCRACY4
competition,4 parks,5 pollution,6 ports,7 power plants,8 pork belly prices9 and 
political “pork”10 among other things.  Not surprisingly, scholars, judges, and 
lawyers have consumed enormous energy debating agencies’ legal and 
philosophical status.11  This outpouring of theoretical attention is matched, 
however, by the gaps in our knowledge about the actual workings of what we 
might call regulatory democracy, or how the public participates in those decisions 
of the regulatory state that so dramatically affect them under existing law.12  The 
4 See Public Financing of Presidential Candidates and Nominating Conventions, 68 FED. REG. 
12484-521 (April 15, 2003)(changing comprehensive rules governing the public financing of 
presidential campaigns and nominating conventions).
5 See Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc., 112 F.3d 1283 (5th Cir. 1997)(discussing the 
validity of National Park Service regulations allocating mineral rights).
6 See Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001) (hereinafter 
“American Trucking”)(discussing particulate matter standards under the Clean Air Act).
7 See Implementation of National Maritime Security Initiatives, 68 FED. REG. 60,448 (Oct. 22, 
2003)(implementing port security and cargo inspection rules in U.S. ports, and including several 
extraterritorial provisions applying to overseas ports).
8 See Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Changes to the Adjudicatory Process, 69 FED. REG. 2182 
(2004).  These regulatory changes are discussed in detail in infra Part I.b.
9 Clarification of Certain Aspects of the Hedging Definition, 52 FED. REG. 27195 (July 20, 
1987)(Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulations affecting hedging transactions for 
pork belly and other commodity transactions).
10 See, e.g., Kristin Loiacono, Special Interests Overtake Homeland Security, 39 TRIAL 11 (Jan. 
2003)(describing essentially requiring the promulgation of regulations that would result in the 
creation of a homeland security research center at Texas A&M University).
11
 Some classic (or near-classic) examples of this genre:  THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF 
LIBERALISM:  IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 125-26, 148-55 (1969) 
(administrative state is built on ideas of “interest group liberalism” antithetical to legal standards); 
Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 
36 AM. U.L. REV. 295 (1987).  See also MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL 
STRUCTURE 135-61 (1995); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:  HOW 
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993); CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1990); Cass R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 17 (1997); 
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1721, 1762 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules With the Force 
of Law:  The Original Convention 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002); Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting 
Overton Park:  Political and Judicial Controls Over Administrative Actions Affecting the 
Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992).
12 For three notable exceptions, see Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and Political 
Control of the Bureaucracy, 92 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 663 (1998)(finding that Medicare regulations 
developed pursuant to the regulatory notice-and-comment process appeared to have been impacted 
by comments from physicians expecting reductions in payments under the new rules); Marissa 
Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices 
Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245 (1998)(providing a description of the 
regulatory rulemaking process and a survey of participants in several rulemaking proceedings, and 
finding that citizens almost never participate) and CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING 157-203 
(2ND ed. 1999)(discussing the extent of public participation in regulatory rulemaking proceedings, 
and concluding that such participation primarily reflects a process where “interest groups are the 
major forces”).  None of these sources, however, analyze the sophistication of individual 
comments, nor do they consider the extent to which comments address matters within the scope of 
the agency’s legal discretion.  Neither do they place the empirical analysis in the context of 
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basic legal requirements built into our current system are clear enough: agencies 
get statutory authority to regulate from the legislature.13   They must ordinarily 
provide notice of proposed regulations,14 accept comments about them,15 and give 
clear reasons for their actions.16  Clear, too, are the theoretical insights gleaned 
from social scientists about the purported difficulty of mobilizing individual 
members of the public with diffuse interests to affect regulations,17 the powerful 
role of the legislature in overseeing the regulatory state,18 and the incentives of 
agency officials to pay disproportionate heed to the concerns of certain players in 
the regulatory process.19  Less clear is who might be concerned enough to actually 
debates about the extent of regulatory democracy, nor do they discuss alternative institutional 
designs for involving the public in regulatory decisionmaking.
13 See Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst. (Benzene) 448 U.S. 607, 
646-48 (1980) (plurality opinion) (OSHA statute, if interpreted appropriately to cure constitutional 
defects, creates a list of factors that the agency must consider in creating a regulation that is not 
arbitrary and capricious, and emphasizing the importance of the agency balancing several 
competing concerns grounded in the statute).
14 See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 552-556 (2001).
15 Id.
16 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (agency must provide 
explanation for its decision, and decision reviewed on the basis of the full rulemaking record).  
The full record includes all the comments submitted by the public.
17 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965)(“[U]nless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or 
unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests”).  See also Pamela Schmitt, Kurtis Swope, and James Walker, Collective Action With 
Incomplete Commitment: Expermiental Evidence, 66 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 829 (2000)(presenting 
results of experiments where individuals must solve a collective action problem in order to receive 
a payoff, and noting that – while subjects anticipate collective action problems – they still have 
difficulty reaching agreements or sticking to them).  But see Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and 
the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 138 (2000)(“A substantial gap exists 
between the theoretical prediction that self-interested individuals will have extreme difficulty in 
coordinating collective action and the reality that such cooperative behavior is widespread, 
although far from inevitable.”).
18 See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?  
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983); Barry 
R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System:  A Principal-Agent Perspective (With 
Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 147 (1984).
19 See, e.g., Jean Tirole, The Internal Organization of Government, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 
13 (1994)(“The difficulty in giving formal incentive schemes to civil servants and elected 
politicians suggests that capture of the decision making by interest groups is of greater concern in 
government than in private corporations.”).  More nuanced accounts also insist that bureaucrats 
and the regulatory agencies they staff are likely to disproportionately respond to the concerns of 
regulated parties.  See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 73 (1989)(“[A]ny government agency that vests its operators with much 
discretion will have the tasks of these operators defined by the pressures of external organized 
interests”).
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comment on regulations, what they say, and how agencies react to those concerns 
in practice.20
My own concern here is to study that process empirically.  I then use the 
insights gleaned in that analysis to offer a new perspective on current regulatory 
democracy and how it can be reformed.21  In Part I, I examine three quite different 
regulations, from the Treasury Department, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
and the Federal Election Commission.22  Each regulation was crafted from 
statutes giving the agency massive discretion over a substantively important issue.  
None provoked any discernible legislative response either before or since the 
regulation was finalized. My analysis shows, among other things, that comments 
from individual members of the public account for the lion’s share of total input 
received about these regulations.23  Those individual comments, moreover, raise 
different concerns from those of organized interests.24  While those concerns 
20
 This is ironic since commentators and lawyers alike often assume that public participation –
when coupled with judicial review and legislative oversight – is part what makes the regulatory 
state legitimate.  See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History, S.Doc. No. 248, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1947) (noting that the “principal purpose” of the notice and comment 
provisions in the APA was to “provide that the legislative functions of the administrative agencies 
shall as far as possible be exercised only upon participation on notice…”).  See also NLRB v. 
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) (public participation in rulemaking proceeding is 
meant to ensure that the regulation is response to the interests and needs of those regulated); 
Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Commission, 412 F.3d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969) (participation by 
parties with an interest in the regulatory rulemaking proceeding ensures that agencies’ decisions 
are based upon relevant information); Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where, and How of 
Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L. REV. 525 (1972).
21 The prescriptive literature on participation in policymaking (and, by extension, in regulation) 
tends to fall into two categories: (1) philosophical discussions of the value of participation in 
policymaking in general (without strong attention to the intricacies of regulatory policy, or 
institutional detail); or (2) discussions of specialized issues like regulatory negotiation or the use 
of technology to facilitate participation.  For some interesting examples of the former, see
Cramton, supra note 20; Joshua Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy, 97 ETHICS 26, 
27-29 (1986); JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY 
(1995).  For examples of the latter, see Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Public Participation in 
Rulemaking, KSG WORKING   PAPER SERIES NO. RWP03-022 (2003), avail. at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=421161.
22
 I pre-selected the three agencies to obtain regulations from a range of different substantive issue 
areas that ordinarily receive less attention than environmental pollution regulations but are no less 
substantively interesting or important to shaping public policy.  Once I selected the three agencies, 
I identified regulations (a) finalized during the last three years that (b) provided the agency with 
substantial discretion (enough to make it difficult to accept that the agency’s decision regarding 
how to write the regulation depended exclusively on factual information generated by expert 
agency analysts), and (c) did not appear to provoke any meaningful legislative response or interest 
during the time when the regulation was being drafted.  I then selected the final three regulations 
essentially at random from among those that met the preceding conditions.  See the Appendix, 
infra, for further details on how I selected these three regulations.
23 See infra Part I.c.  The preponderance of comments from individual members of the public 
persists for two out of the three regulations I studied even when one excludes form letters.
24 See id.  See also Part II.
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raised by individual commenters are nearly always relevant to the agency’s legal 
mandate,25 they lack the legal and policy sophistication of the comments to which 
the agencies paid the most heed.  In fact this “sophistication deficit” appears to 
have some effect on the agency’s probability of accepting a commenter 
suggestion, even when controlling for the commenter’s status as a regulated 
entity.26  Yet agencies and existing law have no systematic means of assimilating 
unsophisticated comments or gleaning any other sort of public insights from 
among the tens of millions of people who lack either the knowledge of a 
regulation’s existence or the ability to advance their opinion about it in a 
sophisticated way.
Together with an existing body of empirical research on political behavior, 
my research sheds light on both the strengths and weaknesses of the procedures 
epitomizing current regulatory democracy.27  As I discuss in Part II, someone 
insisting that those strengths outweigh the weaknesses under the current system 
could do so using one of two plausible positions.  One position idealizes the 
institutions of representative democracy that oversee the regulatory state, and the 
interest groups that play such a crucial role in setting the agenda for those 
institutions.  The other considers the status quo an imperfect but nonetheless 
reasonably acceptable system to achieve public participation in a second-best 
world, even if greater individual participation would be desirable if it could be 
had without undoing the strengths of the current system.  
The first argument is not my primary concern here because it is less 
falsifiable,28 though I note in passing that it is not obviously persuasive.  I focus 
instead on compromise acceptance, the second position purporting to explain why 
we (should) continue using existing procedures to engage the public in regulatory 
policy.  In contrast to the first, this second position seems to depend more clearly 
on a number of empirical assumptions about organized interests, the mass public, 
and regulatory agencies.29  I question those assumptions.  My data belie the notion 
that organized interests raise the full range of concerns relevant to writing 
regulations.30  Surprisingly, my data also belie the notion that agencies 
25 See infra Part I.c.
26 See infra Part II.c.v.
27
 As I discuss in Part II.a, infra, the notice-and-comment process as well as virtually all existing 
participation procedures are demand-driven.  They only concern themselves with those comments 
from people who decide to participate on their own initiative (or through the influence of some 
organized interest).  Those procedures let agencies quickly develop regulations and learn from 
organized interests – many of whom have an economic stake in the regulation.  They lack any 
means to address the concerns of participants who have an opinion but cannot raise it in a 
sophisticated way, or to canvas the views of countless millions who haven’t decided on their own 
that they want to say something about the regulation.
28
 By “falsifiable,” I mean that someone can demonstrate convincing that an argument is false by 
pointing to data, whether quantitative, qualitative, or historical.
29 See infra Part II.c.
30
 By “relevant,” I mean those concerns that an agency is either required or capable of considering 
given the statutes in question, and that are hard to reject on normative grounds as important 
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disproportionately respond to the concerns of the companies and entities they 
regulate, which would make it largely pointless to reform regulatory democracy.  
Instead my data suggest agencies will heed comments from individual members 
of the public if they are presented in a more sophisticated fashion.31  Along with 
other research on political behavior, my data also raise questions about whether 
the larger public’s sophistication and interest in regulatory policy are stuck in the 
“low” positions.32  In short, my data and discussion emphasize the gap between 
current regulatory democracy and the sort of arrangement that many plausible 
normative accounts of democracy would consider desirable.33  If one still believes 
in compromise acceptance in the face of these data, it is likely because no 
alternative arrangement appears reasonable.  How exactly does one motivate the 
larger public to think carefully about the regulations that so profoundly affect 
their lives?  Surely the prospect of having a referendum on campaign finance or 
nuclear licensing regulations is as ludicrous as mass opinions are devoid of any 
useful content on these technical arguments.
But under scrutiny the feasibility argument favoring the current system 
turns brittle, too.  I show this by pursuing, in Part III, an extended thought 
experiment in the institutional design of a new arrangement for regulatory 
democracy.  The reformed procedures preserve some of the strengths of the status 
quo.  They also yield a trove of valuable information about public attitudes that 
the status quo can never provide. 34  The key elements of that design include the 
creation of a specialized participation agency.35  The agency would then select 
random voter samples (or stratified samples, if the goal is to represent key 
interests rather than to foster majoritarian deliberation) and provide them with 
time and balanced information about the regulation, as well as a “regulatory 
public defender” to articulate views to the agency writing the regulation.  This 
considerations in writing the relevant regulations.  See infra Part I.b for a discussion of specific 
examples in the context of the three regulations I analyze here.
31 See infra Part II.b.
32 See infra Part II.c.
33 See infra Part.I.
34 I take up this institutional design challenge not because the mass public should control all or 
even most regulatory decisions, nor because I think deliberative democracy is the elixir of 
regulatory nirvana.  As I discuss in Part III, alternative arrangements might further either 
majoritarian deliberation or quite different goals altogether, such as including the views (enhanced 
through additional information but not necessarily through deliberation) of potentially interested 
parties who do not already participate.  For a reasonable introduction to this burgeoning literature 
(replete with the obligatory cites to Habermas), see JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: 
PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRACY (1996).  But see James A. Gardner, Shut Up and 
Vote: A Critique of Deliberative Democracy and the Life of Talk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421, 447 
(1996).
35
 As I note infra in Part III proposal picks up on some themes that made a brief appearance in 
legal scholarship during the late 1960s and early 1970s.  See Arthur Bonfield, Representation of 
the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV. 511, 530-45; Cramton, supra note__, at 545-
46.  None of these previous efforts provided a detailed theoretical justification for the creation of a 
new participation agency, though, nor do they go into detail about how to structure it.
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approach not only yields richer information about how and when the public might 
want to comply with regulations, but also treats the regulatory state as a fertile 
setting for democratic experimentation.36
There’s a lot to be said for making the regulatory state and its institutions 
the focus of such experimentation.  Regulatory agencies confront a diet of 
concrete governance questions.37  New methods of participation could function 
36
 In Part III I note that such experimentation promises to be most successful if an independent 
agency assumes responsibility for gathering insights about the benefits and implementation 
challenges associated with new forms of participation.  That agency might also begin by setting up 
a few baseline procedures to initially serve as alternatives to current regulatory democracy.  In 
contrast to my focus on institutional design in Part III and elsewhere, the idea that the regulatory 
state can be a fount for experimentation with public consultation has been largely missing from the 
extant literature on regulation and democracy: neither critics of broad delegations nor its defenders 
explicitly recognize that the regulatory state is more than just a legal contraption for solving 
practical problems inherent in national government; it is, too, an incomparable setting for 
pragmatic experimentation with different mechanisms for democratic participation that might later 
inform other aspects of modern self-government.  Scholars interested in civic republican 
understandings of the regulatory state have made occasional references to democratic 
experimentation, but their work tends not to offer concrete new institutional arrangements or 
detailed analyses of whether existing arrangements live up to their expectations.  See, e.g., Mark 
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 
(1992); James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the 
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA L. REV. 287 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the 
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). For some important exceptions, see Cass R. 
Sunstein, Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information Markets, JOHN M. 
OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 219 (2ND SERIES)(August 2004)(reviewing 
empirical research conducted by scholars of social psychology, group dynamics, and experimental 
economics to highlight some of the differences in the likely strengths and limitations of different 
procedures for aggregating individual information relevant to regulatory problems); Jonathan 
Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental Policy Act’s Process for 
Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53 (1996)(providing a speculative discussion of the possibility 
of using “citizen juries” to advise environmental policymakers on broad environmental policy 
matters).
37
 In fact agencies must constantly solve concrete, not general or abstract, problems that require 
major value choices.  See infra Part II.b.i.  This is true even if one assumes considerable fidelity to 
a statutory mandate.  This means democratic experiments involving the regulatory state are 
qualitatively different from exercises like “deliberative polls,” which involve the elicitation of 
thoughtful opinion on some higher-profile, more abstract subject like how to reduce crime or the 
appropriate extent of unilateral intervention that should be associated with foreign policy.  Cf.
BRUCE ACKERMAN AND JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004)(proposing the creation of a 
paid civic holiday two weeks before elections for citizens to gather in local schools and 
community centers to talk about “the issues” and the candidates in a structured fashion).  A lot 
rides on this distinction between specific regulatory questions and broader issues.  One might 
naturally question the information content of public opinions (however elicited) about some 
exceedingly general aspect of public governance, like “foreign policy.”  Suppose, moreover, that 
such opinions were considered as valuable as, say, what a random sample of the public thinks 
about whether the regulations implementing the assault weapons ban should be modified.  Any 
scheme that aims to change, or inform, the process of making broad policy choices must still 
grapple with the question of how to translate the broad (statutory) command into more specific, 
concrete rules or standards.  That translation process is my primary concern here.  The insights 
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with existing legal features of the regulatory state, including judicial review, 
agency expertise, and an administrable arrangement for actually getting 
regulations written at a reasonable administrative and financial cost.  At the same 
time, new methods could yield valuable information about how the public reacts 
to regulation that is currently unavailable.  The regulatory state faces the 
pervasive challenge of integrating public concerns with rigorous analysis of risk, 
costs, and benefits.  Important as this challenge is, no one has come close to 
solving it.   Making headway on it depends on learning more about how to 
integrate sophisticated technical information and public input.  These experiments 
can also yield a small but growing group of citizens suffused with new 
information from a jury-like, meaningful opportunity to take part in shaping the 
regulations that affect their lives.
This is not to say that changing the current system would be easy.  In Part 
IV I acknowledge as much by discussing how current regulatory democracy was 
designed by legislators eager to mollify organized interests whose futures and 
fortunes depended on regulation.  Change is more likely, however, under certain 
plausible scenarios I also describe therein.  In the meantime, my modest hope is 
for this article to show how a combination of close empirical study of the 
regulatory state and analysis of institutional design problems make for a 
compelling scholarly agenda on the regulatory state and its reform.  
I.
THE FACES OF REGULATORY DEMOCRACY
Last year three teams of lawyers, technical experts, and political 
appointees in the Washington, DC metropolitan area finalized the following 
regulations. One altered decades-old laws to transform how federal agents get 
access to private financial information.  Another curtailed the use of elaborate 
trial-type hearings when federal authorities license civilian nuclear technologies, 
which range from radioactive medical devices to nuclear power plants.  A third 
set the rules governing publicly financed presidential campaigns and nominating 
conventions, allowing (among other things) convention organizers to raise 
unlimited amounts of “soft” money from any person or corporation across the 
country.  Each regulation was forged from legal authority letting the agency write 
the regulation in a hundred different ways.  Each also took shape in accordance 
with legal rules giving the larger public notice of the regulation’s internecine 
complexity and allowing that public to have some chance to shape the regulators’ 
new mandates,38 and each, too, emerged from a distinct political context of 
organized interests and bureaucratic attitudes.  This Part adds to our limited 
knowledge of regulatory democracy by studying who participated, what they said, 
gleaned from this process no doubt may further inform other problems involving the institutional 
design of democracy.  
38 See infra Part I.
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and how the agency reacted in developing these three regulations.  The case 
studies also anchor the discussion of regulatory democracy in the rest of the 
paper.
A.  Legislative Power and Regulatory Democracy
The stories of the three regulations I discuss here begin, but do not end, 
with votes in legislative committees and later on the floor of the legislature. The 
Atomic Energy Act created the system of civilian control of nuclear energy that 
years later, culminated in the regulatory changes the NRC approved.39  The FEC 
drafted its most recent public financing regulations with authority it gained in the 
1970s from a trio of statutes affecting campaign finance.  The agency also 
considered whether a more recent refinement of campaign finance law restricting 
certain kinds of donations to political parties also affected the public financing 
system.40  The Treasury Department minted the financial privacy regulations I 
discussed after the strikingly swift passage of the now-infamous USA Patriot Act, 
a statute squeezing together provisions reflecting topical concerns like getting 
more Arabic speakers into the FBI with more longstanding prosecutorial 
aspirations for greater authority.41  Just as legislatures affected the regulations by 
passing these statutes, so too did legislators retain the power to affect those 
regulations by overseeing the agency’s legal authority, controlling its budget, 
forcing its staff to appear at hearings, and shaping the career of the agency’s 
leaders.  All of the regulations discussed here were written using authority from 
ambiguous statutes that gave the agency a lot of latitude over its regulations,42 and 
(as with most regulations) none drew any observable sign of direct legislative 
intervention.
Which raises the question of how agencies behave when Congress seems 
not to be looking closely at what they are doing.  Agency leaders might constantly 
worry about legislators’ potential displeasure.  As a result, Treasury, NRC, and 
FEC regulators might nonetheless face some subtle constraints from legislators, 
despite the lawmakers’ apparent passivity.43  For all that legislators can do to 
39 See infra Part II.b.iii.
40 See infra Part II.b.ii.
41 See infra Part II.b.i.
42 See infra Parts I.b.i, I.b.ii., and I.b.iii for discussions of the discretion each agency retained to 
shape the regulations pursuant to the specific statutes at issue and the agencies’ own broad 
statutory mandates.
43 Perhaps in equilibrium legislators rarely have to explicitly to achieve their goals because the 
regulators already anticipate the constraints.  See, e.g., Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, 
and Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM J. POLI. SCI. 
588 (1989), Jeffrey S. Banks and Barry R. Weingast, The Political Control of Bureaucracies 
Under Asymmetric Information, 36 AM. J. POLI. SCI. (1992); Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. 
Weingast, Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, 19 LEG. STUD. Q. 149 (1994).  The 
theories in these papers are all quite persuasive in terms of their internal, formal logic; the 
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change laws and punish wayward agencies, the lawmakers must contend with the 
brute fact that regulatory agencies produce more laws than even a diligent 
legislature and its staff can ever plausibly digest.  Which means legislators and 
their staff must decide where to turn their fitful gaze when they control the 
regulatory state.44  Administrative procedures, including the regulatory notice-
and-comment procedure – evolved in large measure to make it easier for 
legislators to oversee the bureaucracy by focusing their energies on particularly 
controversial or important regulations.45  Those procedures play a role in 
legislative oversight of regulatory bureaucracies.  They also create a process for 
the agency to gain insights into public reactions to regulatory proposals.  In short, 
the fate of any regulation depends not only on what the legislature wants but the 
specific political circumstances involved, such as how interest groups and the 
public actually use the administrative procedures that are, in theory, so integral to 
regulatory democracy.46
B.  The Case Studies
difficulty often is in measuring their predictions explicitly beyond a few specialized contexts 
because of endogeneity problems.
44 The prospect of legislative intervention is almost certainly shaped by the legislature’s scarce 
resources and competing uses for those resources.  Legislators have to vote on foreign policy 
appropriations, campaign among their constituencies, evaluate tax law changes, and supervise 
their staff, all of which means they cannot afford to supervise every development in regulatory 
policy.  See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 165 (1984).
45
 For example, the procedures make it easier for legislators to intervene where it appers that the 
agency is not adequately considering the interests of organized constituencies to particular 
legislators.  See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. 
LAW, ECON & ORG. 180 (1999).
46
 Charles Shipan makes this point nicely in a recent article reviewing the literature on 
congressional influence over regulatory bureaucracies, and providing an empirical test of 
oversight over the Food and Drug Administration.  See Charles R. Shipan, Regulatory Regimes, 
Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
467 (2004).  Once he controls for some key variables, Shipan finds that congressional influence 
over FDA decisions depends on political circumstances such as the extent of differences in agency 
and congressional (committee or floor) preferences, and the reactions of industry groups.  He 
writes:
The results also show that agencies are influenced by other factors [besides congressional 
influence] when deciding what sorts of policy actions to take.  Obviously the president, 
for example, exerts aninfluence over the agency, as does the overall level of the agency’s 
budget.  But we also see that the agency pays attention to other influences, in addition to 
the preferences of elected politicians, such as the size of the industry.  All told, then, 
agencies are sensitive to a variety of signals that they receive from the political 
environment.
Id. at 478.
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How then do agencies, organized interests, and the rest of the public use 
the legal procedures that constitute our current regulatory democracy?  With few 
exceptions, members of the public have a legal right to take part in the regulatory 
process, regardless of whether they are savvy lawyers for a chemical products 
company or individual laypeople people with no particular technical expertise.47
This makes intuitive sense, since regulations are forged from statutes passed in 
the name of everyone.48  At the same time, the public’s right and opportunity to 
participate in these decisions is limited.  Officially, no one in the public gets a 
veto over the regulation.  Instead participation takes place in a particular legal 
context.  The Administrative Procedure Act requires most regulations to be 
announced to the public and the agencies to receive comments about them from 
the outside public.49 The right for the public to comment, coupled with legal 
requirements that the agency must give reasons for what it does,50 implies has 
some kind of legal responsibility to consider significant issues raised in public 
comments.51  While the elements of this legal framework are relatively clear, 
what’s less clear is precisely what concerns are raised, by whom, and to what 
47
 Most of the exceptions to the APA notice-and-comment rulemaking process involve foreign 
affairs and national security.  But as Section 314 demonstrates, some of the default requirements 
for rulemaking contained in the APA still apply to a number of regulations affecting areas ranging 
from criminal finance enforcement to immigration.
48
 By “regulations,” I mean primarily the regulatory rules enacted pursuant to the notice-and-
comment process (also known as “informal rulemaking”) established by the Administrative 
Procedure Act, or pursuant to a similar process that allows the public to participate in rulemaking 
in some way.  
49 See APA, supra note__, at ___.
50 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 409.  
51
 Let me expand on this.  It is generally accepted that an agency must consider all the important 
dimensions of a regulatory problem – and surely this includes significant dimensions of the 
problem elucidated in public comments.  See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 
375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) cert. denied 417 U.S. 921 (1974).  See also Ronald M. Levin, 
Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind, 41 Duke L.J. 1497, 1501 n.19 (1992) 
(citing Portland Cement Ass’n); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal 
Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 282 (1987) (agencies must 
respond to all serious dimensions of the problem raised in comments). On the other hand, courts 
tend to give agencies a good deal of discretion to decide precisely how to handle comments.  This 
makes it hard to fix the precise counters of the agency’s responsibility to respond to individual 
comments.  See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1355 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(“An agency need not address every conceivable issue or alternative, no matter how remote or 
insignificant.”); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
829 (1977); But cf. Ronald M. Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 
(1995) (“To be sure, an agency has broad discretion to set its agenda and to deal with problems 
one step at a time.  Nevertheless, the agency's self-interest lies in making a strong record to 
respond to pleas to go further than it would prefer; brushing such comments aside can be 
counterproductive.”) (footnote omitted).  What must be reconciled is (a) the agency’s 
responsibility to consider important dimensions of the problem, (b) the public’s right to comment, 
and (c) the agency’s discretion in handling individual comments.  Perhaps the most viable way to 
reconcile these legal principles is to conclude that the agency may not ignore qualitatively 
important dimensions of the problem raised in the course of the notice-and-comment process (i.e., 
by some substantial proportion of the comments in the aggregate).  
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effect – all matters affecting, among other things, legislators’ allocation of scarce 
resources to oversee regulatory policy.  The case studies below shed light on those 
questions.  The Appendix details how I picked these rules, how I analyzed the 
rules and comments, and how I defined crucial concepts such as “comment 
sophistication.”
i.  The Treasury Department:  Changing Federal Agents’ Access to 
Private Financial Information
Money moves across borders and physical chasms faster than the persons 
who send it or spend it.  Sometimes that movement leaves feit traces in printouts 
of wire transfer records, digital account data, or even in the fading memory of a 
currency exchange house employee.  Within government some believe it may 
leave traces of information that reveal dark secrets such as a past crime or an 
impending terrorist attack.52  But authorities’ access to that information depends 
on laws and regulations designed to protect privacy as well as security.  Though 
scholars of criminal justice seldom dwell on the work of the regulatory state, 
criminal enforcement is indelibly shaped by regulatory rules.53  To see the impact 
of regulatory rules on criminal justice and security policy, suppose a team of 
earnest and trustworthy federal law enforcement agents is almost certain that a 
specific person is planning a terrorist attack.  They know the person has probably 
been in the United States for about two years.  They’ve researched his aliases.  
They also suspect he’ll soon receive a wire transfer from abroad to help finance 
the plot.  What they don’t know is where this person lives or what bank he uses.  
Can the authorities locate and obtain his financial records?  For nearly 30 years 
the answer to this question has depended almost entirely on statutes and 
regulations, and not constitutional interpretations.  In the early 1970s the Supreme 
Court basically decided that individuals’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights did 
not interfere with government efforts to obtain financial information from third 
parties.54  Those third parties, like banks, regularly gain private information in the 
course of doing business with consumers.  In response to these developments, 
Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) and related statues 
that together embody a compromise between strong statutory protections for 
52 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against Money 
Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 388-
390 (2003)
53
 Regulatory programs enhance law enforcement powers to use surveillance methods, to control 
populations of special interest like immigrants or felons (i.e., preventing them from purchasing 
weapons), and to obtain and analyze financial records.  Cf. id.
54
 See Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, Sec’y of the Treasury, 416 U.S. 21, 47–49, 61 (1974); United 
States v. Miller, 435 U.S. 435 (1976) (focusing on the justifications for the recordkeeping 
requirements).
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financial privacy and law enforcement demands for financial records.55  That 
balance has changed substantially in recent years.
Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, law enforcement officials were 
frustrated by their relative lack of access to financial records.  Sometimes law 
enforcement investigators working on ex post enforcement had a hard time 
actually getting the records of people who were being investigated, because 
defendants did not always tell authorities where they had accounts.  It was harder 
still to get access to financial records of suspects: that required a judicial 
subpoena, which in turn required authorities to figure out where their suspect 
engaged in financial activity and (in most cases) required persons whose records 
were targeted to receive notice and have a chance to oppose the subpoena in 
court.56
Financial institutions had concerns too.  Their representatives insisted that 
they did not know what (if any) information they could share with other financial 
institutions regarding people they considered suspicious, or whether they could 
act on such information (for example) to close the accounts of suspicious people.  
One might wonder why such institutions would be interested in sharing 
information at all.  One possibility is that the prospects of subsequent government 
investigations leading to possible civil or criminal liability, coupled with the 
potential for bad publicity, might give rise to such pressures.  Although the 
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) system already had its own safe harbor 
provision, there were still questions about a financial institutions civil or criminal 
liability if it accepted business that had raised red flags at other financial 
institutions.  Moreover, there was the slight chance that taking on a customer who 
turned out to be using her bank account to engage in criminal financial activity of 
some kind would lead to public embarrassment.  
For all these pre-September 11 frustrations in using financial data to 
advance law enforcement goals, the executive branch could take at least small 
steps to address these concerns.  The FBI circulated a periodic “control list” with 
the names of people considered suspicious, and requested that financial 
institutions subject individuals whose name appeared on the list to heightened 
scrutiny.57  It could use computers to analyze currency transaction records 
collected subject to existing regulatory authorities – but these provide only a tiny 
snapshot of the aggregate financial transactions in the country, the vast majority 
55
 The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422, previously restricted financial 
institutions from disclosing a person’s financial information to the government unless the records 
were disclosed pursuant to a subpoena or a search warrant.  Depending on the details of the 
regulations implementing Section 314(a), then, federal officials might easily sidestep the existing 
restrictions on information disclosure in the RFPA.  The voluntary law enforcement “control list” 
containing names of people considered suspicious did nothing to extinguish the applicability of the 
RFPA in this setting.
56 See infra notes___.
57 See Shane Kite, AML Plans Move to Active Phase, SECURITIES INDUSTRY NEWS, January 6, 
2003.
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of which do not involve physical currency.  Law enforcement bureaucracies could 
also try to expedite the process for obtaining judicial subpoenas for financial 
records of suspected criminals.  If law enforcement agents knew where a suspect 
kept accounts and had enough suspicion, then they could obtain a judicial 
subpoena for her records.58  But there was no enactment of broad statutory 
authority allowing some regulatory agency to prescribe uniform rules governing 
the mass dissemination of a request to all (or most) financial institutions in the 
country.59  Doing a nationwide subpoena was a questionable strategy at best, on 
both legal and practical grounds.60  In fact, efforts to streamline this sort of 
activity raised some warning flags for politicians and outside interest groups.  For 
example, while financial institutions might be interested in further expanding the 
scope of their safe harbors (so they would not have to face liability if they 
voluntarily chose to share information), they were certainly not interested in being 
saddled with further legal obligations to produce financial records.  
What Section 314 of the USA Patriot Act does is to give the Treasury 
Department the authority to encourage information sharing between financial 
institutions and the federal government, and among different financial institutions.  
Section 314(a) establishes authority for Treasury to create rules for the request 
and sharing of financial information between financial institutions and law 
enforcement.61  While subsection (a) addresses the link between financial 
58
 Under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401 et seq. (hereinafter, “RFPA”), such 
a subpoena would ordinarily give notification to the person whose records are requested, as well 
as a chance to fight the subpoena in court.  See generally Laura N. Pringle and Conni L. Allen, 
Privacy and Related Issues for Financial Institutions and Other Regulated Entities, 53 CONSUMER 
FIN. L.Q. REP. 28 (1999).
59
 The impact of such a rule obviously depends on how broadly one defines “financial institution.”  
Although this may seem like a straightforward matter, even the original Bank Secrecy Act gives 
Treasury wide latitude over how to define a financial institution.  See Bank Secrecy Act 
(hereinafter “BSA”), 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312.  The statute gives Treasury the power to define 
“financial institution” to include, among other entities, commercial banks and trust companies, 
private banks, branches of foreign banks in the U.S., investment bankers, insurance companies, 
travel agencies, licensed money transmitters, casinos, or:
any business or agency which engages in any activity which the Secretary of the Treasury 
determines, by regulation, to be an activity which is similar to, related to, or a substitute 
for any activity in which any business described in this paragraph is authorized to engage; 
or any other business designated by the Secretary whose cash transactions have a high 
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters.
60
 Before 2002, there was no nationwide system allowing law enforcement agencies to 
communicate a request for records to all financial institutions in the country, nor any legal 
requirement that financial institutions cooperate with law enforcement authorities in searching 
their records for information.  On the contrary, RFPA established notable restrictions on the 
disclosure of any such information.
61 See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56  (USAPA).  Section 314 of the Act is an 
uncodified provision that appears in the Historical and Statutory Notes to 31 U.S.C. 5311.  Section 
5311 is part of the BSA, and regulations implementing it appear at 31 CFR part 103.  Since the 
authority of the Treasury Secretary to administer the BSA has been delegated to the Director of the 
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institutions and federal authorities, Section 314(b) directs Treasury to develop 
rules for the sharing of information among financial institutions in the interest of 
preventing money laundering or terrorist financing.62  Under the statute, the 
regulations can allow such information-sharing to take place pursuant to a safe-
harbor from legal liability for the institutions sharing the information.63
The potential impact of Section 314(a) starts to emerge clearly if one 
thinks about the rules affecting how federal agents could get their hands on 
records before the legislation.  For the most part, they had to use a subpoena,
which meant federal law enforcement agents needed at least some ex ante 
suspicions about where the suspected wrongdoer might have her records. The 
latter could then be challenged in court, and the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
further provides for the challenge of a request for financial records.64 In contrast, 
Section 314(a) could make it easier for law enforcement to get information from 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), then FinCEN has responsibility for developing 
the regulations under Section 314. Specifically, Section 314(a)(1) provides in part that: 
[T]he Secretary shall… adopt regulations to encourage further cooperation among 
financial institutions, their regulatory authorities, and law enforcement authorities, with 
the specific purpose of encouraging regulatory authorities and law enforcement 
authorities to share with financial institutions information regarding individuals, entities, 
and organizations engaged in or reasonably suspected based on credible evidence of 
engaging in terrorist acts or money laundering activities.  Id.
A fuller picture emerges when we consider what Section 314(a)(2)(C) states:
[The regulations may] include or create procedures for cooperation and information 
focusing on…. Means of facilitating the identification of accounts and transactions 
involving terrorist groups and facilitating the exchange of information concerning such 
accounts and transactions between financial institutions and law enforcement 
organizations.  
Id.
62 Id.
63
 It provides:
Upon notice provided to the Secretary, 2 or more financial institutions and any 
association of financial institutions may share information with one another regarding 
individuals, entities, organizations, and countries suspected of possible terrorist or money 
laundering activities.  A financial institution or association that transmits, receives, or 
shares such information for the purposes of identifying and reporting activities shall not 
be liable to any person under any law or regulation of the United States, any constitution, 
law, or regulation of any State or political subdivision thereof, or under any contract or 
other legally enforceable agreement (including any arbitration agreement), for such 
disclosure or for any failure to provide notice of such disclosure, or any other person 
identified in the disclosure, except where such transmission, receipt, or sharing violates 
this section or regulations promulgated pursuant to this section.
Id.
64 See supra note __ (discussing RFPA).
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any bank in the country.  That authority might be restricted to instances where law 
enforcement bureaucracies certify that the person whose records they want is 
credibly thought to be engaging in money laundering or terrorism,65 but the 
statute does not provide any remedy for a failure in the law enforcement 
certification process.66  In short, Section 314(a) at least authorizes the creation of 
a simple means for law enforcement agents to “tell” banks what accounts to 
scrutinize with particular care.  The payoff from this may be specific information, 
but also an implicit signal to financial institutions about whom they should
scrutinize carefully.  
That signal to scrutinize or deny services to a suspicious customer could 
also originate from a financial institution, but those institutions interested in 
warning their private sector brethren were long concerned about potential legal 
liability for doing so.  So along comes Section 314(b), which gives Treasury the 
regulatory authority to set up a system for financial institutions to share 
information among themselves.67  How much they actually do that obviously 
depends on their incentives.  But in a world where the potential penalty for 
unwittingly providing a haven for terrorist or criminal financial transactions may 
include not only a fine but also public disapproval, one might imagine that 
financial institutions might be interested in sharing information to minimize the 
risk of fallout.  Such motivations might be patriotic or simply a means of 
minimizing economic and political costs.  Either way, those motivations have to 
be adjusted for the risk of liability that a financial institution might face by 
disclosing financial information that would otherwise be private.  Thus we might 
expect financial institutions to do whatever possible to avoid being caught 
65 Section 314(a)(1) explicitly notes that information sharing should only cover people on 
“individuals, entities, and organizations engaged in or reasonably suspected based on credible 
evidence of engaging in terrorist acts or money laundering activities.”  Section 314(2) states that 
information sharing procedures may focus on “matters specifically related to the finances of 
terrorist groups” (Section 314(2)(A)); “the relationship… between international narcotics 
traffickers and foreign terrorist organizations…” (Section 314(2)(B)); or “accounts and 
transactions involving terrorist groups.”  Although someone might argue about the precise extent 
of the preceding list’s restrictions on information disclosure, the most plausible explanation for 
why those apparent limits are in the statute is that legislators wanted to restrict the scope of 
disclosed financial information. 
66
 Cf. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2277 (2002).  Gonzaga concerned 
the privacy interests that people claimed under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 
U.S.C. § 1232g.  A former university student sued under Section 1983, alleging that the university 
had violated his rights under the statute.  The Court held that, absent specific “rights-creating” 
language, a statute did not create an right enforceable under Section 1983 (or through an implied 
right of action).  See id. at 2275.  Even if the statute includes “rights creating” language, the 
plaintiff must show Congress also intended to create a “private remedy.”   Id. at 2276.  There 
might be a theory under which a sufficiently egregious bad faith violation of the details of Section 
314(a)’s limitations might give rise to a constitutional tort.  But that’s at the extreme, and in any 
case it would be difficult for anyone aggrieved to discover the facts necessary to make out such a 
claim (under Bivens).  Anything short of that would have to be resolved by a remedy created 
through the statute (which does not provide for a remedy) or the regulation (which could). 
67 See Section 314(b), supra note 62.
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between government policies encouraging the sharing of information and 
potential liability to customers for having disclosed the information.
Treasury’s own disclosure of its proposed regulations revealed it was 
contemplating the creation of an efficient new mechanism to get law enforcement 
the private financial information it desired, with two major features.68  First, the 
new system would facilitate blanket, nationwide law enforcement queries to 
financial institutions regarding account information of people suspected of being 
involved in money laundering and terrorist financing.69 Upon finding the records 
of the person in question, the financial institution would have to turn over any 
information gleaned from the customer when the account was established, and 
information about transactions made through the account.70  Information requests 
could therefore become quite routine.71  Not that the customer whose requests 
68
 If this seems like a straightforward expression of what the statute “indended,” it’s not self-
evident from perusing the statute’s legislative history.  See Cong. Rec. – Senate, Thursday, 
October 25, 2001 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 147 Cong. Rec. S10990-02, S11008.  The report 
associated with the legislation states (in relevant part) the following:
[The Treasury Secretary has 120 days to promulgate regulations designed] to permit the 
sharing of information by law enforcement and regulatory authorities with such 
institutions regarding persons reasonably suspected, based on credible evidence, of 
engaging in terrorist acts or money laundering activities. This section also allows (with 
notice to the Secretary of the Treasury) the sharing of information among banks 
involving possible terrorist or money laundering activity, and requires the Secretary of 
the Treasury to publish, at least semiannually, a report containing a detailed analysis of 
patterns of suspicious activity and other appropriate investigative insights derived from 
suspicious activity reports and law enforcement investigations.
Id.  Of course it’s hardly obvious that legislative history should determine the scope of regulatory 
innovation when construing a statute.  See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: 
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretation of Statutes, 73 TEX. 
L. REV. 83 (1994); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an It: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L & ECON. 239, 244-48 (1992).  If that history is considered relevant in 
this case, though, it certainly did not compel the agency to fashion the regulatory system that it 
did.  Instead, the agency’s decision in this regard might have reflected subtler forms of pressure 
driven by its interaction with law enforcement agencies that served as both a major source of 
expertise regarding the goals for the regulations and also the primary beneficiaries of the new 
system.
69 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Special Information Sharing Procedures to Deter 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Activity, 67 FED. REG. 9879, avail. at 2002 WL 331533(FR) 
(March 4, 2002) (hereinafter “Section 314 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking”).  The final 
regulations appear at 67 FED. REG. 60579, 60580-82, supra note 2.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 9884.  Specifically, proposed Section 103.100 provides in relevant part as follows:
(b) Requests for information relating to money laundering or terrorist activities.  On 
behalf of a federal law enforcement agency investigating money laundering or terrorist 
activity, FinCEN may require any financial institution to search its records to determine 
whether the financial institution maintains or has maintained accounts for, or has engaged 
in transactions with, any specified individual, entity, or organization.
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would ever know that, because the regulations forbid the requested financial 
institution from communicating the request with the customer.  What the financial 
institution can do is use the information to make a number of decisions on its 
own, such as deciding not to offer banking services to a person.  This could turn 
the provisions of part 103.100 into something like a warning to financial 
institutions not to offer services to someone.  Second, although law enforcement 
authorities must certify that all persons whose account information is requested 
are suspects of terrorism or money laundering, there is no obvious remedy for any 
violation.  As observed earlier, there is no constitutional expectation of privacy in 
records held by a third party.  This means FinCEN and law enforcement agencies 
must police themselves when it comes to the limits of the justification for 
information requests.72
Part 103.110 of the draft regulation then turned to the parallel problem of 
addressing financial institutions’ liability fears.  The regulations establish a legal 
safe harbor for many different types of financial institutions to share information 
among themselves relating to suspected money laundering or terrorist activity.73
To avail themselves of the safe-harbor under the proposed regulation, financial 
institutions had to “certify” to FinCEN that they were going to engage in 
information sharing and that they would not use the information improperly.74
(c) Certification requirement.  Prior to FinCEN requesting information… the federal law 
enforcement agency shall provide FinCEN with a written certification… that each 
individual, entity, or organization about which the agency is seeking information is 
engaged in, or reasonably suspected based on credible evidence of engaging in, money 
laundering or terrorist activity.
No additional certification is required from federal law enforcement agencies, nor do the 
regulations establish any procedures to audit the extent to which law enforcement agencies have a 
basis for suspecting the individuals, entities, or organizations in question.  Subsequent portions of 
the proposed Section 103.100 provide that the financial institution must provide FinCEN with, 
among other things, all identifying information used by the account holder to establish the 
account, and information involving transactions connected to the account.  Id.
72 The absence of a remedy means no one else will have much of a chance to discipline anyone in 
government who abuses Section 103.100 by making unjustified requests for information.  See 
supra note 66 (discussing Gonzaga).  Note that in Gonzaga, the presumption of a remedy would 
have been even stronger since the alleged violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA) was committed by a state government, thereby making § 1983 applicable at least in 
principle.  Since that would not be applicable here, then the only remaining route is a Bivens
action. 
73 See Section 314 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, at 9885.  The Section 103.110 proposal states, 
in relevant part that:
…[a] financial institution or association of financial institutions that engages in the 
sharing of nformation pursuant to this section shall not be liable to any person under any 
law or regulation of the United States, under any constitution, law, or regulation of any 
State or political subdivision thereof, or under any contract or other legally enforceable 
agreement…
74 Id.
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The final regulations were published in the Federal Register after the 
required notice and comment period.75  The revised regulations looked a lot like 
the original ones.  But they involved a few changes, including reorganization for 
“clarity,”76 slight restrictions in the scope of financial institutions’ responsibilities 
to search for records77 when receiving a federal request,78 greater liability 
protections for financial institutions sharing information,79 and easier means of 
triggering the liability protections.80
Together the original and modified provisions in Treasury’s regulations 
created a system where federal law enforcement could easily pinpoint where 
many individuals have financial accounts, and obtain crucial private information 
about such accounts, such as information about the individuals or entities 
transacting with the owner of the account.  But while Section 314 conferred 
considerable legal responsibilities on Treasury’s FinCEN bureau, it stopped well 
short of compelling the agency to create the system it did.  In fact, though 
Treasury possessed considerable discretion to shape the new system, it held no 
public hearings, nor did it make any systematic effort to assess the reactions of 
laypersons or experts not directly affiliated with an interested party.  Nor did 
legislators appear to make any intervention.
Figure 1
Distribution of Comments on the Financial Privacy Regulation, by Type 
(N=172)
75 See APA § 553 et seq.
76
 The regulations (especially 103.100) were reorganized for clarity.  Specifically, financial 
institutions’ obligations to provide information under Section 314 are now grouped in a single 
paragraph.  See Section 314 Final Rule Statement, supra note __, at 60580.
77
 The regulations added some default rules restricting the scope of what a financial institution 
would have to provide when receiving a request from the government, unless a request specifically 
provides otherwise. There are two default rules.  One default rule says a financial institution only
needs to search its records for current accounts or accounts held during the last twelve months, or 
transactions taking place during the preceding six months.  Another default rule says that financial 
institutions need not report a customer’s future activity unless the information request from law 
enforcement (emanating through FinCEN) specifically asks for such future information.  See Id.
78 See Id. The final regulations also expand the kinds of financial institutions that can share 
information and avoid liability for doing so. The new regulation encompasses all financial 
institutions that are required to maintain an “anti-money laundering” program (which turns out to 
be a lot more than, for example, commercial banks), unless FinCEN specifically “determines that 
a particular category of financial institution should not be eligible to share information under this 
provision.  Note that this means the regulations imply that law enforcement may use FinCEN to 
make a request for future information, because a default nature by its own terms can be altered.     
79 See id.
80
 The final regulations streamline the certification process, through which financial institutions 
opt-in to the information-sharing program. Under the final regulation, the requirement is simply 
that financial institutions provide FinCEN with notice that they will be engaged in information 
sharing (and there is no way to revoke this), and that they make reasonable efforts to establish if a 
financial institution with which they are sharing information has also given FinCEN adequate 
notice.Id.
RETHINKING REGULATORY DEMOCRACY22
1 .2%
7 2 .1%
1 4 .0 %
1 2 .8 %
Uno fficia l or g
Ind ividual
Bus ine ss
Bus  o rg / la w
 
Instead the primary mechanism on which the agency relied to gauge 
public reactions was the regulatory notice-and-comment process.  Figure 1 shows 
the distribution of commenters, and Table 1 reveals a breakdown of the different 
commenters’ concerns, and sophistication.81 The table shows, among other things, 
that not a single mass membership or “public interest” organization concerned 
about privacy participated in the process.  While over 70% of the comments came 
from individuals – and the vast majority of such comments focused on concerns 
about privacy -- these comments proved to be tremendously unsophisticated.  Few 
of them recognized the distinction between the regulation and the statute, and 
only a meager number offered anything remotely resembling a concrete proposal. 
Instead, individual commenters came across as being angry and exasperated at 
what they viewed as unjustified changes in government’s access to private 
financial information.  The following is a typical comment from among those 
submitted by individual members of the public. 
Privacy is a Constitutional right, why should we the people have any more 
rights removed.  This act means the terrorist [sic] win.  You have all the 
necessary instruments in place to follow the terrorist actions now.82
81 See Appendix, infra, for a discussion of how I measured the key variables.
82
 Section 314 Comments, supra note ___, comment # 45.  The commenter continues:
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So while the individual comments raised concerns about privacy and government 
accountability, there was no mention of providing sunsets for the regulation, 
building in reporting mechanisms to oversee the law enforcement agencies 
making the information requests, or providing remedies to people whose records 
turned out to be improperly obtained or used.
Table 1
Financial Privacy Comments (N = 172)
Commenter type Individual Unofficial 
association
Public membership 
or “public interest” 
organization
Business Business 
association or law 
firm representing 
business
Comment Concerns
(by percent of comments raising each concern)
Law enforcement 
objectives 12.9 100
--
36.5 30.2
Legal safe harbor 
for financial 
institutions 0 0
--
58.3 40.9
Administrative cost 
associated with the 
regulation .8 0
--
79.2 63.6
Technical drafting
changes to simplify 
the regulation
2.4 0
--
79.2 77.3
Privacy 92.7 100 -- 12.5 18.2
Comment Characteristics
Average comment 
sophistication .12 1 -- 3.13 3.27
Average length 1.12 1.5 -- 4.25 4.41
Average number of 
suggestions made 
by commenter 
adopted by agency
.01  0 -- 1.88 1.68
Given the degree of concerns about privacy raised by the vast majority of 
the commenters, it’s interesting to note what the agency did not do. It did not 
impose an audit system to assess the extent to which law enforcement requests for 
This is still one nation under God.  How about we do t his, how about we repent and get 
some super help from him.  I guarantee you he knows exactly who’s guilty and whose 
[sic] innocent and where they are.
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information under Section 314 actually lived up to the statutory focus on accounts 
where authorities have “reasonable suspicion” of terrorism or money laundering 
“on credible evidence.”  It did not impose a sunset clause on the regulation to 
evaluate the system’s effectiveness or the danger of unauthorized disclosures.  
Neither did the agency create some scheme to police the law enforcement 
authorities’ information once they acquired it, or to address instances where 
authorities improperly used or disclosed information acquired through Section 
314.  In short, the agency appears not to have incorporated mechanisms to review 
the extent to which the information disclosed to authorities actually was the sort 
of information that the statute wanted to “encourage” banks to share.  The 
agency’s own statement of the basis and purpose for the rule in the Federal 
Register did not even address this matter.83
ii. The Federal Election Commission: Modifying Public Financing of 
Presidential Elections and Nominating Conventions 
Less than a dozen miles from FinCEN’s modern office in Virginia’s 
bustling Tysons Corner is the headquarters of the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC).  Every presidential election since 1976 has been financed in part with 
public funds from a program run by the FEC.84  As part of the public financing 
program the federal government (through the FEC) also helps fund presidential 
nominating conventions.  The FEC signs checks going to campaigns and party 
convention committees, but it also writes regulatory rules governing this public 
financing system.85  The rules – often complex and technical – set spending limits 
for primary and general election campaigns.  The bulk of the rules, however, 
govern matters such as permissible expenses for primary and general election 
campaigns, how they can raise transfer money, how nominating conventions are 
financed, and whether federal candidates and officeholders can raise money for 
conventions.  The regulations even address the decidedly nit-picky question of 
whether a major party presidential candidate who is no longer eligible for the 
nomination can use campaign funds for their own convention expenses.  The 
Commission enforces the regulations by collecting reports from campaign 
committees and parties.  The enforcement staff also conduct audits, and prepare a 
report highlighting policy issues that the commission can address in revisions of 
its regulations to coincide with the quadrennial presidential election cycle.  The 
most recent such cycle was further complicated by passage of the Bipartisan 
83 See id.
84
 A public funding law was passed in 1966 but later repealed.  Shortly thereafter, in 1971, 
Congress approved the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, 2 US.C. §§ 431-455, and 
specialized statutes setting up a public financing system for presidential campaigns. See
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (PECFA), codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013; 
Presidential Matching Payment Account Act (PMPAA), codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042 
(2000).  It was not until 1974 that the system was implemented along with its spending limits.
85 See id.
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Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA), which contained, among other things, 
various reporting requirements that were obviously relevant to the public 
financing scheme along with others that could be (but were not obviously) 
relevant.86
For years the public financing system has worked as follows.  The FEC 
gets money from taxpayers who check off the option for providing funds from 
their tax payments.87  The agency then makes certain funds available to 
presidential campaigns by matching some proportion of contributions raised from 
the public.88  General election candidates also obtain funds in proportion to the 
party’s support in previous elections.  In exchange for these funds campaigns are 
subjected to a tangle of rules about matters such as how much can be spent on 
winding down a campaign committee’s operations,89 or on gifts to staff,90 to how 
a candidate and her retinue pay for a trip to a nominating convention.  Major party 
conventions themselves get public funding too.  Rules governing convention 
funding affect both committees established and controlled by the parties, but also 
the funds that can be provided by “host committees” set up by local businesses 
and “municipal funds” channeling support from local governments.91  Together 
86 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
(March 27, 2002).  Briefly, BCRA changed two important aspects of federal campaign finance 
laws.  First, the act eliminated a category of funds known as “soft money,” which refers to 
financial resources raised by the parties, without limits on the size of contributions, and directly 
from the treasuries of corporations and organizations.  Second, the act regulated “issue ads” –
advertisements aired by corporations, union, and other organizations that may feature a federal 
candidate but do not expressly advocate election of that candidate.  BCRA prohibits airing of such 
ads within thirty days of a primary election and sixty days of a general election.  These broad 
changes were achieved through a complex statutory scheme making a number of changes in 
federal election law and vesting the FEC with considerable regulatory authority to further 
delineate the scope of legal concepts crucial to the statute’s core objectives.  See Stephen 
Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, The End of Soft Money and Issue Advertising, 14 POLITICAL 
COMMUNICATION REP’T: INT’L COMM. ASS’N & AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N (Spring 2004).  Because of 
the statute’s complexity and objectives, some observers and advocacy organizations indicated that 
BCRA’s provisions restricting contributions to political parties might have a considerable effect 
on fundraising practices associated with major party nominating conventions.  These potentially 
affected practices included the raising of large sums of money by local host committees and 
municipal funds trying to support the convention, or the participation of federal candidates in 
raising money for host and municipal committees.
87 See PECFA and PMPAA, supra
88
 To the extent that the statutory framework that gave rise to these regulations embodies a 
coherent theoretical justification, it appears to be grounded in the goal of reducing the need for 
campaigns to spend time and resources raising contributions.  At the same time, one element of 
the scheme stands in some tension with this purpose: the FEC payments to campaigns match only 
smaller contributions. 
89 See FEC Proposed Rules, supra note___, at 18484.  See also Final Rules: Public Financing of 
Presidential Candidates and Nominating Conventions, 68 FED. REG. 47386, 47389 (August 8, 
2003).
90 See FEC Proposed Rules, supra note___, at 18491.  See also FEC Final Rules, supra note___, at 
47390.
91 See 26 U.S.C. § 9008(b).  See also FEC Proposed Rules, supra note___, at 18500.
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these rules affect how candidates and conventions are funded, and how campaigns 
are conducted.  Every election cycle the FEC considers adjusting these rules 
primarily on the basis of the experience of its staff in conducting audits, its policy 
priorities, and any statutory changes.92
It is in this environment that the FEC issued a notice of proposed 
rulemaking indicating the possibility this particular set of regulations.  After 
public comments and testimony, the NPRM was followed by a final regulation 
approved by the Commission.  The new regulation made a number of changes to 
the proposal, particularly in the technical rules governing the process of spending 
and accounting for public funds spent on financing presidential campaigns.  The 
regulations also reflected the FEC’s decision to accept various legal 
interpretations limiting the applicability of BCRA to the financing of nominating 
conventions, and to modify even the rules in the NPRM to make that financing 
process more permissive.93  The Commission even decided to eliminate the 
requirement that convention-related host committees not controlled directly by the 
parties raise money only from individuals and businesses residing in the city 
where the convention would be held.
Together the different provisions of the new regulation created a system 
with minor changes for the financing of campaigns and more substantial ones for 
convention financing.  Among other things, the rules allowed convention-related 
host committees and municipal funds to raise unlimited amounts of money from 
any source (with no geographic limitations), and with federal officeholders and 
candidates able to help raise that money.  The Commission approved these 
regulations despite BCRA’s restriction on unlimited “soft” money donations for 
entities controlled by parties.  This result depended on defining host committees 
and municipal funds so that they’re beyond the reach of BCRA authority.  This is 
certainly a plausible reading of the law, but (by the Commission’s own 
admission) far from the only such reading.94  Indeed, in its own NPRM the FEC 
92 See FEC Lawyer Interview # 1, FEC Lawyer Interview # 2.
93 See, e.g., FEC Final Rules, supra note ___ at 47398.  There the Commission notes it sought 
comment on whether BCRA required limits on convention fundraising as follows:
The Commission also sought comment on whether BCRA requires that the list of 
permissible host committee and municipal fund expenses in former 11 CFR 9008.52 must 
be modified to ensure that convention committees will not receive “a contribution, 
donation or transfer of funds or any other thing of value… that are not subject to the 
limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of [FECA].
Id.  The Commission concluded that “none of the proposed changes” to the rules governing 
convention fundraising “are required by BCRA.”  Id.
94 At a minimum, the regulations could have established more elaborate reporting requirements (or 
perhaps even restrictions) on the funds raised by host committees for nominating conventions, as 
well as disclosure requirements governing the financing of events to host or honor politicians and 
party officials in connection with (and in proximity to) convention sites.  Moreover, nearly every 
aspect of the rules governing presidential campaigns contained in the regulation (from whether 
defeated presidential candidates can pay for their convention attendance expenses from campaign 
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repeatedly emphasized its own uncertainty about how to interpret BCRA and how 
to reform the existing rules more generally.95
Figure 2
Distribution of Comments on the Campaign Finance Regulation, by Type 
(N=1121)
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What, then, did commenters have to say about how the FEC should use its 
discretion?  Figure 2 gives a snapshot of public participation here, and Table 2 
reports comment characteristics. The FEC received about 20 extremely detailed 
comments from law firms, members of Congress, large membership organizations 
concerned with the “public interest,” and other interested parties – nearly all 
demonstrating some extent of mastery and sophistication that tended to exceed the 
degree of sophistication shown in comments for the other proceedings.  Many of 
these participants also had a chance to raise concerns in a public hearing before 
the FEC, though only a small number of interested parties did so.  Yet again, 
funds to how long a campaign can finance its winding down costs from public funds) are the result 
of discretionary applications of agency authority, rather than explicit statutory constraints. 
95 See FEC Proposed Rules, supra note___ at 18484.  There the Commission acknowledges that:
The proposed rules… reflect the Commission’s experience in administering [the public 
financing] program during the 2000 election cycle and seek to anticipate some questions 
that may arise during the 2004 presidential election cycle.  No final decisions have been 
made by the Commission on any of the proposed revisions in this document.
Id.
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though, the vast majority of comments here came from the public, which 
submitted over 1000 unsophisticated form letters criticizing the proposed rules for 
funding nominating conventions (which allowed for greater private contributions 
than these participations would have liked) – thereby raising a concern that does 
not appear to have been central to any interest group or sophisticated party who 
participated.  A handful of members of the lay public also submitted comments, in 
some cases (but not always) raising concerns covered by the membership 
organizations.96  The FEC made some changes to the proposal but did not fully 
address the concerns of the members of the participating lay public.  As with the 
previous case study, more sophisticated comments were more likely to end up 
containing suggested changes that the agency chose to make in its proposed rules.  
In fact, sophistication appeared to have a statistically-significant effect on 
comment “influence” even when controlling for certain commenter 
characteristics, such as whether the commenter represented one of the primary 
targets of regulation (i.e., a political party, committee, or candidate).
Table 2
Campaign Finance Comments (N = 1119)
Commenter type Individual Local 
organization 
or 
government
Law firm or 
business
Political party 
or affiliate
Public 
membership or 
“public 
interest” 
organization
Politician or 
his/her 
representative
96
 Here is an example of a concern raised by one of the more sophisticated individual member of 
the public that was not echoed by any organized interest:
Although I feel strongly about supporting candidates for the presidency and vice-
presidency with public funds, I do not feel that certain expenditures are justified as 
qualified campaign expenditures…  I am not unmindful that a policy of publicly funding 
of [sic] a candidate’s salary would perhaps encourage candidates of modest means to run 
for the presidency.  However, I feel this policy is too unlikely to have its intended effect, 
while at the same time creating the potential for abuse and litigation… Furthermore, I 
feel from conversations with others that the public is likely to see such a rule as 
promoting the personal gain of a candidate, at the expense of the public, for no service 
rendered but job-seeking.  It is possible that negative public perception of such a rule 
would call into question the legitimacy of any public funding of campaigns.
FEC Public Financing Comment # 9.   Meanwhile, the following comment offers an example of a 
comment from an individual raising a concern that organized interests did raise in the course of 
their own, more sophisticated comments:
Now that Congress has banned corporate funding for national political parties, the FEC 
should rule that this ban applies to convention funding as well.  To rule otherwise would 
open a huge loophole into the new soft money regulations that were explicitly intended to 
break the link between officeholders and large contributions.
FEC Public Financing Comment # 11.
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Comment Concerns
(by percent of comments raising each concern)
Legitimacy of the 
campaign finance 
system
99.5 0 50 0 100 0
Importance of 
regulating host 
committees
0 0 0 0 100 0
Importance of 
increasing overall 
convention 
regulation 0 0 0 0 50 0
Value of decreasing 
overall convention 
regulation
0 100 0 100 25 100
Clarifying the scope 
of the regulation .1 0 50 40 75 50
Administrative costs 
of the regulation 0 100 100 80 0 50
Importance of 
flexibility in funding 
conventions 0 100 0 100 0 100
Reducing corporate 
influence 99.8 0 0 0 100 0
Comment Characteristics
Average comment 
sophistication 1 4 3.5 4.4 3.75 4
Average length 1 8.5 13 8 14 3
Average number of 
suggestions made 
by commenter 
adopted by agency
0 3 2 2.8 1 2.5
The upshot here is that most of the unsophisticated public comments 
advocated restrictions on the flow of money to conventions.  These tended to 
come (more so than for the financial privacy or the nuclear licensing regulations) 
in unsophisticated form letters.  The Commission addressed the concerns only in 
passing in the final rule,97 and allowed for a virtually unregulated flow of money 
97 See FEC Final Rules, supra note___, at 47402 (“More than 1,100 timely, essentially identical 
comments that the Commission received by e-email expressed support for the use of tax dollars to 
fund party conventions ‘precisely so that parties may turn away from other sources of 
inappropriate funds’”).  The Commission then discusses the text and structure of BCRA to 
conclude that, at least, it retains discretion not to regulate convention fundraising as the majority 
of commenters would have liked, and cites the canonical case of Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 
366 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(a Chevron precursor) for the proposition that reviewing courts have an 
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to host committees and municipal funds defraying the cost of conventions.  On the 
other hand, the Commission appears to have responded to a number of 
sophisticated comments, including some that came from laypeople.  This matches 
what some of the agency lawyers themselves note – which is that sophisticated 
comments are useful to them regardless of their origin.98
iii.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Scaling Back Formal   
                 Adjudication in the Licensing of Civilian Nuclear Technologies
No energy source inspires as much controversy as nuclear power, and by 
consequence so too does controversy envelop the process of approving civilian 
uses for it.99  Given its pregnant and ambiguous history, the use of nuclear power 
implicates a host of competing concerns for both government decisionmakers and 
their fragmented constituencies.100  Some erstwhile observers of nuclear power’s 
uncertain journey since it was first harnessed in 1945 have described it as fertile 
resource replete with peaceful applications, marred only by the nettlesome waste 
disposal problem.  Others pervasively fear it. 
In 1975, the newly formed Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued 
the first of many statements emphasizing the value of public participation in its 
adjudicatory process.  The Commission noted that the public’s participation in its 
decisions was  “vital ingredient” to assure the NRC carried out its responsibility 
to protect public safety.101  These observations were understandable given the 
trade-offs involved in the statutes governing the civilian use of nuclear power: the 
nascent nuclear industry gained protection from liability through the application 
of the Anderson-Price Act and preemption of any local or state regulation, and 
members of the public (such as those who would be living close to a nuclear 
power plant) who would be likely opponents of the use of nuclear technologies 
would benefit from elaborate formal hearing procedures imposed through 
statutory and regulatory requirements to govern most licensing decisions 
obligation to defer to reasonable agency interpretations even when other sound interpretations are 
possible.
98 See FEC Lawyer Interview #1 (Washington, DC).
99
 For a discussion of how that controversy affects individual members of the public’s perceptions 
of nuclear risk, see Tonya L. Putnam, Communicatinng Nuclear Risk: Informing the Public About 
the Risks and Realities of Nuclear Terrorism, STANFORD CENTER FOR INT’L SECURITY AND 
COOPERATION: WORKSHOP REP’T (Oct. 2002).
100 Among others, these considerations probably include the political and economic interplay 
between civilian and military uses of nuclear power (a concern likely to loom large for those with 
strong views disfavoring the use of nuclear technology in the military sphere), the impact of 
nuclear power use on discrete economic interests (including those of utility companies, fossil fuel 
providers, and manufacturers of complements of nuclear technology), the financial costs and 
benefits of nuclear power for consumers, the strategic implications of civilian use of nuclear 
power for energy independence, the impact of nuclear waste and pollution, and the environmental 
consequences of alternative energy sources.
101 See Northern States Power Company, 1 NRC 1, 2 (1975).
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involving civilian nuclear power.  Thus the construction of a new power plant, the 
permission to operate it, and the use of nuclear materials in other civilian 
technologies were for decades all privileges conditioned on the outcome of 
elaborate trial-type hearings where the NRC could evaluate the economic, 
environmental and public safety implications of granting a license.102  Many of 
those trial-type hearings for license grants and renewals, governed under Subpart 
G of longstanding agency regulations, allowed for formal cross-examination of 
witnesses before an impartial presiding officer.  The hearings, in turn, provided 
considerable opportunities for public safety advocates, environmental groups, and 
other members of the public to participate in proceedings as intervenors.103
Over time the NRC came to emphasize that those hearing procedures had 
costs as well as benefits.104  “Commission experience suggested,” noted the 
regulatory agency in a recent statement, “that in most instances, the use of formal 
adjudicatory procedures is not essential to the development of an adequate 
hearing record; yet all too frequently their use resulted in protracted, costly 
proceedings.”105  Despite some initial reforms in 1989 to reduce the formality and 
procedural burden of obtaining a license, the agency continued to believe that 
licensing proceedings took too long and that the trial-type hearing procedures 
contributed little relative to their financial and administrative cost.106  In light of 
these concerns, the most recent iteration of the agency’s reform of its licensing 
process reached an important milestone in 2001, when NRC issued a notice of 
proposed rulemaking announcing its intent to make considerable changes in the 
licensing process for civilian use of nuclear power.  The NRC’s interest in 
“streamlining” the licensing process was probably driven at least in part by a 
perception that questions about the disposition of nuclear waste, which had helped 
stall interest in the development of nuclear power plants for decades, were about 
to be resolved.107  The licensing process is governed by the Administrative 
102
 The key statute here is the Atomeic Energy Act of 1954, the history and structure of which the 
NRC discusses in its decision in Kerr McGee Corporation (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), 
CLI-82-2, 15 NRC 232 (1982).  
103 See NRC Proposed Rule, infra note___, at ___.  The subject of external funding for intervenors 
has produced some controversy, but in recent years a statute has explicitly disallowed it in the 
NRC context.
104 See Final NRC Adjudicatory Changes Rule, supra note__, at __.
105 See Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Changes to Adjudicatory Process (Proposed Rule), 66 
FED. REG. 19610, 19610 (2001) (“NRC Proposed Rule”).
106 See id. at 19610-11.  In articulating these concerns, the agency accepted a baseline presumption 
that additional licenses for civilian uses of nuclear power would likely be requested in the future 
and that the costs of adjudicating those applications should be cut.  See id. at 1611:
Given [the Commission’s] experience, and with the potential for new proceedings in the 
next few years to consider applications for new facilities, to renew reactor operating 
licenses, to reflect restructuring in the electric utility industry, and to license waste 
storage facilities, the Commission concluded it needs to reassess its hearing process to 
identify improvements that will result in a better use of all participants’ limited resources.
107 See Nuclear Energy Inst. V. EPA, No. 01-1258, slip op. (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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Procedure Act and the Atomic Energy Act – both of which leave the NRC with 
some discretion to decide precisely how licenses will be issued.  Since the early 
development of industrial applications of nuclear power, the licensing had 
basically epitomized formal quasi-adjudication, with all the associated procedural 
safeguards and limitations on decisionmaking, as well as substantial opportunities 
for outside interested parties (including environmental groups) to have their say.  
After a public hearing process, the NRC issued a new proposed regulatory rule 
designed to make the new licensing process more informal, streamlined, cheaper, 
and (probably) quicker.108  The proposed rule then proceeded to make a number 
of major changes in licensing resulting in the substantial elimination of formal 
licensing proceedings with oral hearings, and restrictions in the procedures 
allowing outside advocacy groups to join proceedings as intervenors.109
As with the regulations involving financial privacy and campaign finance, 
the final rule here kept the same basic structure and purpose but included a 
number of specific changes.  (1) The final rule imposes still further restrictions on 
the most formal adjudication for licenses (those resolved under the elaborate trial-
type procedures governed by “Subpart G” of the original regulation).  This 
eliminates discovery and cross-examination for licensing proceedings.The final 
rule restricts trial-type hearings to instances where the NRC concludes that oral 
hearings would be materially helpful in the resolution of contested issues of fact.  
(2) The new rules also make changes in service rules for participants in hearings.  
(3) Changes in rules to be an intervenor in hearings, and minor adjustments in the 
requirements for raising a contention during the hearing (i.e., a bit more time).  (4) 
Other technical changes were made, including some that had no material bearing 
on the availability of formal procedures.  Overall, as with the financial privacy 
and the campaign finance regulations, the NRC’s reading of the law was plausible 
but not the only reasonable approach.  The NRC’s own legal analysis of the 
AEA’s requirements for licensing procedures only establishes that its core statute 
108
 The agency’s proposed rule covered hearing procedures for most of the agency’s functions, but 
not for the licensing of nuclear waste repositories under 10 CFR Subpart J.  The agency believed 
that watering down the formality of licensing procedures for nuclear waste repositories would 
probably “engender substantial opposition” and “a very negative reaction.”  This prompted one 
individual member of the public (displaying relatively greater sophistication than most other 
individual commenters who opposed the new regulations) to write that:
Ironically, the NRC has chosen to ignore the same process concerns and eroding public 
confidence in expediting its approval process to generate more nuclear waste through fast 
track reactor licensing.  The NRC needs to understand that its reactor licensing proposals 
will cause the very “substantial opposition” and “very negative reaction” it is trying to 
avoid.
NRC Adjudicatory Change Comment # 885-0008.
109
 Changes affected the Subpart C hearing selection process, largely eviscerated Subpart G 
hearings (formal proceedings), and made additional changes in Subpart K (irradiated fuel storage 
expansion), L (informal hearings), M (license transfer), or N (“fast track” procedures).  See NRC 
Final Regulations, supra note__.
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does not require the use of formal, trial-type hearings for licensing, thereby 
leaving it with considerable discretion to choose licensing procedures.110   Due 
process doctrine also sets constraints on the NRC’s discretion to shape its internal 
licensing procedures,111 but courts are unlikely to find that the final rules breach 
the limits of that doctrine.112
Figure 3
Distribution of Comments on the Nuclear Licensing Regulation, by Type 
(N=1431)
110 See id. at 19611.  The NRC’s Office of the General Counsel opined that the key statute at issue 
(the Atomic Energy Act) allowed the agency considerable flexibility in deciding how to run any 
licensing process except in narrow circumstances:
OGC reached the conclusion that except for a very limited set of hearings – those 
associated with the licensing of uranium enrichment facilities – the Atomic Energy Act 
did not mandate the use of a “formal on-the-record” hearing within the meaning of the 
APA, 5 U.S.C. 552, 556, and 557, and that the Commission enjoyed substantial latitute in 
devising suitable haring processes that would accommodate the due process rights of 
participants. 
Id.
Not surprisingly, comments from public advocacy organizations contested this analysis, arguing 
that the AEA and the legislative compromise that created it reflect a presumption (though perhaps 
somewhat implicitly) in favor of more procedurally complex tria-type procedures for licensing, 
particularly when it came to licenses for new reactors.  See NRC Adjudicatory Change Comment 
# ___ (Rochelle Becker).
111
 For example, such problems would arise if the NRC provided no rights of intervention in 
licensing hearings to people who might end up living a close distance from a nuclear power plant.  
See United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); Mathews v. Eldridge, 426 U.S. 
319 (1976).
112
 This is a point that the more sophisticated commenters opposing the new regulations also 
contested vigorously. 
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As Figure 3 shows, the NRC’s proposed regulatory changes led to an 
outpouring of public comments, the vast majority from laypeople against the 
move to curtail hearings.  In its Federal Register analysis accompanying the final 
rule, the NRC itself provided unusually extensive commentary and discussion of 
many of the concerns raised by commenters.  Even in such a detailed statement, 
though, the NRC’s discussion of why it rejected the commenters’ concerns about 
more informal procedures was a bit more cursory than its discussion of technical 
changes commenters requested.113  While most of the public comments came in 
simple form letters, a few laypeople took the time to articulate more sophisticated 
concerns about restrictions on formal adjudication, emphasizing the impact of oral 
113
 The Federal Register analysis notes:
In general, all of the private individual commenter and citizen groups opposed the move 
away from the full panoply of hearing procedures in Subpart G [governing the most 
formal type of hearings] and the expanded use of more-informal hearing procedures 
reflected in the proposed Subparts L, M, and N.  Two citizen group commenters argued 
that the Commission’s proposal to expand the use of more-informal hearing procedures in 
Subpart L instead of the full panoply of Subpart G hearing procedures in nuclear power 
plant licensing proceedings was in violation of the AEA [Atomic Energy Act] and APA 
[Administrative Procedure Act]…  In [the commenters’] view, “deformalizing” public 
participation in the decision-making process to generate more HLW [high-level waste] 
through license extensions, new licenses, and amendments essentially eliminates the time 
needed for public awareness and involvement.
Fed. Reg. Vol. 69, No. 9 (Wednesday, January 14, 2004), at 2192.
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hearings on galvanizing public attention and facilitating review of proposed 
licenses.114  Other comments from interest groups and the private sector 
emphasized the administrative problems with hearings and the legal flexibility to 
do without them.  Beyond the minor changes to the NPRM rules that the NRC 
made (discussed above), the bulk of the regulations remained the same.  As with 
the campaign finance and the financial privacy regulations, comments from the 
lay public mostly showed relatively meager sophistication.  Nonetheless, Table 3 
shows how a number of mass membership and “public interest” organizations 
participated in this rulemaking proceeding and raised some of the same concerns 
that the individual commenters did.
Table 3
Nuclear Regulation Comments (N = 1431)
Commenter type Individual Business Business 
organization/ law 
firm representing 
business
Public membership 
or “public interest” 
organization
Unofficial group
Comment Concerns
(by percent of comments raising each concern)
Legitimacy of the 
Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission 5 66.7 75 100 20
Facilitating energy 
access 0 100 75 0 0
Protecting the 
environment, 
health, and safety 9.7 0 50 50 90
Vale of hearings for 
involving the public
100 0 50 100 100
Overall efficiency of 
the regulatory 
process .6 100 100 0 80
Comment Characteristics
Average comment 
sophistication 2 4.67 5 4 3.8
Average length 1.02 9.67 16.25 10.88 2.6
Average number of 
suggestions by 
commenter adopted 
by agency .02 3 3.75 .5 1.7
114 See NRC Adjudicatory Change Comment # ____.
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To summarize:  the agency received well over a thousand comments, the 
vast majority from members of the lay public, expressing concern about the 
cutbacks in the use of formal adjudication.  Although many such comments were 
form letters, both those letters and other comments from individuals raised 
concerns that were proper for the agency to consider given its legal mandate.  The 
nuclear industry raised concerns and made specific recommendations to make the 
licensing process more permissive.  The agency accepted nearly all of these.  
Otherwise the regulations remained much as they were in the NPRM.  If and 
when regulators, courts, and representative politicians reserve ambiguities about 
nuclear waste disposal,115 the licensing changes should make it easier to obtain 
and renew licenses for commercial uses of nuclear power.
B.  Comparing Participation Across Regulatory Domains
My analysis shows both striking similarity and variation in participation 
across these different regulatory domains.  Table 4 summarizes some of both.116
The most salient similarity is in the existing institutions of regulatory democracy.  
Participation is handled exclusively through demand-driven procedures that 
gather input from people who have already decided they’re interested.  This 
certainly applies to the public hearings conducted by the FEC and NRC in 
connection with their regulations.117  It applies to any potential effort )not present 
in these case studies) to influence regulators through the legislature.  And it 
certainly applies to the notice-and-comment process that has become the 
paradigmatic example of modern regulatory democracy.  Despite the reliance on 
demand-driven procedures, comments from individual members of the public 
account for the vast majority of all he public input received.  Even when form 
115 See Nuclear Energy Inst., supra note___.
116
 My description of the regulatory process and the public reactions to it brings up the question of 
why government lawyers, analysts, and their political superiors would care about public input at 
all under the current system. Obviously outside input has the potential to enhance the agency’s 
application of expert, technical knowledge.  The agency also gains some insight into the political 
viability of its regulatory proposals, in all likelihood anticipating some responses and 
incorporating them into the initial notice of proposed rulemaking, and at other times gauging 
reaction by the public feedback.  No doubt the agency would be especially concerned about 
feedback from established interest groups and private interests (interest groups).  These can claim 
expertise.  They have the political power to which the agency’s political overseers in the executive 
and legislative branches respond.  And interest group driven litigation can frustrate the agency’s 
agenda.  That threat of litigation can have an impact on the agency’s concern with participation 
because of doctrines emphasizing the agency’s responsibility to respond to important concerns 
raised in public comments.
117
 Sometimes agencies supplement regular notice and comment proceedings with public hearings, 
though these reflect the notice and comment process’ complete bias toward people who decide on
their own to find out about the regulatory proceeding and who choose to participate.  That’s what 
the NRC did in this context.  See NRC Proposed Rules, supra note___, at ___.
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letters are excluded, comments from individual members of the lay public account 
for over 70% of comments in two out of the three regulations.
Moreover, these comments from laypersons -- though overwhelmingly 
unsophisticated -- nearly all raised concerns that were (or should have been) 
legally important to the agency.  By important, I mean that the comments raise 
issues that are legally relevant given the agency’s statutory mandate; and the 
concerns are normatively hard to dismiss (at least from a sort of democratic 
theory, or majoritarian deliberation perspective).118  In all the cases I examined, 
the law gave the agency enough discretion to take the rules in a different direction 
than it did – one that might have grappled more with the concerns raised by the 
comments from laypeople.  Indeed, it’s at least plausible that an agency analyzing 
such comments yet facing lower costs in deciphering the unsophisticated public 
comments might justify its decisions differently, and perhaps might even decide 
differently.
Moreover, sophistication appears to make a difference in the extent to 
which the agencies are able to take comments seriously.  Lawyers at two of the 
three agencies mentioned this in my interviews with them.  It’s also borne out in 
some preliminary data analysis of the impact of comment sophistication on 
predictions of when the agency will accept specific recommendations made by the 
commenters.119  At the least, my data counsel against dismissing the possibility –
consistent with agency lawyers’ own accounts – that agencies have a harder time 
assimilating, considering, and responding to individual commenters from the 
larger public because of deficits in sophistication.  This is also consistent with 
plausible theories of agencies’ internal organization and the incentives of agency 
staff.120
Sharp differences exist, meanwhile, in the number of comments a 
regulation attracts.  Sharp differences also emerge in the role of mass membership 
118
 This bears some additional explanation.  My standard of legal relevance is grounded not in the 
idea that the agency is obligated to write the regulation by prioritizing the concerns in question, 
but that the agency is at least in a position to write regulations that take into account the types of 
concerns in question.  Sometimes outside constituencies – or the agency itself – may be tempted to 
take into account considerations that are beyond the scope of the statute in question.  This malady 
may invalidate the regulations.  See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472.  The bulk of concerns 
raised by the public were among those that would be exceedingly difficult to exclude on the basis 
of a fair reading of the statutes involved in each regulation. 
119
 I discuss this in more detail in Part III.b, supra.
120
 Agencies and their staff respond to incentives which can obviously be most directly affected by 
representative politicians as well as politically and economically powerful organized interests.  
But this does not eliminate the possibility that agency staff may sometimes have both an interest in 
and an opportunity to please public commenters – particularly when their concerns are intelligible, 
communicated in a persuasive way, and appear reasonable.  If agency staff were able to decipher 
the comments from the lay public, they might also find that these can support the agency’s own 
policy positions.  Cf. Thomas H. Hammond and Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy? 
Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in 
A MODEL OF MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL POLICY-MAKING, 12 J. LAW ECON. & ORG. 119 (1996) 
(emphasizing how agency staff tend to have policy preferences over outcomes).
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or “public interest” organizations that raise concerns different from those likely to 
be raised by the most direct targets of regulation.  These organizations 
participated in the campaign finance and nuclear regulation rulemaking 
proceedings, but were completely absent from the financial privacy regulation.  
Differences also existed in the proportion of comments from the lay public that 
were form letters.  This is consistent with other regulations, and highlights the 
extent to which political and social forces affect public decisions to participate.  
Layperson comments sometimes reflect simple form letters, and sometimes 
appear to indicate quite different rhetorical strategies and concerns about issues.  
The level of sophistication of participants in the notice and comment process can 
vary considerably (both within a regulatory proceeding, and across regulatory 
domains).  And so can the agency’s apparent willingness to make changes in its 
regulations following public input.
Table 4
Comparing Comments Across Regulatory Domains
Regulation Financial Privacy Campaign Finance Nuclear Regulation
Number of Comments
176 1121 1431
Percent of comments 
from individual 
members of the 
public 72.1 98.6 98.3
Percent of individual 
comments that are 
form letters
0 98.4 84.5
Percent of comments 
that are from direct 
targets of the 
regulation 26.7 .8 .5
Percent of comments 
from public 
membership or 
“public interest” 
organizations
0 .4 .6
Average length of 
non-form letter 
comments from 
individual members 
of the public (one or 
more pages) 1.12 2 1.09
Average 
sophistication of non-
form letter individual 
comments from
members of the 
public (5-point scale, 
where 5 is highest) .12 3 1.91
Average number of 
suggestions made by 
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individual member of 
the public adopted by 
agency .01 0 .02
* * *
The preceding case studies provide a snapshot of current regulatory 
democracy.  Participation under its procedures is driven by the demands of people 
who figure out, on their own or through prodding from organized interests, that 
they have something at stake when a new regulation is written.  Even though 
agencies have both the incentive and the opportunity to anticipate political 
reactions to their regulations, the notice and comment process isn’t treated as a 
charade.  Agencies in these case studies often respond to comments by making 
substantive changes in their regulations.121  Their lawyers grapple with concerns 
raised by the commenters.  They change the proposed laws in response to 
feedback from interested parties.  But the case studies also show the limits in the 
agency’s capacity to respond to comments from individual laypersons, whether 
they write on their own or send in a form letter.  Leaving aside the question of 
whether agencies would be motivated to respond, it’s clear the existing process 
does next to nothing to remedy gaps in the commenter’s own sophistication, or 
(indeed) to involve members of the larger public in discussions about regulations 
that will shape their lives.  Whether one believes that steps in that direction are 
warranted depends on one’s vision of democracy in this regulatory context.  
That’s what I discuss next.
II.
THEORIZING ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATUS QUO
The case studies say something about who participates in certain 
regulatory rulemaking proceedings, what they say when they participate, and how 
certain agencies respond.  The case studies do not say anything directly about 
whether the extent of public involvement or agency responsiveness is appropriate.  
How should that question be answered?  No reasonable defender of the regulatory 
state has ever suggested that the public should be completely screened out of 
being involved in regulatory decisions.  Such exclusion would be politically 
difficult in a system like our own.122  But if complete exclusion of the public is 
neither possible nor desirable, the question is then how we might want or expect 
individuals from among the larger public to get directly involved in these 
121
 The few researchers who have looked at this in other contexts – primarily environmental policy 
-- have also found this to be the case.  See Martino Golden, supra note__, at___.
122 See Part V.b, infra.
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decisions.  In this Part I discuss how one might defend the way existing law 
involves the public in regulatory decisions.  Though I am more concerned with 
normative arguments than political explanations in this section, I return to the 
political problem in Part IV.  The heart of this Part is an effort to scrutinize some 
empirical assumptions that help bolster support for the current system, thereby 
making possible reforms of that process seem misguided, unnecessary, futile, or 
all of the above.  I find many such assumptions unsupported.   
A.  Justifying Current Regulatory Democracy Under Broad Legislative 
Delegations
Consider the following two justifications for our current regulatory 
democracy.  One rests on the following strong claim: representative democracy 
and the interest group competition that is such a pervasive feature of it render the 
existing notice-and-comment procedures close enough to ideal that it isn’t 
necessary to supplement them with any reforms.123  Another justification would 
rest on a weaker claim, which I call compromise acceptance:  the position that no 
institutional mechanism to implement democracy is perfect, but that current 
regulatory democracy amounts to a reasonable compromise in a second-best 
world.  I then draw on my empirical case studies and research in political 
behavior to critique some of the empirical assumptions that would bolster 
compromise acceptance.  I suggest that many of the assumptions underlying 
compromise acceptance turn brittle once they’re subjected to scrutiny.  The result 
should lead us to reexamine the normative viability of the status quo, which then 
leaves the question of whether it’s actually feasible to implement any alternatives, 
and what concrete benefits those alternatives might provide.
i. A Strong Claim: Representative Politics and Interest Group   
   Competition Entirely Resolve the Problem of Regulatory Democracy    
The best way to understand the arguments supporting current procedures 
for regulatory democracy is to take a step back and ask what public participation 
itself is supposed to accomplish in the first place.  When scholars, judges, and 
policymakers discuss the regulatory state they often emphasize the importance of 
participation, but those discussions sometimes reflect different strands of thought 
regarding the right type and extent of participation.  The strand I term 
participatory democracy emphasizes the value of broad participation by 
organized interests as well as individuals.  This approach stands in sharp contrast 
to what might be called regulatory pluralism, which focuses on the value of 
organized interests, representative politics, and technical expertise.  When it 
comes to regulatory democracy current law is far more aligned with regulatory 
123
 This is not to say that people who like the status quo because they idealize representative 
democracy are necessarily “pluralist” in the tradition of Robert Dahl.  
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pluralism than participatory democracy.124  Someone who believes strongly in the 
wisdom of regulatory pluralism would also find wisdom in how current regulatory 
democracy operates.
The participatory democracy strand holds that broad participation is 
central to democratic government.125  The history of the regulatory state 
occasionally seems to reflect this concern with mass public participation.  
Legislators can influence the work of agencies in response to a rare but powerful 
burst of public attention to some matter of regulatory policy.  Agencies are legally 
required to consider comments raising important issues, regardless of who they 
come from.126  Presidential executive orders sometimes include exhortations for 
agencies to nurture participation.127  With few exceptions, members of the public 
have a legal right to take part in the rulemaking part of the regulatory process, 
regardless of whether they are savvy lawyers for a chemical products company or 
individual laypeople people with no particular technical expertise.128  Third-party 
members of the public also have some opportunity to intervene in regulatory 
adjudication.129  This makes intuitive sense, since regulations are forged from 
statutes passed in the name of everyone.130  The regulations themselves are 
124 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Against (And For) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 
YALE L. & POL. REV. 553, 554 (1997)(“The provision of strong protection for a strongly reviled 
system of special interest politics thus appears to be less a paradox than an example, familiar in 
our system, of a sound political and constitutional commitment to take some risks and to bear 
some costs in return for larger social benefits.”).
125 See SIDNEY VERBA, KAY SCHLOZMAN, AND HENRY BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC 
VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (1995)(“Citizen participation is at the heart of 
democracy.  Indeed, democracy is unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate freely 
in the governing process.”). 
126 See supra notes___ (discussing the limited, but non-trivial, extent of agencies’ responsibility to 
consider relevant and important concerns raised in comments received pursuant to the notice-and-
comment process).
127 See EXEC. ORDER 12,866 (1993), SECT. 6(a)(1)(calling on agencies to “seek the involvement of 
those intended to benefit from and those expected to be burdened by any regulation”).  Many 
agencies probably do little more than honor this in the breach (at least when it comes to doing 
anything other than just proceeding with the procedures required by the substantive statute in 
question and the APA).  Since most regulations are intended to benefit some defensible definition 
of the larger “public,” it’s hard to see Section 6(a)(1) as something other than an aspirational goal 
for mass public involvement in the regulatory process.
128
 Most of the exceptions to the APA notice-and-comment rulemaking process involve foreign 
affairs and national security.  But as the case studies demonstrate, some of the default 
requirements for rulemaking contained in the APA still apply to a number of regulations affecting 
areas ranging from criminal finance enforcement to immigration.
129 See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 
359, 362 (1972)(“The recent and dramatic expansion of intervention in administrative proceedings 
has built upon doctrinal developments in three distinguishable but related areas: the right to 
intervene in court adjudications; standing to seek judicial review of administrative action; and 
standing to intervene in administrative adjudications”).
130
 By “regulations,” I mean primarily the regulatory rules enacted pursuant to the notice-and-
comment process (also known as “informal rulemaking”) established by the Administrative 
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obviously important: often they have the force of law just as a civil or criminal 
statute would.131  They affect a pervasive and growing share of the nation’s 
domestic and international decisions.  In part for these reasons one commentator 
has described mass participation in regulatory rulemaking as perhaps “the most 
complex and important form of political action in the contemporary American 
system.”132
Decades ago the U.S. Senate commissioned a study of participation in the 
regulatory state that appeared to be premised on the value of participatory 
democracy.133  An early passage provides a short statement of that view and its 
basic rationales:
Increased public participation and input can provide regulators with a 
greater range of ideas and information, broaden the active constituency of 
the agency, and place greater emphasis on public interest concerns and 
viewpoints.  A lack of such public participation, on the other hand, 
requires regulators to rely too heavily on input from the industry they are 
charged with regulating.134
Democratic theorists and legal scholars writing in previous decades often 
concurred in the value of this aspiration.135  Participation helps render that power 
legitimate in two ways.  Regulations affect the public and are promulgated in its 
name; members of the public should therefore be able to affect the regulation 
because they have an interest, however slight when it is disaggregated, in the 
regulation.136  Some also note that participation’s value extends beyond its direct 
impact on governance,137 to include the subjective well-being138 of people 
participating and their opportunity for civic education.139
Procedure Act, or pursuant to a similar process that allows the public to participate in rulemaking 
in some way.  
131 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules With the Force of Law:  
The Original Convention 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002).
132 Kerwin, supra note__, at ___.
133 See United States Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Vol. III: Public Participation in 
Regulatory Agency Proceedings, 95th Cong, 1st Session (July 1977).
134 Id. at p. vii,.  Given this ambitious goal for participation, the study predictably finds that the 
status quo falls short in fulfilling any expansive version of participatory democracy goals.
135 See generally BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984); CAROLE PATEMAN, 
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970).  For some examples from legal academia, see
Bonfield, supra note__, at __; Cramton, supra note__, at __; and Gerald Frug, Administrative 
Democracy, 40 U. TORONTO L.J. 559, 574-79 (1990).
136 See Kerwin, supra note ___, at 158 (“The credibility and standing a rule enjoys with those who 
will be regulated by it or enjoy the benefits it bestows depend heavily on the accuracy and 
completeness of the information on which it is based”).
137 See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
1705, 1709-14 (1998)(distinguishing among participation, aggregation, and governance interests 
associated with the right to vote).
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Of course, nothing in the participatory democracy strand makes 
participation infinitely valuable: after some point decisions must be taken, and 
policies must be executed.140  What this strand seems to imply is rather that 
efficiency values should be balanced against the value of participation, and that 
such participation should regularly allow people to have an effect on regulatory 
policy.  If the existing notice-and-comment, expertise-focused structure of 
administrative law does not allow this to happen, then people interested in 
participatory democracy would ask what alternatives exist that could blend expert 
technical judgment with opportunities for public involvement in decisionmaking.  
Thus the impulse for occasional experiments like the Carter Administration’s 
drive for expanded public hearings and television advertising soliciting public 
comments on regulations,141 or the more recent use of “deliberative polls” to 
advise state utility regulators.142  And while direct democracy may seem ill-suited 
138 See, e.g., Michael E. Morrell, Participatory Democratic Procedures: Normative Theory Meets 
Empirical Science, 52 POL. RES. Q. 293 (1999).
139 See John M. Strate et al., Life Span Civic Development and Voting Participation, 83 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 443 (1989)(emphasizing the impact of participation opportunities on lifetime civic 
education).
140
 As I have defined it, this “participatory democracy” strand is fairly consistent with the resent 
enthusiasm for deliberative democracy.  See, e.g., JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: 
PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRACY (1996).  But the “participatory democracy” strand 
does not depend on some sort of deep, slow deliberation as much as on participation in the process 
of decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
245, 248 (2002).  Justice Breyer writes:
Serious complex challenges in law are often made in the context of a national
conversation, involving, among others, scientists, engineers, businessmen and –women, 
and the media, along with legislators, judges, and many ordinary citizens…  That 
conversation takes place through many meetings, symposia, and discussions, through 
journal articles and media reports, through legislative hearings and court cases. 
[Emphasis added].
Justice Breyer’s list could well have included the notice-and-comment process or its close cousins 
like negotiated rulemaking.  His vision seems to depend less on the specific contributions made by 
groups and more on the notion that people can participate in the “national conversation,” whether 
they are scientists or “ordinary citizens.”
141
 President Carter issued an executive order directing agencies to explore “holding open 
conferences or public hearings” to expand the scope of participation.  See Exec. Order 12,044.  
The Carter reforms led to increases in the time for comment for many rules, the provision of 
advance notice that an agency was considering rulemaking in a certain area, and occasional use of 
television and radio advertising soliciting comments.  See Kerwin, supra note___, at 169 
(discussing Carter-era innovations).
142 See generally Robert C. Luskin, James Fishkin, & Dennis L. Plane, Deliberative Polling and 
Policy Outcomes:  Electric Utility Issues in Texas, Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of the 
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (Nov. 1999) (on file with author) 
(describing changes in the opinions of a sample of people asked to consider electric utility pricing 
issues in Texas, following the provision of materials to the participants and a chance for them to 
deliberate about the issue).
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for some regulatory issues, it certainly seems like a procedure that imbues a 
decision with legitimacy.143
This kind of mass participation seems downright unnecessary to others.144
To wit, the regulatory pluralism strand eschews mass public engagement in 
regulatory policy in favor of what seems like a more pragmatic alternative.  A 
substantial chunk of the empirical and theoretical research on the regulatory state 
emphasizes the role that interest groups play in shaping regulatory policy.145  A 
lot people have understandably concluded that organized interests have 
disproportionate power in shaping regulations like the Section 314 rules, 
compared to the lay public or to interested individuals or organized groups that 
lack organization and political resources.  What makes the regulatory pluralism 
strand of thinking about public engagement distinctive is not its recognition of the 
role interested parties play but its tendency to equate the positive with the 
normative.146  Echoing Dahl and other pluralist thinkers,147 proponents of this 
143 See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
144 See e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, The Paradox of Mass Democracy, in RETHINKING THE VOTE 210, 211 
(Ann R. Crigler, Marion Just, and Edward J. McCaffery, eds. (2004)(“For perfectly 
understandable reasons, the more we broaden and equalize political participation, the more 
difficult we make thoughtful individual political choice.  In other words, there is some trade-off 
between the quality and quantity of individual political engagement”).  See also Arthur Lupia, 
Deliberation Disconnected: What It Takes to Improve Civic Competence, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 133 (2002)(noting that many reform efforts to expand deliberation and reasoned 
decisionmaking among the public are based on faulty assumptions).
145
 There is a vast literature here addressing the role of interest groups in regulatory policy.  The 
following are a few interesting examples.  See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Control and Feedback in 
Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1094 (1985);  Mathew D. 
McCubbins, The Legislative Design or Regulatory Structure, 29 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 721 (1985); 
Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of Political Control 
and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 588 (1989). 
146
 The normative claim is easier to accept if one also believes that group priorities are aligned with 
those of different segments of the public, and that groups help fulfill a crucial objective by 
restraining government.  See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP FRICKEY, AND ELIZABETH 
GARRETT, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 49 (1995).  
Synthesizing a voluminous literature on the role of groups and factions in political representation, 
they define pluralism in the following terms:
(1) Citizens organize into groups for political action.  The citizenry has different opinions 
and different economic interests, which leads to the formation of “interest groups.”  (2) 
Interest group politics result in… the spreading of political power across many political 
actors… Strong interest groups, many of which are private of voluntary organizations, 
protect individuals against opporessive and tyrannical government.  In a way, a 
decentralized pluralist system expands one of Madison’s checks on self-serving factions, 
as the ambitions of one group checks the ambition of others and of government actors… 
(3) Politics can be conceptualized as the process by which conflicting interest-group 
desires are resolved.  Because the objectives of one interest group can often be obtained 
only at the expense of others, the groups will come into conflict.  The state regulates that 
conflict, and indeed the political system might be seen as nothing more than the arena in 
which interest group conflict is played out.  
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view might emphasize that a combination of structures of political representation 
and interest group competition is probably the best (if not the only viable) way to 
integrate the public in complex regulatory and administrative decisionmaking.148
This is the sort of view that made the early architects of the Administrative 
Procedure Act celebrate the fact that – even before the structure of the modern 
regulatory state had been formalized – many agencies had realized that their 
success as regulators depended on consulting with interested parties that had both 
a stake in the outcome of the regulatory process and the requisite expertise to 
inform that process.149
What current regulatory democracy achieves is a system to accomplish 
that sort of consultation.  The institutions of the regulatory state help legislators 
know what sort of regulatory policy is being imposed and how the most important 
political constituencies will react to it.  The existing mechanism for engaging the 
public seems perfectly suited to allowing organized interest groups to participate 
at various stages in the process: at the time legislation is written in the first place, 
later through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process that applies to most 
regulatory rules, and then subsequently through litigation and informal efforts to 
shape agency enforcement policy.150 Agencies must then contend with any serious 
Id (citations omitted).
147 See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, American Hybrid, in CLASSIC READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 205, 
219 (Pietro S. Nivola & David H. Rosenbloom, eds. 1990) (“I  defined the ‘normal’ American 
political process as one in which there is a high probability that an activate and legitimate group in 
the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision”).  
Dahl not only describes interest group competition as a pervasive feature of the American political 
system.  He also exalts this feature:
[T]he normal American political system… appears to be a relatively efficient system for 
reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintaining social peace in a 
restless and immoderate people operating a gigantic, powerful, diversified and incredibly 
complex society.  This is no negligible contribution, then, that Americans have made to 
the arts of government – and to that branch, which of all the arts of politics is the most 
difficult, the art of democratic governance.
Id., at 222.
148 See, e.g., Edward P. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (2001); Schuck, 
supra note___, at ___.
149 See FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE 103-04  (1941) (hereinafter, “ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT”).   See also Kerwin, 
supra note ___, at 158 (noting that the lack of participation from interested parties may result in a 
rule “deprived of information that is crucial…”).
150
 An advocate of the more ambitious participatory democracy approach might note that the 
formal institutions of the regulatory state – such as the notice-and-comment process -- are set up to 
engage individuals and informal groups, not only interest groups.  Rarely if ever does the law of 
the administrative explicitly restrict participation to interest groups.  On the contrary: in most 
cases, interest groups get to participate because the individuals they represent would have a chance 
to participate – whether because they have the standing to get judicial review or because the public 
at large has the power to submit their views during the notice-and-comment period.  What the 
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issue raised in the rulemaking record.151  The harder question is whether this 
arrangement is satisfactory in any deeper sense.152
Anyone whose answer to that question considers current regulatory 
democracy ideal or close to it – and not just a compromise – must harbor a belief 
in the power of representative politics and organized interests to constantly enrich 
the process that serves up the regulatory rules.153  To believe in regulatory 
pluralism one has to believe organized interests faithfully represent their 
members’ concerns.  One must also believe that allowing competing interests to 
contribute their ideas, influence, and distinctive points of view will yield desirable 
outcomes in a regulatory process that is otherwise primarily driven by expert 
judgment.  While both of these assumptions are contestable, at least a few things 
could keep the regulatory pluralism model looking like a pretty desirable 
approach to participatory democracy.  The agency problems might be assuaged by 
the fact that interest groups have to compete for members, and at least a few 
interests – such as large corporations, select not-for-profit associations, and 
highly-motivated individuals – have the options of representing themselves 
directly.  While involvement in the regulatory process by interested parties may 
raise the specter of agency “capture,” perhaps the antidote is to be found in 
interest groups are supposed to do is to solve the collective action problems that would otherwise 
keep most individuals from following regulatory developments that would have an effect on them.
151
 As one established doctrinal summary of the field put it: “Most remands [of regulatory rules] 
are based on a court’s conclusion that the rule is arbitrary and capricious because the agency did 
not discuss ‘adequately’ some decisional factor, comment, data dispute, or potential alternative to 
the action taken in the rule”  RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, AND PAUL R. VERKUIL, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 334 (1999).
152 Comparing the implications of these different strands of thought about participation would be 
easier if one could measure the impact of a particular approach to participation on some desired 
regulatory output.  Legislators and organized interests often talk as though such a benchmark 
exists.  Despite such talk and the steady stream of strategic plans that come from the agencies 
themselves, it is often unclear precisely how regulatory performance should be measured.
Benchmarks are easiest to develop when statutes in question are precise and the subject 
of regulation intuitively lends itself to some fairly obvious performance measure (like having the 
FDA limit exposure to dangerous and ineffective pharmaceutical products).  Things become at 
least somewhat more opaque when statutory authority is more ambiguous (as is almost always the 
case), and the regulatory domain does not itself seem to suggest some obvious regulatory 
benchmark, as with the case studies on campaign finance and financial privacy.  In fact the point 
of participation may be precisely to inform the agency’s regulatory goals, or (at least) the link 
between goals set by statute and the details of regulation.  The implicit normative questions 
involved in setting such benchmarks should at least make one skeptical of the position that the 
extent of democracy in regulation should be determined instrumentally, through reference to some 
consensually desired set of outcomes.  Observers who think they have found such an 
uncontroversial metric, like wealth maximization and application of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, 
would no doubt be inclined to measure different institutional arrangements for regulatory 
democracy on the basis of how well their desired result is achieved.  But for those of us who find 
such pervasive instrumental criteria at least somewhat unavailaing, it becomes important to 
consider the extent to which the regulatory state conforms to a host of normative criteria, one of 
which might be its consistency with our preferred views about the nature of democracy.
153 See, e.g., Schuck, supra note__, at __.
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competition.  Thus, while individual citizens with diffuse interests may not be 
able to contribute much to a regulatory proceeding on air quality, industry and 
environmental groups would have the resources to participate with the requisite 
technical sophistication.  They could challenge each others’ assumptions and 
provide the agency with new information, and blow the whistle if the agency 
neglected an important aspect of the problem.154
Nonetheless, that idealized normative view of representative democracy 
and interest group competition is not obviously correct.  It needs to be defended, 
for reasons that emerge clearly if we think about the blemishes associated with 
any kind of democracy that is supposed to work in the real world.  Unless we 
make unrealistic assumptions, any collective decisionmaking process will give 
some people more power than others.155  Thus, depending on the institutional 
details, collective decisions that supposedly depend on democratic procedures can 
still empower an oligarchy.  Procedures that are supposed to be explicitly 
democratic – such as local elections, legislative voting, or presidential contests –
reflect dramatic differences in participation.  Not everyone legally entitled to be 
154
 Indeed, there might be a few important reasons why this reliance on organized interests should 
be perfectly acceptable on normative grounds, at least to some people.  One might think that 
virtually all the work of the regulatory state requires highly-sophisticated technical expertise 
anyway, which raises questions about just how much we achieve by stepping up the involvement 
of the mass public in regulatory policy.  That’s how courts tend to talk about regulatory policy.  
See, e.g., Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 115 (1985) 
(upholding agency decision regarding an unfair labor practice because the “Board has the primary 
responsibility for applying ‘the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial 
life’”); National Rifle Ass’n v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of a 
complaint against a Justice Department practice of creating a temporary audit log of gun 
purchasers, on the ground that “it is the agencies, not the courts, that have the technical 
expertise… to carry out statutory mandates”).It could be that interest groups are the only ones 
(along with directly interested parties) with the means and incentives to solve collective action 
problems to learn about the issues, organize a response, and otherwise meaningfully take part in 
regulatory policymaking.  Moreover, the views of interest groups are often in conflict, so various 
interests might police each other throughout the regulatory process – including during the notice-
and-comment process.  Or at least this is supposed to be true in the administrative pluralist version 
of the world.
Others think legislatures and agencies because are excellent settings for deliberation. See
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31 
(1985)(suggesting that a “belief in a deliberative conception of democracy…” provides a basis for 
evaluating administrative and legislative action that has both powerful historical roots and 
considerable contemporary appeal.”).  See also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, 
AND ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION: STATUES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 327-
327-380 (describing key institutional features of the legislative process like single-subject rules, 
generality requirements, and legislative immunities as rules designed to facilitate legislative 
deliberation). 
155
 The literature on this topic is vast.  At its center is Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem, and 
the substantial literature critiquing it.  For an insightful introduction to the debates surrounding 
this result, see Richard H. Pildes and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy; 
Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 
(1990).
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heard participates equally, and intensity of participation rarely matches the precise 
extent of the interests at stake.  Members of an organization do not always have 
enough time to get to know the slates for boards of directors.  Constituents of a 
local school district may not all vote in the local election.  The electorate for 
presidential elections may not take the time to discern the differences in positions 
between two candidates or make the effort to vote in the primary.  People face 
collective action problems.  Even where individual members of the public are 
represented by organized groups, these groups form intermittently, and solve 
collective action problems only imperfectly.  In short, differential rates of 
participation affect virtually all democratic decisionmaking procedures.  Such a 
skew in participation need not be a disaster.  Societies might still value collective 
decisionmaking procedures that make participation easier for some people than 
for others.156
What’s more, even voters with little information or opportunities to 
deliberate can make reasonable choices about representative politicians by 
interpreting cues from institutions and intermediary individuals that they have 
reason to trust.157  Lupia and McCubbins present the most elaborate theory of this 
type.  They use a steady stream of experimental results and formal models to 
show how voters can make sense of representative democracy even with limited 
information.158 It turns out, though, that the normative thrust of their theory 
depends on key assumptions that sometimes just don’t hold.  If one rejects the 
assumption, for example, that voters can rely on trustworthy intermediaries to 
assess whether they should support a candidate associated with a particular 
package of policies, then the theory doesn’t support the view that representative 
democracy is ideal.
Despite the preceding reasons for faith in representative political 
arrangements, it nonetheless remains true that under certain conditions, distortions 
themselves also entail certain normatively significant costs.  Sometimes it makes 
no sense to assume that voters can rely on intermediaries to interpret policy 
156
 If people participate at different rates and with different intensity, perhaps this shows 
differences in the intensity of their underlying preference – which is certainly valuable information 
under certain conditions.  It would be costly, possibly unconstitutional, and perhaps unworkable to 
ensure that everyone participated to the same degree in a given collective decision.  And despite 
such limits, differences in a speaker’s articulateness or an audience’s receptivity would skew the 
impact of participation in any case.  Not only might we still value collective decisionmaking 
procedures that reflect or depend on differential rates of participation, but changing such 
differences in participation might entail various kinds of costs – ranging from administrative 
complexity to free speech restrictions.
157 See, e.g., Paul Sniderman, Taking Sides: A Fixed Point Theory of Political Reasoning, in 
ELEMENTS OF REASON 79 (Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, & Samuel Popkin, eds. 2000).
158 See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS 
LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998) (emphasizing the role of candidate reputation in 
voters’ reasoned decisions about representative politics).  See also SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE 
REASONING VOTER:  COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1991) 
(emphasizing the role of retrospective evaluations and candidate evaluations to argue that voters’ 
choices in presidential elections are “rational”).
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developments.  The value of representative democracy then ends up depending on 
what we expect that democracy itself will accomplish.  For some observers, 
democratic collective decisions are just inherently valuable -- because they allow 
people who will be impacted by the decision to participate in making it.159  For 
others, democracy is valuable because it allows a majority of the relevant 
community to choose the best course of action in a public-spirited way after some 
kind of deliberation.160  For still others, the potential chaos and unpredictability of 
democracy is valuable because at least it provides information useful in 
policymaking that would not otherwise be available to government.161  All of 
these rationales are reminiscent of the participatory democracy strand of thought 
regarding regulatory democracy.  They are undercut to some extent by distortions 
in participation.  The distortions introduce the possibility that people with a stake 
in the collective decision will simply not participate.  The distortions also make it 
harder to achieve any sort of majoritarian deliberation in the decision.162
Time and again, there is a formalistic answer to quandaries about the 
appropriate type and extent of democratic participation: Whatever the electoral 
institutions require as a minimum rate of participation is enough.  After all, not 
everyone wants to participate in making decisions about financial privacy, nuclear 
regulation, or campaign finance, and not everyone should be made to do so.”163
This answer of course begs part of the question because the minimum degree of 
participation is determined by law, and the law itself is the product of the 
democratic process.  Nonetheless, whatever one thinks of the formalistic answer 
in the legislative context, it seems like that answer is even less satisfactory for the 
159 See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 321 
(1997)(describing “procedural” theories of democracy that highlight the “inherent fairness or 
justice of its system of substantial and equal participation in legislation by the governed.”).
160 See, e.g., Bohman, supra note___, at ___ (discussing the inherent value of incorporating people 
who will be affected by a decision into the process of decisionmaking).  See also JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW 
AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1995).
161 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, The Economics of Life and Death, SCI. AM. 40 (May 1993)(describing 
democracies’ ability to avoid famines).  See also Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, supra note___, at 
163 n.1 (“[W]e consider the representativeness of the participatory input from the perspective of a 
concern with its impact on the communication of citizens’ needs and preferences to political elites 
and thus a concern with equal protection of interests”).
162
 Suppose, for example, that voting in the election for Insurance Commissioner costs the average 
citizen goes from about $5 to about $7 in time and effort (perhaps because polling places are 
closed).  Suppose further that as a result of this change, 10% fewer citizens decide that it is worth 
their effort to take part in the election.  Even if the loss of that 10% of voters does not render the 
election illegitimate, the loss weakens the claim that the democratic, collective decision is 
legitimate because people affected participated.  The loss of voters also weakens the claim that the 
election reflects the result of some kind of desirable majoritarian deliberation.  Finally, the loss of 
the 10% of voters deprives the new insurance commissioner of information about (and much of 
the incentive to care) how some chunk of the electorate reacted to her candidacy.
163 Cf. Rubin, supra note___, at ___ (suggesting that the existing arrangements for participation 
and decisionmaking in the regulatory state are legitimate, and that excessive idealized thinking 
about democracy is confusing in this arena).
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rest of the regulatory state.  Consider some of the problems with delegation.  The 
work of agencies is one step removed from the work of legislators.164  Of course, 
legislators can also be swayed more directly by voters when the issue catches 
popular attention.  But this again presupposes that the issues capturing popular 
attention match the list of issues that matter most under any defensible criteria.165
One might plausibly conclude that delegations, on the margin, make it no easier 
and perhaps harder for the members of the public to understand and monitor the 
law’s development --  particularly for those chunks of the public who have not yet 
decided if they care.166
The point here is just to show that people can raise principled questions 
about whether representative politics (and associated faith in interest groups) 
resolves all the important questions about democracy in the regulatory state.  
That’s not so.  It’s at least possible to raise questions about representative 
democracy, particularly given voters’ cost of gaining information about regulatory 
164 See, e.g., Theodore Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism, and 
Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 296-312, 314-18, 321-22 (1987).Theodore Lowi, 
The End of Liberalism, in FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 166, 169 (PETER H. SCHUCK 
ED., 1994)(“modern law has become a series of instructions to administrators rather than a series 
of commands to citizens”).
165
 Berinsky underscores this point in a fascinating empirical study of members of the public who 
answer “don’t know” to pollsters’ questions.  See ADAM J. BERINSKY, SILENT VOICES: PUBLIC 
OPINION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA (2004).  When people are polled they may 
have a host of reasons for saying they “don’t know” the answer.  He then shows how opinion 
surveys are systematically biased because they pervasively fail to consider how “don’t know” 
respondents feel.  While some respondents choose to answer thus because they fear their true 
answer will expose them to social disapproval, others answer “don’t know” because of the 
relatively high cost of forming an opinion.  Id. at 105.  Berinsky convincingly argues that this 
biases responses towards those that are cognitively easier to justify, thereby biasing the resulting 
opinion on matters as important as whether intervention in Vietnam was warranted (particularly 
during the early 1960s).  Id. at 132.  Yet there unlikely to be some inherent connection between 
the normative importance of an issue (however measured) and the ease in forming an opinion 
about it (or in considering the justification for a particular position on an issue).
166
 The argument is not that delegations are either undesirable or unconstitutional.  On the legal 
question, Posner and Vermeule, supra note ___, advance persuasive arguments against judicial 
invalidations of legislative action on nondelegation grounds.  Earlier, Mashaw argued in a similar 
vein in favor of delegating powers to the executive branch.  See Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: 
Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON & ORG. 81 (1985).  My point 
here is that delegations might make participation particularly important because they make 
elections less of an effective proxy for what voters think about regulatory issues.  There are, of 
course, exceptions that I have described earlier, where substantial chunks of the public acquire an 
intense interest in a regulatory decision.  See supra note__ (discussing the extent of interest in the 
tobacco and telecommunications media ownership regulations).  But leaving aside these 
exceptions, my conjecture is that high-profile legislative votes receive more attention than 
regulatory proceedings that become routine because they have been delegated.  Some members of 
the public take cues from interest groups with which they identify in trying to make sense of legal 
developments, and those groups might often keep track of regulatory policy.  But the literature on 
leadership dynamics within interest groups and the experience with Section 314 highlight limits in 
the role interest groups can be expected to play in informing the public about policy 
developments. 
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decisions.  All of which means that representative democracy, despite all its 
virtues, is not necessarily an ideal system for involving the public in regulatory 
decisionmaking.  Few institutions are defended on the basis that they are optimal, 
though.  Which means it’s worth considering current regulatory democracy not as 
the ideal but as a reasonable compromise in a second-best world where 
legislatures routinely delegate power to bureaucratic regulatory agencies.
ii.  Compromise Acceptance
Some people might see the status quo not as an ideal system to involve the 
public in regulation, but merely as an acceptable compromise.  An ideal system, 
in this view, might foster greater participation from the mass public, more 
reasoned deliberation, or some other desired quality.  Yet these goals may also 
appear too costly, elusive, or questionable in value to warrant replacing the 
current arrangement.  One example of this view appears in some of Cass 
Sunstein’s early writings on regulation, where he concludes that mass 
participatory democracy in the regulatory state is “unworkable.”167 In this 
account, representative politics, and regulatory pluralism in general, are not 
idealized manifestations of democracy for the regulatory state; indeed, those 
inclined towards compromise acceptance might question the very notion of an 
idealized manifestation of democracy.  Instead the focus of this approach is on 
what’s an acceptable compromise for democracy and public engagement if 
delegations are going to happen in the first place.  Perhaps some people crave 
deep deliberative discussions in politics, which makes mass participation in 
regulatory governance irrelevant at best and counterproductive at worst.168
Another argument that fuels compromise acceptance is the sense of futility 
about the prospects for changing how regulatory agencies carry out their legal 
mandate.  Precisely how could the present system be changed, and who would do 
it?  Because current regulatory democracy is politically efficient, it is sometimes 
assumed to be the only politically feasible arrangement.  I explore this view in the 
last section of the paper in the paper and find it wanting.169
C  Challenging Empirical Assumptions Supporting Compromise Acceptance 
In fact compromise acceptance is rooted in some widely accepted common 
wisdom about regulation.  Courts and commentators, for example, often accept 
the premise that regulations should be shaped most by experts imbued with 
sufficient insights about science, economics or law to know what they are 
167 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE
14-15 (1990); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, supra note ___, at 39.
168 See also Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok:  The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative 
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173 (1997).
169
 I explore this view in the final section of the paper and find it wanting.  See infra Part IV.
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doing.170  In contrast, the individual members of the public whose votes decide 
mayoral and legislative elections are thought to have little of any importance to 
say about regulatory policy, because tend to lack both the sophistication and 
interest that would make such insights possible.171  That’s not to say there is no 
such thing as democracy in a world of broad legislative delegations.  On the 
contrary – while organized interests certainly have a disproportionate share of 
power to shape regulatory policy under existing arrangements, that may prove to 
be just a mild problem here, since different interest groups are sometimes 
assumed to represent a broad enough range of concerns to encompass all or most 
arguments that informed citizens would make if they were themselves 
participating in developing regulations.172  In any case, if members of the public 
feel strongly enough to supplement what interest groups contribute to the 
regulatory process they can do so, since members have a legal opportunity to take 
part in regulatory development through the notice and comment process.  Any 
differences between organized interests and individual members of the public in 
their ability to express their ideas is unlikely to matter much because regulators' 
willingness to consider outside views will depend on whether commenters are 
organized interests capable of affecting the agency's political and litigation 
environment.173  To the extent that important reforms are needed in the regulatory
state, they are often taken to involve technocratic improvements to centralize 
presidential control over regulations or improve the quality of government 
decisionmaking.174  There is, in some minds, little point in reforming regulatory 
democracy because it's both unnecessary, impractical, and futile.175  The pages that 
follow question nearly every aspect of this account.
i.  Assumption # 1:  Regulatory Problems are Technical Problems
Scientists, economists, specialized lawyers, and other technical experts 
form the core staff of all regulatory agencies.  The same pattern is repeated 
whether the agency’s responsible for energy, environmental protection, election 
regulation, or enforcement of laws against commodities fraud.  It figures that 
regulatory agencies would look this way when they were so ardently justified as 
sources of technical expertise that would use their special knowledge to 
implement legislative mandates in a complex and uncertain world.  That’s an 
170 See, e.g., Breyer, supra note__, at ___.
171 See Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note__, at __; Rubin, supra note__, at __.
172 See Schuck, supra note___, at ___.
173 See infra Part II.b.v.
174
 For one thoughtful example of this quite pervasive approach, see Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. 
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995).  See also Robert W. 
Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation?  Deeper 
and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489 (2002).
175 See infra Part II.b.v.
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account that helps justify limited mass public involvement in the regulatory 
process.
And why not?  Regulatory problems about campaign finance, privacy, 
nuclear power, or environmental protection involve complex judgments about risk 
and value that probably benefit from expertise.  But they also involve policy 
judgments that often reflect ambiguous statutory commands.  Sometimes judges 
explicitly recognize the importance of policy judgments but note that the agency 
should make them because is rendered accountable through representative 
politics.176  But most of the time courts defer to agencies, invoking expertise and 
institutional competence as justification.  Commentators have long raised 
questions about this claim, though lately some scholarly voices have sought to 
defend the idea of expertise by noting that laypeople have a tendency not to make 
sound judgments about risk.177  Still, there is something unsatisfying about the 
narrow claim that the heavy lifting done by the regulatory state when it regulates 
is predominantly about expertise. Let me illustrate this first with Section 314, and 
then with examples from other regulatory contexts.
Take privacy as an example.  Like many other issues entrusted to 
regulators, financial privacy turns out not to be pure technical matters under 
almost any defensible definition.  Even if one assumed that the law enforcement 
interest at issue in the Section 314 regulations should be treated as the exclusive 
domain of experts (a questionable assumption), there is almost no way of 
describing privacy concerns as the exclusive domain for experts.  It is true that the 
statute clearly emphasizes the goal of encouraging the sharing of information 
about suspected terrorists or money launderers, yet the statute also commands that 
sharing should be limited.  Both the nature of that limit, the rest of the USAPA 
statute, and the underlying APA notice-and-comment process suggest that the 
agency is supposed to strike a balance between several different issues.178   One 
goal, obviously, is advancing national security and law enforcement objectives.  
Treating this as a matter for experts to resolve is certainly plausible, though not 
obviously right.179  And whatever one thinks of the idea that national security and 
176 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 403 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing the impact of partisan 
changes on the administration of agency programs)(hereinafter “State Farm”).
177 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 295 (2002).
178 Cf. Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst. (Benzene) 448 U.S. 607, 
646-48 (1980) (plurality opinion) (OSHA statute, if interpreted appropriately to cure constitutional 
defects, creates a list of factors that the agency must consider in creating a regulation that is not 
arbitrary and capricious). (emphasizing the importance of the agency balancing several competing 
concerns grounded in the statute).
179
 The question is in part whether people likely to be called on as experts in the field (i.e., law 
enforcers) are in a position to provide accurate information about what legal changes are needed.  
This raises at least two different kinds of problems.  One is the quality of information and analysis 
that experts on national security and law enforcement can provide.  Another is an agency problem: 
given that law enforcers, like anyone else, have interests and respond to incentives, there may be 
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law enforcement can be treated as ripe for technical resolution by experts, the 
remaining concerns implicit in the statute are about privacy and accountability for 
the use of sensitive information.180  Presumably, this is why there are some 
restrictions on the use of the financial information by the government and 
financial institutions.  One could make similar observations about the other 
regulations I discuss in detail.  Nuclear power licenses are supposed to be granted 
on the basis of technical standards.  But those standards are not the only factor in 
deciding just how the process of fact-finding and involvement of local community 
groups should proceed.  Nor can anything that plausibly passes for technical 
standards decide whether convention fundraising should be limited by the donor’s 
city or state of residence.
Some might still insist that nearly all material questions in regulatory 
policy are simply questions about the risks associated with particular states of the 
world – and perhaps about the probability that those different states of the world 
will come to pass.  Seen in this light, the concern over privacy evinced by Section 
314 is nothing more than an awareness of the risk that the government will abuse 
its access to financial information.  This way of thinking again turns all of 
regulatory policy into the anodyne task for a technocratic expert.  It is true that 
any policy question might in principle reduce to a matter of expected utility, but it 
is not clear how this cuts.  Agency officials have to think about expected utility 
when they make decisions, and so does everyone else.  But expected utility is 
about the value assigned to a state of the world, not just its probability.  If a 
distoritions created when they serve both as experts and also beneficiaries of particular legal 
changes.  See Cuéllar, supra note __, at __.
180 For example, one commenter had the following to say:
I oppose all regulations of the Patriot Act proposed by the Treasury Department.  This act 
will do nothing to prevent terrorism and will only result in further losses of freedom and 
privacy for honest, law-abiding Americans.  The proposed Act is unconstitutional; the 
Administration and Congress will be violating their oaths to uphold the US Constitution 
if they agree to pass this or any similar legislation.  I hope my government still listens to 
its citizens and I have not wasted my time in stringently and in all ways OPPOSING 
THIS PROPOSED LEGISLATION.  Thank you for doing what is highest and best for all 
Americans.
Section 314 Comments, supra note___, Comment # 124.  Another said this:
Banks already ignore the Privacy Act and illegally discriminate against people who do 
not use a Slave Surveillance Number (SSN)[sic].  I am opposed to your so-called “Patriot 
Act” and any other police state tactics you dream up.
Id., Comment # 63.  In many ways, these two comments from individuals convey the tenor of 
many of the public comments received.  The Appendix, supra, lists excerpts from additional 
comments.  Comments such as # 63 and # 124 constitute a far cry from a sophisticated argument 
to the effect that the agency should minimize the damage done by Miller by narrowing the scope 
of law enforcement authority.  But the preceding commenters would probably agree with the 
existing statement if given an explanation (and if she did not believe that all was lost in any event).
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citizen chose to be concerned about the Section 314 regulations and an agency 
official was not concerned, their difference of opinion may have nothing to do 
with their different estimates of the probability of abuse, but from a different 
guess about the cost they would bear if 100 people knew that the citizen was 
sending money to a drug treatment center.  Moreover, even if the citizen and the 
agency official began with the same valuation of the scenario, the government 
official might be desensitized from repeatedly being exposed to private 
information.181
Risk analysis and fact-based technical standards may not answer every 
material question about the regulations I study here, but might they be unique?  
Consider another two radically different contexts.  In Rust v. Sullivan182 the 
question was whether – and how – the federal Department of Health and Human 
Services could apply a gag rule limiting abortion-related counseling in federally-
funded clinics.  While the court made some moves in the direction of 
acknowledging ideological differences in how a Republican administration would 
treat the issue, the major thrust of the argument for deference to the agency was 
expertise and reference to “reasoned analysis”:
At no time did Congress directly address the issues of abortion counseling, 
referral, or advocacy.  The parties’ attempts to characterize highly 
generalized, conflicting statements in the legislative history into accurate 
revelations of congressional intent are unavailing.  When we find, as we 
do here, that the legislative history is ambiguous and unenlightening on 
the matters with respect to which the regulations deal, we customarily 
defer to the expertise of the agency.183
Technical and scientific knowledge probably matters some to this decision.  But 
only the most expansive definition of expert would let one just call the decision 
“science.”184
181 One could think of the existing administrative process and all its political checks as a way to 
address the regulatory issues that should not be left to the experts.  But, as Section 314 also makes 
clear, not every commenter with a morsel of information about the regulation’s policy 
implications manages to provide sophisticated input.  Not only does this lack of sophistication 
make it harder for a willing agency to assimilate contributions from many members of the public 
who do take the trouble to provide their comments.  A teeming mass of unsophisticated comments 
is also likely to reinforce the idea that nothing will happen if the agency ignores the comments 
from laypeople.
182
 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
183
 500 U.S. at 185-86. 
184
 And the bigger the concept of expertise, the more it makes sense to remember James Q. 
Wilson’s admonition about it.  In discussing the politics of bureaucracy, Wilson wrote:
What the statute left vague “experts” were to imbue with meaning.  But expert opinion 
changes and some experts in fact are politicians who bow to the influence of organized 
interests or ideologues who embrace the enthusiasms of zealous factions.
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It is environmental regulation, though, not abortion, campaign regulation 
or financial privacy that gets the lion’s share of attention in scholarship on 
regulation.  On the surface, it would seem smart to screen out nonexpert opinion 
on questions about how much particulate matter in the air will make children 
struggle to breathe.  As with the other examples, though, here too legal decisions 
nearly always encompass policy and value choices along with scientific ones.   
Consider the Environmental Protection Agency’s recent rules governing the 
concentration of arsenic in drinking water promulgated under the Safe Drinking 
Water Act.185  One study critiqued the final rule, alleging that the regulator was 
insufficiently attentive to technical economic and scientific concerns.186  Another 
scholarly commentator defended the rule, suggesting it was not the product of 
shoddy analysis but instead the result of legitimate judgment calls.187  According 
to this commentator, the agency issued a reasonable rule reflecting a legitimate 
interpretation of conflicting data from wage-premium studies188 and attention to 
the need for an adequate margin of safety.189  It is a separate question to ask 
whether the larger public would care or understand the debate between the two 
positions described above – a question I take up below – but the disagreement is 
obviously not just about science.  It is about the type of inference to draw from an 
imperfect wage-premium study, and even more so about whether there is a need 
WILSON, supra note ___, at 330.
185
 Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2000). 
186 See Jason K. Burnett & Robert W. Hahn, EPA’s Arsenic Rule: The Benefits of the Standard Do 
Not Justify the Costs (2001), avail. at http://aei.brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/ reg_analysis_ 
01_02.pdf.
187 See Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341 (2002).
188 Id. at 2355.  Professor McGarity writes:
[It is] certainly correct to emphasize that existing wage premium studies produce a very 
wide distribution of estimates and that they surely do not encompass every consideration 
that should go into monetizing the value of a statistical life.  Whether these problems are 
cured [as the Burnett and Hahn study implies] by picking a number in the middle of the 
range of peer reviewed studies, multiplying that number by four because another law 
professor thought that was a sensible way to account for a few of the neglected 
considerations, and boosting that number by an additional twenty-three percent because 
rich people assign a higher monetary value to their lives than modest wage earners do is 
certainly an open question.
189 Id. at 2375.  The article notes:
How many of us want to drive over a bridge or ride in an airplane for which the last 
dollar spent on safety just equaled the projected monetized lives saved discounted to 
present value?  A margin of safety provides a backup level of safety as a hedge against 
catastrophe when experts turn out to be wrong.
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for an adequate margin of safety in a regulation designed to reduce a potentially 
dangerous concentration of arsenic.190
I could go on, but the point should be clear.  Precisely because regulations 
governing everything from guns to germs are so often written from exceedingly 
general statutory authority, the questions that need to be answered by regulators 
writing them are not purely technical, or purely anything.  Of course agencies are 
expected to use rigorous analytical tools to weigh the risk of environmental, 
health-related, security, or occupational risks, depending on their mandate.  What 
such analysis depends on are questions such as how to interpret an ambiguous 
statute (not just ambiguous facts), or how to make judgment calls about the value 
of particular outcomes (not just their probability).  Unless one defines technical 
expertise or science in a way that explicitly includes political judgments, it is not 
plausible to treat all regulatory policy issues as being primarily about expert or 
scientific decisionmaking. Obviously expert decisionmaking has a role sculpting 
regulations about domestic security and financial privacy.  And sometimes 
statutes appear to call almost exclusively for scientific and technical 
determinations.191  Regulatory policy aims to affect complicated problems that are 
often not easily understood or explained.  But the regulatory pluralism model 
seems to confuse two ideas.  One is that regulatory decisions are primarily about 
expert judgment.  The other is that view that most regulatory decisions involve 
contestable legal interpretations and policy judgments, both of which should be 
informed by technical and scientific expertise.  There is a difference.  In one 
approach the experts are assumed to be the ideal decisionmakers, and the rest of 
the regulatory process is meant only to assure they do not run amok with the 
public trust.  In the other approach the experts are viewed as being in a secondary, 
albeit valuable, role.192  Amidst the pluralist orientation of current procedures of 
regulatory democracy and the nondelegation doctrine’s implicit focus on technical 
and scientific expertise, something gets lost in the shuffle.  What gets lost is the 
idea that statutory interpretation in the course of writing regulations involves 
value choices as much as technical and scientific knowledge.   
ii.  Assumption # 2:  The Public Lacks Interest
190
 I am not suggesting that one can dispense with expert decisionmaking in determining (a) 
exactly what amounts to a “dangerous concentration” of arsenic, (b) evaluating the consequences 
of various methods of arriving at that concentration, or (c) estimating the economic cost of those 
methods.  The point is these tasks do not exhaust the work that needs to be done to turn an 
ambiguous statutory command into a regulatory rule. 
191 See, e.g., See Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001) 
(hereinafter “American Trucking”) (interpreting the Clean Air Act to require exclusively a 
technical determination of what constitutes an adequate air quality standard to protect “public 
health”).
192
 Thus, adherents to the second approach are not surprised to find that agency administrators are 
rarely apolitical technical experts. 
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It is received wisdom that individual members of the public tend to have 
little interest in regulatory policy.193  But the three regulatory case studies show 
that individual members of the public routinely participate, often sending in the 
vast majority of the comments, producing both form letters and distinctive 
contributions, and in all the three case studies raising concerns that were 
appropriate for the agency to consider given its legal mandate.  Even when form 
letters are excluded, individual comments from the lay public accounted for 
upwards of 70% of all comments received on two out of the three regulations I 
analyzed.194  While not all regulations draw such public participation, many do.  
As Figure 4 shows, many regulations inspire considerably greater participation 
from the public than the cases I studied here.
Figure 4
Different Rates of Participation in Regulatory Rulemaking Proceedings
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193 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 42-51 (1993)(suggesting the public 
lacks interest in understanding complex risk-related regulatory issues).  See also Rubin, supra
note__, at 725 (“The problem, as stated, is that direct democracy is quite foreign to representative 
government and is virtually the antithesis of the modern administrative state”).
194
 Comments from individual members of the public (excluding form letters) accounted for 74% 
of comments on the financial privacy regulations, and about 80% of the comments on the nuclear 
licensing regulations.  For the total percentage of comments (including form letters) see Table 4.
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Participation through notice and comment or similar mechanisms may 
seem adequate or even superfluous if there is little interest in participation from 
the public.  But it turns out that some segments of the lay public engage in spirited 
acts of participation.  Members of the lay public make up the substantial majority 
of participants in notice and comment proceedings in the regulations I studied.  As 
Figure 4 shows, a number of other regulations generate sufficient interest among 
the larger public to result in tens – and even hundreds – of thousands of 
comments.195  Whatever one thinks about the source of these comments or the 
non-commenting public’s apathy, it is simply inaccurate to suggest that individual 
members of the public harbor no interest in regulatory policy.  Even under current 
procedures, the extent of that interest depends on the nature of the regulation, the 
interest group environment, and whether one gauges interest by comparing the 
percentage of comments that come from individual members of the lay public to 
comments that come from anywhere else.
A skeptical observer might question whether the interest shown by the 
hundreds or thousands of individual members of the lay public sending in 
comments is enough to support the conclusion that the larger public has a latent 
interest in regulatory policy.  But interest is not some kind of fixed constant.  The 
public’s interest depends on the process through which they are queried. The 
motivation to understand an issue – like the motivation to get involved in political 
activity – can respond to changes in a person’s environment.  If forming an 
opinion on an issue seems costly and people believe there is little reason to do so, 
it is no mystery that people might not invest in being informed.  Thus, a person 
planning to buy a car may not recognize that her vehicle’s purchase price might 
be driven in part by the safety record of the plant where the cars are 
manufactured, because lower safety might raise the wage that a company needs to 
offer workers, and (assuming competition does not constrain the manufacturer) 
the extra labor costs might be passed on to the consumer.  The preceding 
discussion sheds some light on how individuals’ sophistication react to the 
environment, which can help break the cycle where limited information 
contributes to lack of interest.  Regardless of whether the interest perceived is 
entirely self-regarding or not,196 people who overcome their lack of time or 
attention197 and participate are likely to be those who see specific value in such 
195
 Sources on file with author.  Obviously, rarely do members of the mass public find out about 
regulations from poring over the dense pages of the Federal Register.  The public appears to find 
out about the regulations in several ways: (a) from interest groups of which they are members, (b) 
from media coverage combined with searching for information on the Internet, (c) and from 
educated opinion leaders in their social networks.
196 See Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, supra note___, at 529 (“In discussing the reasons they 
became active, participants make clear… that they think of themselves as acting for the common 
good.”).
197 See id., at 129 (surveying the public to assess the determinants of political activity, and finding 
those not active gave the following among the major reasons for not getting involved: lack of time, 
39%; prioritizing family over the welfare of the polity, 34%; irrelevance of politics to “important 
things in… life,” 20%).
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activity.  There is no good reason to think that perception of value will be fixed 
rather than dynamic.  
A contrary view would suggest that interests are more rigid, and in 
particular, that they are driven largely by financial and economic factors.198  This 
view would emphasize the idea that when people have financial stakes in the 
outcome of a regulation (as do the banks in the case of Section 314 or the 
manufacturers of equipment for nuclear power plants), they will exhibit an 
interest in the outcome.  Yet the reality is that people make decisions on the basis 
of more than just their own material interests.  They also care about how other 
people in the polity are doing.199  And when they are concerned about their own 
situation, the concerns are not only about financial or economic status.200  This 
helps explain why dozens of individuals wrote to comment on the Section 314 
regulations.  Nonetheless, interest in politics is rarely enough to make someone 
participate in political activity – time, money, and skills have also have a large 
effect.201
Consider, for example, the financial privacy regulation in light of the 
preceding insights.  The regulation’s effect is quite broad.  It can allow the 
financial transaction information of anyone in the country to be obtained by 
government agents as long as they fill out a certification.  Its clauses limit the 
Right to Financial Privacy Act.  They let financial institutions share information 
about anyone, with few limits.  Not all of this is apparent to the disaggregated 
mass of individuals who are going to be affected by this, not even those whose 
activities or positions might make them more liable to be affected by the new 
authority.  It would seem wrong to ascribe the apparent lack of interest among 
more people to a deliberate conclusion that Section 314 did not matter all that 
much.  Instead, it is entirely possible that they care but don’t think they will make 
a difference (i.e., the unsophisticated commenters on Section 314 did not make a 
difference, after all).  But information and a belief in one’s efficacy can change 
198 See Michael Lewis-Beck, Pocketbook Voting in U.S. National Election Studies: Fact or 
Artifact?, 29 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 348, 349 (1985)(reviewing survey research indicating that financial 
and economic self-interest appears to exert a strong effect in the voting decisions of a significant 
proportion of the American presidential electorate, and critiquing the methodology of studies 
arguing that such findings are largely artifactual). 
199 See.e.g, Donald Kinder & D. Roderick Kiewit, Sociotropic Politics, 11 BRITISH J. POLI. SCI. 
129 (1981) (political attitudes not driven by views of personal material gain but by, among other 
things, conceptions of what would advance overall economic well-being).  Any framework that 
views political activity in terms of rational, goal-seeking behavior must still accept that it’s not 
just narrow material interest that makes people do things. 
200 See generally Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and 
“Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988).
201 See, e.g., Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, & Kay Lehman Schlozman, Beyond SES:  A Resource 
Model of Political Participation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271, 285 (1995) (developing and finding 
empirical support in cross-sectional studies of survey research for a model of political 
participation where interest in politics is not enough to explain political participation, and instead 
“[t]he resources of time, money, and skills are also powerful predictors of political participation in 
America”).
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individuals’ sophistication and interest.  In short, because participation is more 
widespread than commonly thought and interest is itself endogenous, it would be 
simply wrong to conclude that the public is not interested in regulatory policy.
iii.  Assumption # 3: Interest Groups Provide Effective Representation
Organized interests basically raise the same kinds of concerns that 
members of the public would raise, though perhaps in a more sophisticated 
way.202  Or do they?  Accepted as this view is, my case studies show something 
different. Some of the case studies show the public raising concerns that are quite 
different from those raised by organized interests.  Agencies often get a lot of 
form letters.  But far from confirming that individual public participation can be 
reliably equated with organized interest group representation, the form letters 
showcase some limitations of relying on organized interests.  Leaders of interest 
groups are always likely to have subtly different agendas from those of their 
members -- even those agreeing to send in form letters.
This result may subtly undermine some versions of compromise 
acceptance.  After all, the greater one’s faith in what can be achieved through 
interest group representation and competition, the more the status quo looks 
desirable.  Committed supporters who idealize representative democracy through 
politicians and interest groups have considerable amounts of such faith.  For those 
less sanguine about the status quo, acceptance of current regulatory democracy 
would be easier if interest groups made sophisticated arguments through the 
notice & comment process covering all or most of the sorts of concerns that a fair-
minded external observer would consider important to the development of the 
regulation (and consistent with any relevant statutory mandates).  This is not 
always the case: (a) on financial privacy, no interest groups developed 
sophisticated arguments about privacy, which is all but impossible to exclude as a 
relevant consideration on principled normative grounds or on the basis of what the 
statute allows the agency to consider.  The few other studies on regulatory 
participation show this is not rare.  Kerwin finds that about 15% of rules get no 
comments at all,203 and Martino Golden finds that public advocacy organizations 
fail to participate at all.  This means the relative absence of public advocacy 
groups concerned about the policy implications of the regulations which was so 
stark in the Section 314 regulations is not an aberration.  Even where interest 
groups participate extensively, their positions are likely to be subtly different from 
those of their members, and certainly different from those of individuals in the 
larger public who don’t even participate through the proxy of  some interest 
group.  (b) In all case studies, the concerns raised by members of the lay public 
were far from irrelevant in a deeper sense: they go to the heart of what the 
202 See Schuck, supra note__, at __.  See also Dahl, supra note___, at ___.
203 See Kerwin, supra note__, at ___.
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agencies tend to claim they want to consider – the larger macro-level impact of 
the regulation.
iv.  Assumption # 4:  Demand-Driven Procedures Already Provide 
Diverse Public Perspectives
Is there really a problem with participation under the status quo, given the 
considerable number of individuals from the public who actually do participate in 
regulatory proceedings?  It’s true the public sometimes evinces a considerable 
demand for taking part in regulatory proceedings by sending in hundreds, 
thousands, or hundreds of thousands of comments to regulatory agencies.  But 
participating members of the public almost certainly don't reflect the distribution 
of public opinion (either the public's superficial reactions or some more 
considered judgment).  There is, of course, no certain way of telling whether 
participating members of the public actually reflect something close to the 
distribution of public opinion on a particular regulatory issue unless one used a 
reasonable method to sample the larger public's opinion.  But the case studies 
show considerable clustering in the concerns raised by the public, and related 
public opinion surveys suggest some of the electorate would have differing views.  
At the same time, some segments of the public are likely to think of commenting 
as a high-opportunity cost activity with little return, so their views wouldn't be 
represented.  Nor is the participating public (in the regulatory case studies) raising 
the full range of plausible political and economic concerns that individual 
members of the public would have.
Notice what this means for compromise acceptance.  If people are inclined 
toward compromise acceptance but take democratic theory seriously, it would be 
nice if the notice and comment process at least produced a range of comments 
from individual laypeople representing a broad array of perspectives from the 
public.204  Nonetheless, just as interest group comments may not represent the full 
range of public perspectives on regulatory policy issues, neither do the public 
comments actually received in my three case studies.  While these comments are a 
valuable indication of certain public concerns that are hard to ignore, they are 
distorted by the fact that not everyone has an incentive to participate.  This is why 
the jury system requires incentives (negative and positive) for mass participation, 
and the same is required here.
v.  Assumption # 5:  Sophistication Deficits Have No Effect
In 1971, Lee C. White, the former chairman of the Federal Power 
Commission, shared the following parable about regulators’ relationship to the 
people and entities they regulate:
204 Cf. Ian Shapiro, Elements of Democratic Justice, 24 POL. THEORY 579 (1996).
RETHINKING REGULATORY DEMOCRACY 63
A successful lawyer in Keokuk is appointed by the President to serve on 
an independent regulatory agency or as an assistant secretary of an 
executive department that exercises regulatory functions.  A round of 
parties and neighborly acclaim surround the new appointee’s departure 
from Keokuk.  After the goodbyes, he arrived in Washington and assumes 
his rule as a regulator, believing that he is really a pretty important guy.  
After all, he almost got elected to Congress from Iowa.  But after a few 
weeks in Washington, he realizes that nobody has ever heard of him or 
cares much what he does – except one group of very personable, 
reasonable, knowledgeable, delightful human beings who recognize his 
true worth.  These friendly fellows – all lawyers and officials of the 
special interests that the agency deals with – provide him with 
information, views, and most important, love and affection.  Except they 
bite hard when our regulator doesn’t follow the light of their wisdom.205
White’s parable helps illustrate the sort of compelling logic bolstering a 
simple idea coloring many accounts of regulatory agency behavior: that agencies 
are held tightly in the thrall of the organized interests they are supposed to 
regulate.  This “capture” idea, in turn, lends credence to the view that not much 
would change if regulatory democracy were reformed to help members of the 
public articulate their views to the agency in a more sophisticated fashion.  The 
last thing in the world one would expect a “captured” agency to do is pay 
attention to commenter suggestions on the basis of how sophisticated the 
comments are, rather than from who they come from.206
Why indeed would anyone believe that a comment’s sophistication would 
lead the agency to take it more seriously?  As a theoretical matter, it's doubtful the 
agency just wouldn't care about sophistication.  A more sophisticated comment, 
drawing (for example) clear distinctions between what the statute requires and 
what the commenter believes the regulation should achieve, or providing 
background empirical or legal analysis, might be more informative to an agency.  
The paragraphs and phrases of such a comment might make it easier for agency 
205
 Remarks of Lee C. White, Brookings Institute Conf. on Administrative Regulation, Apr. 8, 
1971, quoted in Cramton, supra note__, at 530 n.14.
206
 Indeed, some scholars question whether agencies would pay much attention to any comments at 
all.  Over a decade ago Don Elliott colorfully observed that”Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to 
public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions – a highly stylized process 
for displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life takes place in other 
venues.”).  E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992).  What’s 
striking about this observation is how sharply at odds it is with the data I here present, for at least 
two reasons.  (1) The agencies responsible for each of the three regulations made a considerable 
number of changes in their regulations apparently in response to the notice and comment process 
(and claimed to do so in response to comments in the Federal Register statements accompanying 
the final rules).  (2) The individual members of the public making up the vast majority of 
commenters for each regulation did not have a parallel setting where they could have raised their 
concerns directly to the agency.  
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lawyers to assimilate and consider.  Indeed, some lawyers interviewed for this 
article specifically say that they do.207  My data support this view.  They provide 
at least some initial quantitative evidence that sophistication may affect the 
agency's willingness to make a change in the regulatory rules in response to 
comments (financial privacy, and maybe electoral regulation).
Let me elaborate. Think about the people who do choose to participate in 
notice and comment proceedings by sending in a comment.  For those lawyers 
and commentators inclined to compromise acceptance and seeking to take 
democratic theory seriously, there would be some cause for concern if the people 
who sought to participate had dramatically different degrees of sophistication to 
make their points.  Such concern would be based on (a) the plausible intuition that 
differences in sophistication (in addition to differences in political power) might 
affect agency reactions to comments, and (b) the notion that differences in 
sophistication do not parallel distinctions in the strength of the normative claim 
someone has to participation in the development of regulatory policy. In fact, as 
Table 5 shows, when examining a pooled dataset of all comments across 
regulations, sophistication appears to predict whether the agency adopted 
commenter suggestions.  The sophistication variable is highly statistically 
significant even when we control for whether the comment is coming from an 
entity regulated by the agency.208  I use logistic regression to calculate the extent 
to which the probability of the agency’s accepting recommendations in a 
comment can be predicted from comment sophistication.  As a rough proxy of the 
commenter’s political and economic influence, control for whether the commenter 
is among those who are the most direct targets of regulation.  Other things being 
equal, a one unit increase in sophistication would lead to a Y increase in the odds
that a commenter’s suggestion would be incorporated by the agency.
At the margin, it would be easier to accept the status quo (for people with 
the above-described beliefs) if it turned out that participants in the notice and 
comment process all had similar degrees of sophistication to make their 
arguments.  It turns out that’s not the case, as I demonstrate in thre three 
regulatory case studies.  The lay public tends to have lower sophistication than 
207 See NRC Lawyer Interview, FEC Lawyer Interview # 1, FEC Lawyer Interview # 2, Treasury 
Lawyer Interview # 1, Treasury Lawyer Interview # 2, FCC Lawyer Interview.
208
 I used ordinary binary logistic regression.  This result is tentative because I’m sometimes 
dealing with small numbers of observations, which make it harder to include controls in the 
model.  The appendix discusses other aspects of my methodology.  I checked for rubustness of 
these results in several ways.  First, I conducted the same binary logistic regression analyses for 
each regulation separately and I found significant effects in each case (though may be a higher risk 
of a multicollinearity problem in the case of the campaign finance data).  I also obtained some 
effect when using alternative control variables, such as those accounting for the substantive issue 
raised by a commenter’s concern.  Sophistication was also a significant predictor of agency 
acceptance of comment suggestions when examining only comments received from the lay public, 
from directly regulated entities, and from organized interest groups that were mass membership 
organizations, or groups asserting that they had a “public interest” goal. 
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organized interest groups, and even people among the lay public vary in their 
sophistication.  
Three plausible theories help explain sophistication’s apparent impact 
here.  As some of them claim, agency lawyers may be willing (or even eager) to 
respond to commenter concerns, but have a limited budget of time and energy to 
respond to commenters that raise an identifiable concern without recommending 
an explicit, credible means of addressing that concern.209  Agencies could also be 
viewing sophistication as a proxy for litigation risk, either because sophisticated 
commenters are considered more likely to be capable of initiating litigation 
themselves, or because more sophisticated comments might draw closer scrutiny 
from courts reviewing the agency’s action and its justifications.210  Finally, the 
more sophisticated commenters may think about the regulations in a 
fundamentally different way, which might affect not only how they appeal to the 
agency but what their appeal requests on a substantive or procedural level.  
Possible though it is for new information or assistance in understanding law to 
have such a deeper transformative effect, it’s not necessarily all that different 
from convincing a commentator to be strategic.211  In the Conclusion, I propose 
further research to assess these different theories.
Of course, many facets of life in a democracy reflect variations in 
sophistication, including (among others) participation in the mass media, speech-
making, and jury service.  Who knows whether it’s possible or even desirable to 
redress these.  My immediate purpose is to emphasize that compromise 
acceptance of the regulatory democracy status quo should not rest on the notion 
that individual members of the public and organized interests deciding to 
participate in the notice and comment process have comparable ability to get their 
point across to the agency.  Nor should it rest on the notion that such ability is 
irrelevant to what agencies do with regulations at the end of the day.
209
 There’s nothing implausible about suggesting that government officials’ need to make cognitive 
or analyitcal efforts might have distributional consequences on what government institutions do.  
Cf. KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991).  It may seem 
somewhat less plausible to think that agency lawyers and staff would have an interest in giving 
effect to commenter recommendations.  Nonetheless, in my interviews with agency lawyers who 
worked on these regulations, many insisted their major roadblock to considering individual 
comments is that they raise a concern but don’t offer concerete recommendations to resolve that 
concern.  See Interview with FEC Lawyer # 1, Interview with FEC Lawyer # 2; Interview with 
NRC Lawyer.  These responses, in turn, are consistent with accounts suggesting that lawyers and 
agency staff have interests other than just minimizing the distance between agency policy and 
their own preferred outcomes, or that they believe that more sophisticated comments can 
sometimes raise concerns (or offer insights) that can result in pareto improvements to the 
regulation.
210 See Overton Park, __ U.S. at ___.
211
 Indeed, if there were some way to increase an individual commenter’s sophistication, she might 
not necessarily change her views about the value of oral hearings in nuclear licensing or the 
offensive nature of reductions in financial privacy.  What she might be willing to do is to 
recommend a mild change moving the regulation in her preferred direction if the agency would 
therefore consider the propsed change more seriously.
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Table 5
Logistic Regression Predicting Comment Acceptance From Sophistication and 
Status as a Target of Regulation (All Three Regulations)
Total sophistication 
controlling for 
status as a 
regulated party
Adjusted 
sophistication 
controlling for 
status as a 
regulated party
Status as a 
regulated party
Variables and Results
Constant
B -9.223†† -5.57†† -4.409††
Std. Error .611 .273 .178
Wald Stat. 227.5 .415 614.6
Odds ratio 
(Exp [B]) 0 .004 .012
Regulated Party
B 5.742†† 5.228†† 6.318††
Std. Error .587 .502 .419
Wald Stat. 95.6 108.6 227.9
Odds ratio 
(Exp [B]) 311.8 186.3 .554.7
Total Sophistication 
(qualitative)
B 2.124 - -
Std. Error .185 - -
Wald Stat. 131.6 - -
Odds ratio 
(Exp [B]) 8.362 - -
Adjusted Sophistication 
(qualitative x comment length)
B - .478†† -
Std. Error - .055 -
Wald Stat. - 76.78 -
Odds ratio 
(Exp [B]) - 1.613 -
Model Summary
-2 Log Likelihood 222.5 270.7 394.2
Cox & Snell R-Squared
.18 .166 .127
Nagelkerke R-Squared
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.737 .677 .519
Models specified (and coefficients calculated) using ordinary binary logistic (logit) regression 
procedures.  A “*” denotes significance at the .25 level, “**” at the .15 level, “***” at the .05 level, “†” 
at the .01 level, and “††” at the .001 level.  Though significance tests provide a basis for probabilistic 
inference in statistical samples, they also shed light on the likely importance of statistical relationships 
in populations.
vi.  Assumption # 6:  A Fixed Public Dearth of Sophistication
Questions of regulatory policy often turn on insights gleaned from 
rigorous risk analysis, complex technical information, or nuanced legal 
distinctions, where someone competent considers the extent to which a regulation 
might achieve a particular benefit given a certain cost.  Yet laypeople have 
difficulty understanding information about probabilities.  Some commentators 
have argued for insulating administrative agencies from political and public 
interference on this basis.212  Such a view might further bolster compromise 
acceptance of our current regulatory democracy, given a perception that the 
public's too unsophisticated to think about technical regulatory policy.
Yet this claim also turns out to be unavailaing.  There are, first of all, 
multiple publics -- some of whom routinely display sophistication (and we can see 
that from the comments).213  Unaffiliated experts, for example, are likely to have 
212 See Sunstein, Risk & Reason, supra note 3, at ___; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT 
STATE 139 (2002)(defending default rules giving agencies wide latitude to conduct-cost benefit 
analysis even when the legislature has not explicitly allowed it, in order to “increase the rationality 
and sense of regulatory policy”).
213 If there were simply an unadulterated “public will” existing in the abstract, it would be easy to 
evaluate a preference aggregation scheme by comparing the result of the scheme to the preexisting 
public will.  But that is not possible.  Moreover, to the extent that some mechanism appears to get 
closer to this ideal through direct democracy, this does not necessarily make the resulting system 
“better.” A recent case highlights some of the possible drawbacks of simply incorporating a 
referendum into the administrative process. In 1995, the Buckeye Community Hope Foundation 
purchased land zoned for apartments in the City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio and set out to build 
Pleasant Meadows, an affordable housing complex.  See City of Cuhayoga Falls v. Buckeye 
Community Hope Foundation, avail. at 2003 WL 1477301 (2003). Using low-income tax credits, 
the Buckeye Community Hope Foundation (Buckeye) obtained financing, bought some land 
zoned for apartments – and then ran into a problem.  As the plan wound its way through the small 
city’s Planning Commission and City Council, a vocal group of city residents coalesced to oppose 
Pleasant Meadows. They complained to the Planning Commission, which imposed various 
conditions on the project, including that Buckeye build an earthen wall around the whole project.  
Buckeye agreed, and the Planning Commission unanimously approved the project, recommending 
it to the City Council.  
The opponents of Pleasant Meadows were undaunted.  The City Council meetings 
scheduled to discuss Pleasant Meadows were anything but pleasant.  Cuyahoga Falls’ Mayor came 
to express his personal opposition to Pleasant Meadows.  So did angry residents, who voiced a 
number of concerns about the low-cost apartments: that the development would bring an influx of 
families with children, that the families who lived there would cause crime and drug activity to 
escalate, and (indeed) that it would attract a population similar to the one on Prange Drive, which 
happened to be Cuyahoga Falls’ only predominantly African American neighborhood.  None of 
this swayed the City Council, which approved the project in April 1996 over the objections of the 
Mayor and a growing group of angry residents.  Twenty eight days after the Council approved 
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plenty of sophistication about a regulation under discussion, whether it involves 
fishing rights in the Pacific Northwest or financial transaction recordkeeping 
requirements.  Perhaps more significantly, sophistication is endogenous to how 
one gets participation -- even for members that are less competent to begin with.
It would make little sense to involve members of the public in risk 
analysis or cost evaluation if people were irrevocably unwilling or unable to 
understand the subtleties involved.  But the fact that people use mental short-cuts 
does not necessarily imply that different approaches to public engagement are 
incompatible with reasoned decision-making about risk.  Sometimes heuristics 
may represent a reasonable way for people to economize on decision costs.214  Of 
course, heuristics sometimes lead people astray.  For example, people often have 
trouble evaluating risk215 – and much of regulatory policy involves heavy doses of 
risk analysis. 
But this observation merits a few answers.  First, people do not always 
ignore probability information.216   Second, regulation is not entirely about risk.  
Pleasant Meadows, its opponents filed a petition pursuant to local law requesting that the 
ordinance approving Pleasant Meadows be submitted to a popular vote, which the City allowed 
voters the “power to approve or reject at the polls any ordinance or resolution passed by the 
Council” within 30 days of the ordinance’s passage). Cuyahoga Falls City Charger, Art. 9, § 2, 
App. 14.  The petition led to a referendum, in which voters decisively rejected the prospect of 
Pleasant Meadows.  
The use of the referendum here raises a few problems.  A mass election did not appear to 
be the setting for participants to consider the long-term costs and benefits of building Pleasant 
Meadows.  If anything, the opposite happened: the facts suggest that the referendum drive was 
fueled in part by racial animus against the black voters who would be the likely beneficiaries of 
Pleasant Meadows.  Yet the nature of equal protection doctrine virtually eliminated Buckeye’s 
ability to challenge the referendum as a means of race discrimination because of the difficulty of 
proving intent from the voters participating. The Ohio Supreme Court eventually found the 
referendum invalid on the ground that the Ohio State Constitution authorizes referendums only in 
relation to legislative acts, not administrative acts, such as the site-plan ordinance.  As this article 
demonstrates, the rationale for such a distinction is not as strong as it seems.  Nonetheless, the 
problems with referenda remain.
214 See, e.g., LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note ___, at ____ (discussing how retrospective 
evaluations on key issues and other heuristics can help voters discipline policians); Sniderman, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at ____.
215
 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) at 
3.
216 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 67-68 (2002).    Sunstein 
writes:
By drawing attention to probability neglect, I do not mean to suggest that most people, 
most of the time, are indifferent to large variations in the probability that a risk will come 
to fruition.  Large variations can, and often do, make a difference – but when emotions 
are engaged, the difference is far less than the standard theory predicts.  Nor do I suggest 
that probability neglect is impervious to circumstances.  If the costs of neglecting 
probability are placed “on screen,” then people will be more likely to attend to the 
question of probability.
RETHINKING REGULATORY DEMOCRACY 69
Section 314, for example, also required the agency to make decisions about the 
extent of financial institutions’ administrative costs, and degree of financial 
privacy protections that should exist given the absence of a constitutional right to 
such privacy.217  Third, experts also have some problems dealing with risk: they 
sometimes neglect or overestimate considerable risks idiosyncratically or in as a 
result of how their professional task is defined.218  This means that disparaging 
heuristics does not necessarily imply that experts should replace laypeople.  It is 
no surprise that experts are often better at understanding risk and other complex 
concepts that affect regulation, but that understanding is itself not impervious to 
the impact of cognitive short-cuts.  Fourth, people’s failure to consider 
probabilities in a normatively defensible way can often be affected by the choice 
situation – which is just another application of the larger principle that 
sophistication is partly endogenous to the choice setting.219  Fifth, some 
alternative approaches to public engagement could involve experts or other 
stakeholders who might be as sophisticated as the decisionmakers within the 
agency.  Sixth, there is at least an open question whether some of the public’s 
likely distortions in considering risk (i.e., the dread of dying one way versus 
another way) should affect the assessment of certain risks.220  The case studies 
show, moreover, that regulation is not just about risk analysis.  It’s hard to tell a 
story where decisions about how to interpret campaign finance laws or financial 
privacy concerns turn entirely (or even primarily) on risk, unless of course the 
concept of risk is stretched to the point that it loses all meaning.   
Could the public gain the necessary sophistication to take part in all the 
subtleties of regulatory judgment? In fact the conventional wisdom is that most 
members of the public lack both the insight and coherence to play a useful role in 
informing regulatory policy.221  Laypeople tend to experience the world by using 
heuristics that simplify the complexity of their environment.222   Some of the 
problems people have in understanding risk are predictable, and so they can 
probably be corrected to some extent: in short, the mental short-cuts are not 
217
 Moreover, there is a distinction between risk – involving situations where probabilities can be 
assigned – and uncertainty – where probabilities are not known.  SEE JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING 
TECHNICAL CHANGE 185-207 (1983). While subjective probability estimates from experts are 
probably a great place to start in thinking about uncertainty, it may not be the only ingredient one 
would want to consider.  Cf. McGarity, supra note___, at ___.  
218 See, e.g., SCOTT SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY 250-55 (1993)(discussing problems in expert 
estimates of nuclear weapons safety).
219 See, e.g., HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK 91-92 (1996).
220
 Put differently, it may be very difficult in principle (and not just because of heuristics people 
use) to separate the evaluation of dreaded risks from the act of calculating its risk by itself.  This is 
admittedly questionable – but it is not obvious that such “dread” should always be rejected.   
221 See, e.g., Breyer, supra note___, at ___.  See also Rossi,  supra note___, at ___; Sunstein, Risk 
and Reason, supra note___, at ___.
222 See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note ___, at ____.  See also Sniderman, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined..
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unchangeable.223  Their use depends to some extent on the environment.224  If 
people experience a change of setting or motivation, they can change the mental 
short-cuts they use to make sense of a problem.225  People can probably display 
some additional sophistication and less reflexive reliance on a mental short-cuts if 
they think their opinion matters and they have access to more information.226  In 
contrast, public opinion polls only provide a momentary snapshot of what people 
think; providing people with information, and allowing them to think about it or 
deliberate, can result in something more meaningful.227
What all this implies is that individuals’ sophistication could be catalyzed 
enough to understand complicated regulations.  This observation is consistent 
with the preceding discussion of democratic accountability in the administrative 
pluralism model of public engagement.  Even the seemingly ridiculous comments 
about the public financing rules or the financial privacy rules pursuant to Section 
314 of the Patriot Act cannot be dismissed completely, because a different process 
might evoke more sophisticated responses from these very same commenters.  
This might be achieved for two different reasons: (1) a different process (i.e., 
explicitly putting risk profiles “on screen”) could inform the participants in some 
regulatory proceeding about what is at stake, and correct some of the limitations 
of the mental short-cuts they might be using; (2) signaling to someone that their 
opinion matters might give them incentives to become informed and analyze 
information on their own.228
223 See, e.g., PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 190 (2000).  Slovic reviews experimental 
evidence on perceptions of risk and concludes that “an accident that takes many lives may produce 
relatively little social disturbance… if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-understood system 
(e.g., a train wreck).  However, a small accident in an unfamiliar system…, such as a nuclear 
reactor or a recombinant DNA laboratory, may have immense social consequences if it is 
perceived as a harbinger of further and possibly catastrophic mishaps.”).
224 See, e.g.,  James P. Morris et al., Activation of Political Attitudes: A Psychophysiological 
Examination of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis, 24 POL. PSYCH. 727 (2003)(affectively charged 
political stimulus can affect evaluations of information).
225 See Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note ___, at 265 (describing how risk communication 
studies successfully informed the redesign of EPA information). 
226 See supra note ___, at  ___ (discussing research showing how changes in the setting can 
provoke people to use more sophisticated cognition to understand a complex problem).
227
 An entire research program in political science at one point seemed to indicate that public’s 
views were suffused with attitudes that had little if any coherence.  See See Helmut Norpoth & 
Milton Lodge, The Difference Between Attitudes and Nonattitudes in the Mass Public:  Just 
Measurement? 29 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 291 (1985) (noting that instability in responses to political 
attitude surveys is partly explained by “nonattitudes,” where respondents provide an opinion 
indicating that they have a particular attitude about an issue when they may not).. See also
Luskin, supra note ___, at ____.  This research program, coupled with the inconsistencies and 
shortcomings in responses revealed by regular public opinion polls, makes some people question 
whether the public can ever make a useful direct contribution to choices in policymaking.
228
 Both theories of rational choice and theories of social cognition imply that it makes a difference 
to convince participants that their opinion matters.  For a rational choice perspective, see Morris P. 
Fiorina, A Dark Side of Civic Engagement in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 395, 
418 (Theda Skocpol and Morris Fiorina, eds. 1999).  Fiorina models the decision to participate as 
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D.  Synthesis:  Reassessing Current Regulatory Democracy
My data show that at least some members of the public are at least 
somewhat interested in playing a role in shaping regulation.  Democratic theory 
implies that these and other members of the public should play a role in shaping 
regulations that will affect them at least as much as the statutes passed by 
representatives they have directly elected.  Reasonable versions of democratic 
theory also show the problems with the existing notice and comment process.  
Because the public’s interest in regulations and their ability to understand them is 
not fixed, then problems might be mitigated through procedures that catalyze 
public imagination and capacity.
But even if someone wanted to change the status quo, would it be feasible 
to do so?  For some people who believe in compromise acceptance, the status quo 
may be reasonable not only because of empirical suppositions that make it seem 
valuable, but also because there's no feasible alternative.  Some people might 
even readily acknowledge that current regulatory democracy is not an ideal way 
of making regulatory policy, but may not believe the status quo can be feasibly 
resolved.  For example, some might emphasize that if there's no way to promote 
higher sophistication among the public, more participation means lower-quality 
decisionmaking.229  Others might suggest that no changes are feasible because 
agencies cannot be trusted to expand participation impartially.  The following 
section engages these arguments by asking how we might plausibly design a 
feasible institutional structure to let members of the public more directly 
contribute to the regulatory decisions that shape their lives.
IV.
REDESIGNING REGULATORY DEMOCRACY
Modern government makes it easier for some people to voice their 
concerns than for others.  Because the “public will” is self-evident, democracy 
a function of the individual’s expected utility of participating (call this Ep), which is in turn a 
function of the probability the individual’s action is decisive for the outcome (call this p), the 
individual’s assessment of the alteranative compared to the status quo (B), and the costs of 
participating (c).  Thus Ep = p(B) – c.  Holding B and c constant, raising p results in a larger Ep, 
which gives an individual a greater reason to participate.  For a social cognition perspective on the 
impact of convincing a participant that their voice matters, see Norman Frohlich and Joe A. 
Oppenheimer, Choosing Justice in Expermiental Democracies with Production, 84 AM. POLI. SCI. 
REV. 461 (1990)(using experiments to show expanded productivity and effort among individuals 
given a chance to participate in decision about social rules).
229 See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note ___ at 211 (“[T]here is some tradeoff between the quantity and 
quality of individual political engagement”
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requires that views must be aggregated somehow.  It is the scheme chosen to do 
that – whether some kind of direct democracy, voting in geographic districts, or 
the notice-and-comment process – which determines the content of what counts as 
public’s will.230
More than 30 years ago a small group of scholars and policymakers 
writing about administrative law recognized this basic point and used it to buttress 
their case for reforming regulatory democracy to respond to silent voices.  “An 
agency promulgating rules affecting the poor cannot assume that it automatically 
knows what is best for such people,” wrote law professor Arthur Bonfield in 
1969.231  While “the ample personal economic resources and relatively well-
financed organizations of middle and upper income Americans usually assure 
their particular interests adequate representation in federal administrative 
rulemaking,” he continued, “under-privileged persons are usually unable to keep 
themselves adequately informed of…rulemaking authority affecting their 
interests.”232  Three years later, U.S. Administrative Conference Chairman Roger 
Cramton added that:
230
 The preference-aggregation mechanism (or “institutions”) can impact the derivation of the 
public’s “will” in at least two different ways: most directly (and obviously), institutions determine 
how preferences are counted up.  See, e.g., Sam Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing 
Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, 
Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503 (1981). See 
generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, AND RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF 
DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 2001).  But institutions can also shape how people develop preferences over 
time.  See, e.g. Cass R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 17 (1997).  Sunstein aptly 
describes why taking preferences “as a given” seems to ignore the fact that preferences are always 
constructed according to the context:
[T]he initial allocation creates the basic ‘reference state’ from which values and 
judgments of fairness are subsequently made, and those judgments affect preferences and 
private willingness to pay.  Of course, a decision to make an entitlement alienable or 
inalienable (consider the right to vote or reproductive capacities) can have preference-
shaping effects.  Because of the preference-shaping effects of the rules of allocation, it is 
difficult to see how a government might even attempt to take preferences ‘as given’ or as 
the basis for decisions in any global sense.
231 See Bonfield, supra note___, at 512.
232 Id. at 511. Bonfield provided no empirical evidence to support this proposition.  But subsequent 
studies of income effects on political participation support his intuition.   In their comprehensive 
volume on the social and economic characteristics of political participation in the U.S., Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady find (unsurprisingly) that family income is a statistically significant 
predictor of overall political participation (measured in as an aggregate function encompassing 
voting, working on a campaign, and other forms of political activity).  See Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady, supra note__, at 352.  Comparisons in specific political activity between higher income 
voters (earning $75,000 a year or more) and lower income ones (earning $15,000) are a bit more 
striking: while only 52% of lower income individuals surveyed voted in the last election, 86% of 
higher-income ones did.  Fully 73% of higher income individuals in the sample were affiliated 
with a political organization, while only 29% of lower income ones were, and while 56% of higher 
income respondents made campaign contributions, 6% of lower income ones did.  Id. at 190.  
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Those who believe that it is important, within limits that are bounded by 
considerations of agency effectiveness and efficiency, to improve the 
administrative process by broadening public participation have a special 
obligation to develop institutions that will do the job without crippling the 
administrative process.233
Unfortunately, this brief episode of interest in reforming regulatory democracy 
was rarely if ever accompanied by compelling theoretical justifications or detailed 
institutional designs to meet charges such as Cramton’s.  Neither was it followed 
by a sustained move within government towards “experimentation” with 
alternative methods of regulatory democracy that could provide insights to “serve 
as the basis for more general reform.”234
This Part takes up Cramton’s charge.  It scrutinizes the argument that 
“feasibility problems” preclude the implementation of any reasonable alternatives 
to current regulatory democracy.  I find that argument wanting.  I use an extended 
thought experiment to sketch the broad outlines of alternative procedures for 
public consultation that could either assist in representing relevant interests or 
foster majoritarian deliberation.  Both of those approaches could be achieved 
through the creation of a participation agency to select and inform small groups of 
participants about the relevant regulation.  The agency could deploy regulatory 
“public defenders” to give such groups legal representation in the regulatory 
rulemaking process.  The financial and administrative costs are reasonable, 
particularly given that participants would not have a veto over regulations and the 
financial could be scaled by initially focusing only on particularly important 
regulations.  This arrangement could also yield a number of practical benefits.  
The work of the participation agency would rapidly generate knowledge about 
how to structure public consultation that might be relevant beyond the domain of 
federal regulation.  It could spur innovation in the development of methods to 
integrate public perception with rigorous analyses of risks and costs.  The 
alternative procedures I sketch here could also greatly enrich agencies’ knowledge 
of how the public responds to regulations under changing circumstances, a benefit 
particularly important where the viability of regulations (such as the speed limit or 
campaign finance restrictions) depend in some important measure on mass public 
compliance.
A.  Two Alternative Approaches to Regulatory Democracy: Corrective Interest 
Representation and Majoritarian Deliberation
While respondents feeling “no financial pinch” engaged in a mean number of 2.3 political acts 
during the previous year, recipients receiving food stamps engaged in .9 political acts.  Id. at 209.
233 See Cramton, supra note__, at 546.
234 Id.  But see Part II.a (briefly discussing limited efforts in government agencies during the late 
1970s to broaden participation, most of which were abandoned).
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There’s no way to move beyond current regulatory democracy (or even to 
judge whether such a move is advisable) without addressing the persistent view 
that no viable changes are practically feasible.  Though I dismiss most of the 
“feasibility” problems in the pages that follow, it’s best to start by proposing a 
reasonable definition of feasibility.  It would be hard to accept such a definition if 
it did not include some of the following elements.  Any mechanism for consulting 
the public should not dramatically raise the financial cost of developing 
regulations.  Neither should it disrupt the regulatory state’s existing capacity to 
analyze complicated technical and scientific information.235  A feasible 
alternative, moreover, should incorporate some way to mitigate the drawbacks 
associated with most versions of direct democracy, where apparently 
unsophisticated voters to little to enrich the policymaking process.236  Finally, 
reforms in regulatory democracy should not weigh down the regulatory process 
by just adding veto players.237
The proposals that follow live up to this definition.  They also compare 
favorably to reforms that keep demand-driven procedures but rely on the Internet 
to achieve ambitious goals,238 or those that simply allow an agency writing 
regulations to pick and fund intervention from outside representatives of the 
larger public.239  They take advantage of the regulatory state’s existing institutions 
235 Cf. Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note___, at ___ (“[A] well-functioning democracy seeks 
above all to produce policies that will, in fact, improve people’s lives… The task for the future is to 
develop institutions that will respond to people’s values, not to their errors.”).
236 Cf. Ortiz, supra note___, at 215 (“The problem is that the voters do not have an adequate 
incentive to listen.  This is, in other words, largely a demand, not a supply problem and subsidies 
and penalties directed at merely showing up [and voting] will do little to fix it”).  In taking this 
position, Ortiz seems to neglect the extent to which effort and engagement are endogenously 
determined by the process through which individual views are solicited in the first place.  
237 Cf. Thomas O. McGarity, The Court and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to 
Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997).
238 See GAO, Electronic Rulemaking: Efforts to Facilitate Public Participation Can Be Improved, 
REP’T TO THE COMM. ON GOVT. AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE (avail. at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03901.pdf) (Sept. 17, 2003).  Of course the Internet and other 
technologies can enhance various features of my proposed regulatory reforms, but it is not (by 
itself) some magical fix for issues involving regulatory democracy.
239
 Some of the problems with this approach are underscored nicely by a study conducted over 20 
years ago of the Federal Trade Commission’s experience with a program designed to fund public 
participation in agency proceedings.  See Barry B. Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency 
Proceedings: The Federal Trade Commission Experience, 70 GEO. L. REV. 51 (1981).  Boyer 
notes the agency’s problem in finding a principled rationale to pick certain representatives of 
consumer interests over others.  He then turns to how lodging responsibility for the program 
within the FTC itself inexorably entangled the participation program in controversies about the 
agency’s overall regulatory agenda.  He notes:
The agency’s activism had provoked powerful opposition and most of its activities were 
regarded with suspicion, if not hostility.  The agency’s aggressive use of its rulemaking 
powers during the period studied also tended to make the compensation program less 
necessary, and its accomplishments less visible than they otherwise might have been.  If 
RETHINKING REGULATORY DEMOCRACY 75
without disrupting the capacity of analysts, economists, scientists, and lawyers to 
develop sophisticated technical analyses of regulatory programs.  The costs are 
manageable when compared to other costs borne in the development of 
regulations, such as economic analysis or enforcement costs.  Moreover, the costs 
are scalable, so if only scarce resources are available the techniques I describe 
could be used to focus on particularly important regulations.240  Regardless of 
whether the proposals end up applying to only a small subset of regulations at first 
or to most of them, my proposals don’t simply add veto players that would further 
paralyze the regulatory process.  Instead they add to the rulemaking record that 
can be used by agencies to support regulations and by courts to review agencies’ 
work.  Most crucially, these approaches solve the problems associated with the 
more quotidian versions of direct democracy by obtaining a manageable number 
of participants who can be coaxed toward thinking about regulatory problems in a 
more sophisticated way.
i.  Corrective Interest Representation
Suppose one believes that people should take part in regulatory decisions 
when they will be materially afffected.  This is not an unreasonable premise in the 
regulatory state.  Practices like negotiated rulemaking occasionally involve 
agencies in figuring out who might be affected by a particular rulemaking 
proceeding.241  Through negotiated rulemaking, the agency determines who might 
be interested in participating in the rulemaking proceeding in order to reach an 
early consensus on the proposed rule.  But the point of negotiated rulemaking is 
not explicitly to identify people or constituencies who might have a particular 
interest and yet run the risk of being unrepresented.  Instead, the major purpose of 
negotiated rulemaking is to enhance rules, reduce litigation, and shorten the 
rulemaking process by providing a mechanism for consensus rulemaking 
proposals.242
direct funding is intended to counterbalance the persuasive powers of the regulated 
industry, it was hardly desirable to test the concept in an agency like the FTC, where the 
chairman admitted publicly that staff attorneys had conducted anti-business “vendettas” 
in rulemaking proceedings.  The FTC of the 1970s, in many respects, was a particularly 
unfortunate time and place to experiment with direct funding for public participation.  
Beyond the unhappy circumstances in which the agency compensation program 
developed, however, was the underlying dilemma involved in striking an acceptable trade 
off between participants’ technical competence and grassroots participation.  
Id., at 140 (citations omitted).
240
 OMB already draws some distinctions in the “importance” of regulations, and additional 
methods could be developed to distinguish among them. 
241 See generally Matthew J. McKinney, Negotiated Rulemaking:  Involving Citizens in Public 
Decisions, 60 MONT. L. REV. 499 (1999).
242
 Note that negotiated rulemaking does not always seem to live up to its expectations.  See, e.g., 
Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L. REV. 
386 (2001).
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Imagine extending just one aspect of the agency’s mandate during a 
negotiated rulemaking procedure, identifying interests that are likely to be 
particularly affected by the regulation, and transferring this mandate to a 
specialized agency charged with selecting participants who will be affected by the 
regulation but are unlikely to speak up on their own.  The goal here would not be 
to speed up the regulatory process but instead to do something that might seem to 
go in precisely the opposite direction: including people who will clearly be 
impacted by the regulation but may lack the sophistication to gracefully articulate 
their concerns, and giving those people a chance to constructively voice their 
interests.  The process would involve at least three components: (1) selecting a 
“corrective” sample of people, (2) providing a setting in which they could voice 
their concerns in a way that corrects for deficiencies in sophistication (i.e., 
through assistance from counsel or a facilitator), and (3) devising a process 
through which an agency would be nudged to take seriously the resulting 
opinions.  A lawyer from the agency or an independent agency might then be 
charged with advocating for the group’s ideas.243
Imagine how this could work in the context of the financial privacy 
regulation I discussed above.  The agency charged with issuing the regulations 
(i.e., Treasury), perhaps along with a separate specialized agency focused on 
public engagement (call it a participation agency),244 make an initial 
determination about who is likely to be particularly affected by the regulations but 
unlikely to represent themselves – including, among others, smaller banks and 
credit unions, bank employees, or legitimate customers particularly likely to be 
concerned about privacy.  No doubt that it would be difficult to design a 
defensible system for choosing “who will be especially affected yet unlikely to 
adequately represent themselves.”  
The participation agency would break down the task into a few different 
pieces.  One is to define the kinds of benefits and burdens that could be caused by 
the proposed regulation if it went into effect (i.e., privacy intrusions that could 
243
 The lawyer’s responsibility would be to represent overall tendency of the deliberative group’s 
conclusion.  In the absence of consensus, the lawyer would highlight the group’s majority 
position, with perhaps some brief additional attention to the views of any significant minority.  All 
of this raises the question of how the agenda for the group’s discussion will be set, how the 
materials and moderator for the discussion will be selected, and how the lawyer’s incentives will 
be structured to foster faithful representation of the group’s views.  These are not always easy 
questions, but they can be solved.  Jury deliberations, mock jury and focus group arrangements, 
deliberative polls, and experimental studies all shed some light on how to resolve the issue of 
agenda-setting, moderators, and materials.  The lawyers’ behavior can be addressed in part 
through employee selection and performance audits.  The effectiveness of these procedures in 
enticing lawyers to faithfully represent the group’s views still leaves the question of how 
executive branch officials, legislators, and interest groups affect the process.  I deal with this in 
Part V, infra. 
244
 The separate agency can serve as an important repository of expertise – which is hardly 
irrelevant here and may shed important light on how to determine who is interested.  A variation 
on this would make the centralized agency more specialized – focusing on the representation of 
people with particular kinds of interests, such as privacy concerns.  
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result in unauthorized disclosure, changes in the probability of being subjected to 
time-consuming, costly, or harrowing investigation, new tasks for financial 
institution employees).  Another is to make some considered judgment about who 
among members of the general population may disproportionately bear the 
preceding benefits and costs.245  This phase of the process could result, for 
example, in a conclusion that recent immigrants from the Middle East who make 
small wire transfers would be especially likely to trigger scrutiny.246  Finally, once 
the agency has made this determination, it might consider whether the 
constituencies disproportionately affected are constructively represented in the 
process.  This might include considering the sophistication (or even existence) of 
comments from some of the impacted constituencies.  The agency would then 
select a small number of people in the “underrepresented” constituencies to take 
part in the rulemaking process.247
How exactly would the selected participants take part in the regulatory 
process?  A mass of comments that do not even distinguish between the Patriot 
Act (let alone Section 314) and the regulations themselves would not be as useful 
as comments that acknowledge that Section 314 is the law of the land while 
providing specific suggestions of how to write the desired regulations.  At least 
two possibilities are worth considering here.  One is to provide people with a sort 
of deliberative forum.  Some group of people numbering between 7 and 15 might 
be chosen to receive information, with the chance to deliberate.248  They would all 
245
 The methodology for making this determination could range from relying in part on a sub-
sample of people who wrote in comments (admittedly an imperfect mechanism, but perhaps 
suitable for some issues) to computer simulations or good-faith estimates.  In any case, the goal 
here would be to get a picture of how the regulation might operate in a world where the agency 
making use of it (in this case, an entity like the FBI) would be making discretionary decisions 
about its use.
246 Cf. Cuéllar, supra note ___, at ____.
247
 The resulting assemblage of participations could not be called representative of the interests of 
the larger population.  While the notion of the government deciding who to include as affected 
parties may strike some as troubling, it is not without precedent: government agencies often have a 
legal obligation to consider the implication of a regulatory rule on some relatively unrepresented 
constituency, like small business.  See, e.g., Exec. Order 13272 (requiring agencies to consider the 
implications of their regulations on small businesses).  It is not obvious that allowing agencies to 
simply claim that they are considering the interests of a constituency results is better than actually 
getting people from that constituency to comment.  During the Carter Administration, the 
Department of Agriculture sought to obtain more comments from groups that were affected by 
regulations establishing agricultural marketing orders for commodities.  Among other things, the 
department investigated “public attitudes and views on a planned marketing order through a 
solicitation of comments mailed directly to affected groups.”  Kerwin, supra note___, at 171.
248
 For a discussion of the value of choosing groups of approximately this size, see SIDNEY VERBA, 
SMALL GROUPS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (1961).  Deliberation has its share of perils arising 
from group dynamics, see Lupia, supra note__, at___, but it is far from obvious that such perils 
outweigh the benefits of group discussions (particularly when led by a moderator trained to 
minimize some of the risks of group deliberation, such as insistence on consensus), and the 
efficiency benefits of structuring a process targeting multiple participants simultaneously (i.e., in 
contrast to the cost of having to provide, for example, 12 separate briefings to the participants).  
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get balanced materials explaining the arguments for and against the proposed 
regulation.249  Then they would get the chance to talk to each other and question 
experts from the agency about the possible alternatives.  The agency would use 
the existing proposed regulations as a basis for discussion.  The goal of the 
deliberation would not be to subject the regulations to an up-or-down vote but 
rather to elicit concerns, observations, and ideas about how the regulation should 
evolve.250  Part of what the process would have to accomplish is to separate the 
factual issues best resolved through expert analysis from interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute and policy judgments.  The deliberation group would be in a 
position to inform what to do about the latter but not necessarily the former.251
The corrective sample’s discussions then inform the rulemaking process 
and become part of the record.  Accordingly, the public can raise valid concerns 
given the statutory scheme, and these in turn can become a basis for litigation.  
Later I will consider other alternatives that give legal effect to the deliberations.252
In the meantime, the most important point is that the corrective sample’s 
deliberations would have some legal effect – for example, by creating a 
presumption in favor of a particular regulatory strategy, such as the issuance of 
Section 314 regulations with a remedy for unauthorized disclosure of sensitive 
financial information.
ii.  Majoritarian Deliberation
This leaves another alternative to current regulatory democracy, one that 
tries to enrich regulatory policymaking through majoritarian deliberation rather 
than enhancing the discussion among competing interests.  By this I mean the idea 
that decisions are best made by deliberative, electoral majorities or some sort of 
equivalent proxy.  A popular referendum is not the only way to involve a wider 
slice of the public in regulatory decisions.  Majoritarian deliberation implies a 
249
 The agency would prepare these with oversight from the centralized agency.
250 Cf. Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, supra note ___, at 463.  Their description of a deliberative poll in 
the United Kingdom provides one example of how the deliberation groups could function:
On Friday evening, the participants spent 45 minutes in plenary session being welcomed, 
watching a brief documentary describing the issues they would be discussing, and being 
reminded of what lay before them.  On Saturday, they spent three-and-a-half hours in 
small group discussions, then three hours in large group exchanges with panels of experts 
fielding questions, then another hour back in the small groups.
The difference here, of course, is that the subject matter is not as general as what participants in 
the deliberative poll had to discuss, and that the participants would collectively have the benefit of 
a lawyer (“a regulatory public defender”) to articulate their views to the agency writing the 
regulations.  Instead of fairly open-ended questions about criminal justice policy (for example), 
the basis for discussion among the deliberation groups would be the agency’s proposed rule.
251 See Part IV.a
252 See id. for additional technical details involving the presentation of information to the 
deliberation group.
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process where a majority makes a decision in accordance with its views about 
what would be best for the polity.253  Regardless of whether this is practically 
feasible (it may not be), it represents a particular view of what regulatory 
policymaking should be.  
To some people the legislature and organized interests are already 
providing a mechanism to represent (and perhaps even deliberate254 about) 
majority views.255  All this talk about a “majoritarian” deliberation alternative 
may therefore seem confusing since the regulatory rulemaking process is often 
analogized to the legislative process, which is often assumed to be majoritarian.256
But neither the rulemaking process nor legislation necessarily live up to this idea.  
For one, electoral majorities can differ in their views about regulatory policy 
when compared to mobilized, economically and politically powerful interest 
groups.257  The preceding sections highlight how different the reality of the 
regulatory rulemaking process is from some kind of ideal version of majoritarian 
deliberation.258 Contrast that with majoritarian deliberation, which aims to replace 
voters’ superficial ideas with informed opinions shaped by deliberation.  As with 
the corrective approach, the idea is that informing people and giving them a 
chance to deliberate could shed light on what satisfies their own interests.  In 
addition, the chance to learn and deliberate might signal to participants that there 
is some value in thinking beyond their self-interest when they consider the 
regulatory decision.259
253
 It is the sort of process reminiscent of Rousseau’s discission of the “general will.”  See JEAN-
JAQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT 5 (WORDSWORTH 
CLASSICS 1998) (1762).
254 See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, supra note___, at ___.  This aspiration 
of a deliberative legislature or agency staff is sometimes recognized to fall short of the reality, but 
the theorizing about how to close that gap is treated more as a matter of changing theories of 
governance and less as a matter of institutional design].
255 See, e.g., ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 150 (1989).
256 See generally ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM (2001).
257
 By “electoral majorities,” I mean majorities of voters in a particular jurisdiction.  What 
constitutes a majority obviously depends on the boundaries of the jurisdiction and the process 
through which preferences are aggregated.  See ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN, & PILDES, supra note 
230, at 1 (“At the heart of a democratic political order lies a process of collective decisionmaking 
that must operate through pre-existing laws, rules, and institutions.  The kind of democratic 
politics we have is always and inevitably itself a product of institutional forms and legal 
structures.”).
258 To be sure, elected politicians can intervene on behalf of electoral majorities to affect 
regulatory policy when the issues in question have mass political appeal.  But once again, this sort 
of argument assumes a view about democracy that has to be defended.  The regulatory pluralism 
view leaves it to interest groups and voters to figure out what matters in regulatory policy, and in 
politics more generally.  Anything that is not already important enough to voters when it comes 
time to vote or make a donation to an interest group is assumed not to matter.
259
 This is not meant to suggest that individual participants could ever (or should) put aside their 
own interests.  Such interests are important and the existing model does not represent these.  
Moreover, personal interests may serve as a heuristic through which voters can form views about a 
complicated policy.  Nonetheless, the deliberative process might expand the scope of that inquiry 
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The majoritarian deliberation approach largely follows a similar plan: 
there needs to be a way of selecting the sample of people, a space to deliberate 
and learn about the issue, and a means of giving their input at least some legal 
effect.  The major differences are in the selection of the sample and the goal of 
informing the participants.  Here the participation agency would not need to 
figure out a way to discern who might be especially affected.  Instead the 
animating vision of democracy here is to provide a group of laypeople (as a proxy 
for a majority) with the chance to shape the regulatory process.  If the goal is 
something other than a referendum, then the group would have to be small enough 
to make it feasible to educate its members and to give them a chance to deliberate 
among themselves.260  In short, the process would involve selecting a random 
sample of people from throughout the country, helping them understand Section 
314 (or nuclear licensing, campaign finance, or a hundred different regulatory 
domains), and asking them what they think.  As before, a lot of the choices about 
the structure of the deliberative process are really about how to create the 
relevance condition.  To the extent that such a relevance condition could be met, 
the majoritarian deliberation approach would focus on eliciting the views of 
people regarding what regulation would be in the putative interests of the polity, 
rather than on considering whether people with strong interests support or oppose 
the policy in question.
B.  The Institutional Design of a Participatory Bureaucracy and Regulatory 
Public Defenders
It takes special knowledge to run a new means of infusing agencies with 
public participation.  The new “participation agency” could handle a panoply of 
functions supporting the process of public participation in the regulatory process.  
A separate agency would have a specific mandate to enhance decisionmaking 
across agencies, without having to concern itself with competing tasks involving 
civil servants and political appointees who get invested with a specific point of 
view.  Its leadership might consist of a board of appointees with fixed, staggered 
terms.  Their job would be to supervise the staff in discharging a few interrelated 
functions.  First, the agency would promulgate rules261 for how members of the 
public would be selected to participate in deliberation groups.  Second, the agency 
would prepare risk and cost-benefit analysis materials that would be presented to 
either corrective or majoritarian deliberation groups.  These analyses would be 
and get people to think about how others might be affected.   Whether this happens because people 
are genuinely capable of altruism or because people simply further expand the scope of their own 
evaluations of their self-interest does not really matter that much.  The point is that they might 
view an issue differently when they have a chance to talk to people about it and learn about it.  Cf. 
Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, supra note ____, at ____.
260 See Hackman, supra note___, at___.
261
 The first set of rules could be promulgated subject to the traditional notice-and-comment 
process to avoid an infinite regress problem.
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designed to complement those of the agency with direct responsibility for the 
regulatory program.  Deliberation groups would therefore get more than one point 
of view about the risks, costs, and benefits associated with any given proposal.262
Third, the participation agency would provide trained moderators to facilitate the 
discussion among either the corrective or the majoritarian deliberation groups.  
Finally, the agency would provide the lawyers to take the contributions of 
participants and turn these into more sophisticated comments that would become 
part of the administrative record.
The agency would also have the responsibility of promoting the 
participation of people selected to be part of the deliberation group associated 
with the majoritarian deliberation approach.  This would require legislation giving 
people some incentive to participate (or forcing them to bear some cost if they did 
not).  Potential participants could be enticed with a financial reward, a mild 
penalty for non-participation, or a combination of both.  Otherwise valuable 
people would be excluded and there would be overrepresentation of people for 
whom the opportunity cost of participation is lower.  This is probably what 
happens when laypeople participate in the notice and comment process.  While 
the participants in the Section 314 rulemaking proceeding made intelligible 
contributions and raised concerns about an important issue, neither their degree of 
unsophistication, nor their substantive views, are likely to be representative of the 
larger public.  Members of the public with more sophistication are likely to be the 
kinds of people who face a higher opportunity cost from participating in 
rulemaking instead of spending time with their kids, their friends, their garden, or 
advancing their careers.  If reforms in regulatory democracy are to enrich the 
regulatory state with perspectives that are largely ignored today, then there must 
be participation from among these higher-opportunity cost folk.  In any case, the 
defining features of reforms would be to get participants as close to the actual
decision as possible, instead of keeping their input general.  The more specific the 
feedback, transmitted through a moderator or legal representative, the more 
possible it would be for the implementing agency to grapple directly with public 
input about specific proposals.263
262
 The participation agency could also generate information about how the public weighs trade-
offs between different regulatory programs, a project that would raise the separate question of how 
(and how much) to give effect to those participants’ preferences.  For present purposes I want to 
focus instead on how the participation agency would enhance the record in the context of the 
development of a single regulation.   
263
 Otherwise the implementing agency has to do all the work of translating vague opinions into 
regulations, which may be no different from agency responses to a vague delegation and therefore 
no different from the status quo.  Obviously, there is a limit to the public’s potential sophistication 
(even after all the institutional reforms I have described).  My point is that sophistication is not 
fixed in the “low” position.  The people participating in the corrective mechanism will have less of 
a challenge, because (by definition) they will be motivated by their stake in the outcome (they may 
even be experts with a “professional” stake in the regulatory policy).  The majoritarian mechanism 
could take advantage of techniques like panels of competing experts, contingent valuation, and 
pedagogically sound uses of analogical reasoning, the public participating 
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The agency would develop mechanisms to select the relevant sample and 
structure discussions among people (in a manner that mitigated any potential 
adverse effects to decisionmaking arising from collective discussions and from 
distinctions in the manner some members of the public consider risk-related 
probabilistic information).  For the corrective approach, the external agency could 
empanel groups of unaffiliated experts who would identify stakeholders for 
consultation.  For the majoritarian deliberation approach, the external agency 
could administer a system consisting primarily of jury service exemptions, 
perhaps supplemented by oversampling and incentives for people less likely to be 
subject to (even compulsory) jury service, or to select to carry out their jury 
service by participating in a majoritarian deliberation group.  Many members of 
the public have quite high opportunity costs arising from their desire to work, 
spend time with family, rest, or otherwise live life to the fullest.  They must be 
given an incentive to act.
The agency would then structure discussions among the selected 
participants.  The main goal of structuring the discussion is not necessarily to 
realize some deliberative ideal.  It’s just to have the public react to a specific 
agency policy proposal – such as that contained in the Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making (NPRM) – rather than some vague generality.  That’s what makes 
virtually any version of this reformed regulatory democracy different from 
proposals to hold deliberation days264 or deliberative polls.265  All that may be 
fine, but it still requires a regulatory state to translate ambiguous legal commands 
into regulatory rules and enforcement patterns, and therefore the question remains 
(even with deliberative polls and deliberation days) regarding how the regulatory 
agencies themselves should function.266
The agency’s role would further encompass the provision of regulatory 
public defenders – teams of lawyers whose role would be to promote the 
perspective of the group constituted to consider the regulatory proposal in 
question.  The agency could also leverage resources such as the Internet to 
promote and facilitate forms of participation consistent with the corrective and 
majoritarian deliberation approaches.  A reasonable oversight structure (perhaps 
similar to that of the Federal Election Commission) would be a critical ingredient 
of all this, to preserve the agency’s ability to act and appear in a manner that 
would be perceived as legitimate and politically unbiased.  The agency would also 
have to be at least somewhat insulated from interference from the president’s 
administration and the legislature’s.267  If such a reasonable oversight structure 
seems difficult to achieve, it is because the larger political conditions that it 
264 See Ackerman and Fishkin, supra note___.
265 See Luskin, Fishkin, and Plane, supra note___, at __.
266
 Of course, the concern of the external participation agency (and my concern here) is with how 
regulatory democracy can function, not with retooling every aspect of democracy itself.  While the 
alternatives I propose may be somewhat costly, they are rendered less so and more administrable 
because they are grafted onto an existing regulatory process.
267
 Such insulation need not be complete or permanent to achieve its broader objectives.
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requires – for example, where legislators support that structure when it’s created 
and over time -- seem unlikely to materialize.  In take this up in the final section.  
In the meantime, I recognize I’ve provided only a rough sketch of how the 
participatory bureaucracy would be designed.  Even such a sketch should make it 
amply clear that such a design is feasible and would help solve a number of 
practical problems that currently affect the regulatory state.  
There is also the question of how much all this would cost.268  Between 
1981 and 2000, the number of regulations considered important enough to be 
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget totaled 34,386.269  While this 
averages to about 3,800 a year, the number of rules reviewed in some years is 
considerably less (about 500 per year in the late 1990s).270  Depending on the 
details of how they are structured, the reforms might cost as little as a focus 
group.  The higher the projected cost, the more it would make sense to try the 
proposals through a pilot project.  Regardless of whether the new approaches are 
implemented through pilot projects, I do not expect the agency would to solve all 
the problems associated with the changes.  But it could help address them and in 
the process it would create opportunities to protect the public engagement process 
from naked manipulation by the agencies or their political superiors.
C.  Practical Contributions of Redesigned Regulatory Democracy
268
 Obviously, all of the benefits from alternative arrangements for regulatory democracy must be 
weighed alternatives will have some financial costs and logistical costs. See, e.g., Rossi, supra
note 221, at ___.Hiring moderators, lawyers, and analysts takes money, as does the compensation 
of people selected to be part of the deliberation groups.  Moreover, participation can slow down 
regulation.  Deliberation groups would need to be chosen, constituted, and dismissed.  Agency 
lawyers would need to take more time to think about the concerns raised in the deliberation 
groups.  Delay is not always a problem, as poorly thought-out regulation may be worse than no 
regulation at all.  But it may be a problem in the sense that statutes passed by Congress reflect an 
interest in getting regulations implemented.  All of this means that the benefits of the alternatives 
may not always exceed the costs. The question of regulatory agency inaction is worth thinking 
about separately.  One might think that Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), is wrong, but as 
it stands today it limits the public’s ability (or that of any interest group) to compel regulatory 
action.  Even if one does not accept that the alternative approaches rest on a uniformly “better” or 
more defensible approach to democracy, one might accept that choosing the right kind of approach 
to public engagement depends a little on the circumstances. For example, one might prefer some 
kind of corrective interest representation for nuclear licensing (with its explicit costs and benefits 
for regional populations) but some kind of majoritarian deliberation process to enrich the financial 
privacy regulations (given their impact across regions and social strata).
269 See Steven P. Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 846 (2003).  The Office of Management and Budget Reviews only 
“economically major” and otherwise “significant” rules, and only 1,693 were economically 
significant during the relevant time-period.
270 Id.
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The point of all these changes is as simple as it is profound: a redesigned 
system of regulatory democracy can achieve things – in particular, three – that the 
present system cannot.  The new system can leverage the existing structure of the 
regulatory state to experiment with alternative democratic arrangements involving 
the representation of interested constituencies or majoritarian deliberation.  That 
sort of experimentation can also extend to encompass the methods used to 
combine democratic participation with rigorous technical analyses of costs, 
benefits, and risk.  All of this can also yield valuable information about how the 
electorate views specific regulations – including some that depend on public 
support.271
i.  Creating a Framework for Democratic Experimentation that Leverages 
the Existing Structure of the Regulatory State
The legal machinery of the regulatory state opens up some possibilities for 
galvanizing participation that would be harder to achieve in a garden-variety 
collective decisionmaking process, like a town meeting or a school board election.  
In contrast to other collective decisionmaking procedures, the regulatory state 
does its regulatory work through institutions that are explicitly designed to 
integrate technical and legal decisionmaking with some kind of public input.  This 
makes it a little easier to solve the administrability problems that might arise with 
alternative approaches to public engagement.  This also turns out to be a way of 
educating the participants about regulations and what their development requires. 
All of this should make one question whether current regulatory democracy takes 
too narrow a view of public participation in the regulatory state.  
Experimenting with new forms of democracy forces regulators and the 
society to which they are supposed to be accountable to confront some important 
questions. Different issues may call for dissimilar versions of democracy.  If it is 
possible to solve the technical problems associated with the alternative 
approaches to public involvement in the regulatory state, then how is one to 
choose among them?  That depends on the version – or vision – of democracy that 
seems appropriate for particular kinds of problems.  The question is difficult 
because there is no one right answer.  Prosperous countries mix and match 
different kinds of democratic procedures successfully.272  The U.S. Constitution 
determines only a fraction of the rules for involving the public in regulatory 
decisionmaking.273  The rest can be changed by statute or executive branch 
271
 It makes no sense to assume that legislatures would be interested in obtaining these benefits, 
unless specific political circumstances arose.  Part IV discusses how and when legislators might 
support the alternatives.
272 See, e.g., DAVID M. FARRELL, COMPARING ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (1997).
273
 But note that the Constitution leaves open many of the most important rules of electoral 
competition.  The Voting Rights Act, the recent electoral reform legislation and associated 
appropriations, and the requirement that the House of Representatives have only 435 members are 
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practice.  Indeed, while the federal constitution’s architecture obviously relies 
heavily on representative politics,274 legislatures can delegate power.  That opens 
up the question of how democracy should work its way into the regulatory 
process, and what kind of democracy one prefers.  
Parallel to the question of what kind of democracy is desired is the 
question of how to integrate the views of experts and those of a larger public.  The 
alternative framework for regulatory democracy, and the participation agency in 
particular, can provide a reliable means for aggregating new insights about how to 
make this happen. Sometimes agencies use survey methods to shed light on the 
public’s “contingent valuation” of different states of the world.275  The fact that 
contingent valuation is already a reality might make the present project seem a bit 
besides the point.  Not so.  Far from being a reason to be skeptical about the 
regulatory democracy alternatives I discuss here, agencies’ interest in contingent 
valuation shows some of the possible contributions of a reformed conception of 
regulatory democracy.  For there is plenty to learn about how the public evalutes 
risks and considers regulatory alternatives.  Indeed, there’s considerable ground 
left to cover in combining rigorous risk analysis with public engagement.  The 
regulatory democracy alternatives leverage the existing institutional structure of 
the regulatory state not only to facilitate democratic experimentation, but to 
enhance the development of new mechanisms to consult the public about risk 
regulation.  Contingent valuation as it’s been practiced thus far in the regulatory 
state is not the only principled approach to consulting the public about risks, or 
about the costs they’d be willing to bear in order to reduce them.276
In some ways it seems the ambition of the regulatory state has always 
been to provide a legal mechanism for harmonizing expert judgment and public 
just a few examples of how some of the rules of the political game are not set directly by the 
constitutional text.
274
 The “Republican guarantee” clause has been held not to mean much of anything as a practical 
matter. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184 (1992) (finding no violation and stating 
“[T]he Guarantee Clause has been an infrequent basis for litigation throughout our history. In most 
of the cases in which the Court has been asked to apply the Clause, the Court has found the claims 
presented to be nonjusticiable under the "political question" doctrine.); Murtishaw v. Woodford, 
255 F.3d 926, 961 (9th Cir. 2001) (“challenge based on the Guarantee Clause, however, is a 
nonjusticiable political question”); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 27 (2nd Cir 1996) 
(noting traditionally “claims brought under the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable political 
questions” and to the extent that this is not always the case, exceptions are rare).  Direct 
democracy is not considered per se a violation of any federal constitutional guarantee against 
arbitrary decisions, see Cuhyoga Falls, __ U.S. at ___ (2003), or any other kind of constitutional 
guarantee for that matter.  
275 See ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL AND RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE 
PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 2 (Resources for the Future, 1989).
276 For one of the more illuminating discussions of this aspect of “contingent valulation” method, 
see John M. Heyde, Comment, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
331 (1995)(defining contingent valuation as “a controversial survey technique used to establish 
both the ‘use’ and ‘nonuse’ values [of a resource, where]… a surveyour asks ‘affected’ people 
how much they would pay to prevent contamination of a natural resource, or alternatively, how 
much they would demand to accept contamination”).
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input.  That’s what many of the system’s advocates and proponents say.277
Alternative mechanisms for public engagement need not give the public a 
monopoly on the content of a regulatory rule, any more than the existing system –
so strongly identified with the regulatory pluralism strand of thinking – gives 
commenters total control over the resulting rule.  The challenge is to strike a 
balance.  The alternative conceptions of regulatory democracy provide a means 
through which to do so.  One goal is to entice the administrative process to take 
public input seriously.  The other is to preserve the agency’s flexibility to act in 
accordance with executive branch policy prescriptions and the views of technical 
experts.  Which means one can imagine alternative methods of public input 
coexisting with technocratic schemes to inform regulatory policy, such as cost-
benefit analysis.278
ii.  Expanding Knowledge of Public Reactions to Regulations
Besides being useful in living up to a defensible standard of democracy in 
the regulatory state and in learning more about how to blend expert and lay 
opinion, reforms in regulatory democracy can also help enhance the effectiveness
of regulatory policy in some cases.  (a) The reformed process can help the agency 
learn more about the perceptions of regulatory policy among members of the 
public, under different conditions (i.e., engaged versus passive) which probably 
adds to the agency’s reservoir of information about how to promote support of 
regulatory policies among the public.  This is obviously directly useful in 
instances where the regulation depends directly on public compliance, but it also 
enhances the agency’s capacity to design regulations that might withstand 
changes in public perceptions.  Some examples involving direct public 
compliance: speed limits, airport security regulations, campaign finance.279  What 
is more, changes in public perceptions can influence the viability of regulations 
even if they don’t directly depend on public compliance, like speed limits, travel 
and immigration regulations, banking rules, and some pollution control rules.  
Finally, the new reformed process of regulatory democracy can sometimes 
expand the feasible set of options,280 which allows the regulatory agency to 
277 See, e.g., Sunstein, Arsenic, supra note___, at ___. 
278 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Introduction: Cost Benefit Analysis – Legal, 
Economic, and Philsophical Perspectives, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 837, 838 (2000).  Adler and Posner 
note:
Even the proponents of cost-benefit analysis do not generally argue that it should be the 
sole decision procedure for administrative agencies and other governmental bodies.  
There may well be scenarios where it is welfare maximizing for agencies to employ some 
other procedure, such as… (nomonetized) mitidimensional assessment.  
279
 If no one followed these rules then it would become nearly impossible for the government to 
enforce them.
280
 This assumes the new procedures can be made politically viable, which I discuss in infra Part 
IV.
RETHINKING REGULATORY DEMOCRACY 87
pursue some courses of action that are probably closer to optimal in terms of 
either political satisfaction, efficiency, or both.
The key point is that a reformed version of regulatory democracy delivers 
a rich lode of information about how people react to the regulations under which 
they live.  Current regulatory democracy persists not because this information is 
normatively irrelevant or useless in the design of regulations.  Instead the status 
quo persists because it serves a political purpose for legislators and policymakers 
that respond to political costs and benefits.  But neither political difficulties nor 
the persistence of still other problems in regulatory policy should stop us from 
thinking carefully about how the current system works or the persuasiveness of its 
theoretical justifications.  Instead of an antidote to resolve all the difficult 
questions in regulatory policy, I am offering observations about how the law of 
the regulatory state shapes the process of deciding on what those difficult 
questions really are.
IV.
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON REGULATORY DEMOCRACY
Despite all the feasible reforms of regulatory democracy, the defining 
feature of the regulatory state has nearly always been the reliance on demand-
driven procedures for engaging organized interests in developing regulations. 
Here I sketch three political scenarios that might give life to the alternative 
approaches that I have described.  Since these scenarios depend on certain 
preconditions, some of which are unlikely, no one is likely to topple the current 
arrangement for regulatory democracy any time soon.  What is left is a recurring 
opportunity for change that the margins that may inform the perceptions of 
legislators, regulators, interest groups and the public, and thereby gradually make 
it easier to pursue alternatives to the status quo. 
A.  The Political Economy Supporting the Status Quo
Legislatures shaping the developing administrative system harbored a 
substantial interest in contributing to the development of an regulatory state that 
could be subject to their oversight, and (just as important) could generate 
information about the impact of regulatory policy on important constituencies.
Viewed in this light, the APA and its notice-and-comment procedures become 
part of a fire-alarm approach to overseeing the bureaucracy.  As one article 
describes it: 
When something goes awry, constituents pull the fire alarm, bringing the 
attention of political officials down on agency proceedings.  To the extent that 
sustained congressional attention is costly to an agency, it will seek to avoid 
attention by serving congressional constituents so that alarms do not get 
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pulled.  Nevertheless, if agencies can keep their actions secret, especially if 
they can conspire with particular interests against others, congressional 
interests might not know about agency proceedings until it is too late… The 
APA helps mitigate this problem by requiring a substantial degree of 
transparency…  Affected constituents must be notified in advance of 
proceedings and given opportunities to participate and provide their views.281
If politicians care about fire alarms and interest group opposition, then they would 
want a system that responds to political power as well as interest.  The resulting 
model of public engagement would predictably have a focus on generating 
information about the views of people and groups who would most be willing to 
expend resources to shape the regulations in question – or to punish politicians 
and bureaucrats for an unwelcome one.282
None of this implies that powerful interest groups would exclusively rely 
on administrative procedures like the notice-and-comment process to signal their 
displeasure to politicians.  Interested parties could also rely on having their allies 
serve as political appointees or deploying congressional staffers to gather 
information.  Nor is it necessary to argue that the sole or primary purpose of 
administrative procedures was to benefit politicians’ favored interest groups.283
Instead the contention is that, on balance, the APA and associated procedures 
probably helped (and continues to help) politicians track the reactions of outside 
interest groups, a development that in turn could advance their electoral and 
policy agendas.
Thus there is more than just a conceptual attraction to current regulatory 
democracy.  There is a political and economic logic behind its brawn.  The result 
is a system that does not necessarily benefit everyone, nor does it live up to all the 
ideals participatory democracy.  But existing procedures certainly make it easier 
281
 McNollgast, supra note ___ at 199.
282 The Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure 
(issued in 1941) suggests that even before passage of the APA, agencies already understood the 
value of avoiding confrontation with interest groups that might undermine the agency in Congress:
Early in the present century a number of agencies appear to have adopted regularized consultation 
in connection with their rule-making processes…. The practice of holding conferences of 
interested parties in connection with rule-making introduces an element of give-and-take on the 
part of those present and affords an assurance to those in attendance that their evidence and points 
of view are known and will be considered.  As a procedure for permitting private interests to 
participate in the rule-making process it is as definite and may be as adequate as a formal hearing.  
If the interested parties are sufficiently known and are not too numerous or too hostile to discuss 
the problems presented conferences have evident advantages over hearings in the development of 
knowledge and understanding.  ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note ___, at 103-04. The 
report implies that the goal of administrative procedures to involve the public should be to involve 
interested parties.
283 Contra Balla, supra note___, at ___.
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for interest groups and representative politicians to work with the regulatory state 
to achieve their goals.
B.  Possible Reform Scenarios
All of the preceding admittedly makes it somewhat difficult for legislators, 
regulators, and high-level political appointees in the executive branch to adopt 
reforms in regulatory democracy.  But change is not necessarily impossible, so in 
closing let me provide a sketch of three scenarios that could bolster the prospects 
for the alternatives.  Nothing in the empirical literature on congressional 
dominance suggests that agencies are bereft of meaningful discretion.  Indeed, 
most formal models illustrate circumstances where the agency retains 
considerable political power to choose how to use its authority.284  And if the 
agency is able to keep some control, the views and desires of its leadershop may 
reflect more than just pre-existing fixed policy preferences.  
In light of all this, I offer three scenarios where it becomes more possible 
to redesign regulatory democracy.  The three scenarios reflect the premise that 
ambiguous statutes do not represent legislators’ genuine desire to defer to experts, 
but instead a political compromise.285  That compromise may, in turn, be affected 
by politicians’ guesses about what sorts of policies are politically palatable.286
Figuring out what precisely is politically acceptable (by congressional district, by 
state, or by national electorate) is difficult, perhaps even for politicians who 
survive a competitive process weeding out the ones who cannot do the figuring 
very well.  Nonetheless, some guesses about the political popularity of legislation 
are probably easier to make than others, and sometimes politicians just get it 
wrong.287
In the first scenario, begin with the premise that politicians often use 
opinion polls as an important tool for shedding light on what voters want.  The 
information they provide can supplement politicians’ own sense of how voters 
stand on the issues most likely to matter in elections (such as crime and the 
economy).  Meanwhile, with few exceptions regulatory issues are likely to seem 
uninteresting and relatively unimportant by comparison, unless of course there is 
a some incident or shock, making a previously unimportant issue very relevant.  
For example, the September 11 attacks could transform terrorist financing 
counter-measures from something marginally important into a centrally important 
284 See Craig Volden, A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers 
System, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 111 (2002).
285 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest and A.C. Pritchard, Statutes With Multiple Personality 
Disorders:  The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN L. REV. 627 
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
286 See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note __, at ___
287 See, e.g., John Hardin, An In-Depth Look at Congressional Committee Jurisdiction Surrounding 
Health Issues, 23 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 517 (1998)(describing legislators’ travails involving 
catastrophic health insurance amendments to Medicare-Medicaid).
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issue.  The same could be said for transportation security policy.  In such 
situations, voters’ pre-crisis responses in opinion polls would not provide an 
accurate perspective about the electorate’s take on things after the crisis.  This 
means that politicians would have to be guessing how a crisis could affect the 
public’s judgment, and therefore the politicians’ prospects in future elections.288
The logic of this scenario would make the viability of reforms in 
regulatory democracy depend on politicians’ beliefs about the state of the world.  
Reforms in regulatory democracy would be most attractive in the following 
situation: (a) there is a high enough probability that a low-importance issue might 
skyrocket in importance later on; and (b) they cannot guess what a voter would 
think once circumstances forced her to reflect more about it.  This means that at 
least sometimes, a deliberation group could help politicians go about their 
business of supervising the work of the regulatory state.289  If reforms in 
regulatory democracy were politically valuable to legislators but faced 
bureaucratic resistance, outside interest groups might fund corrective or 
majoritarian deliberation proceedings and then funnel the results to agencies 
through the existing notice-and-comment process (perhaps with a quick “cc:” –
the equivalent of a knowing glance – to interested legislators).  The corrective or 
deliberative proceedings themselves might be conducted by companies or not-for-
profit organizations with a reputation interest in the integrity of the results. 
Now imagine a different scenario.  Reforms in regulatory democracy are 
promoted by political entrepreneurs and become popular among the public.  They 
are not diluted because they are used to resolve statutory ambiguities in areas 
where the interest group context is not strong enough to predetermine the result.  
So imagine that for some issues, interested parties lack the power or interest to 
achieve objectives through the existing approach.  Think, for example, of 
regulations governing the use of money provided to state governments for the 
development of drug offender diversion programs (i.e., “drug courts”).  If no 
288
 To some extent, experts and agencies working under the aegis of the executive branch serve as 
proxies for public engagement.  They can also help solve controversial matters for which 
politicians occasionally want to avoid responsibility.  But the alternative approaches could 
perform useful functions, helping provide additional insulation from responsibility when 
politicians have to deal with a hot potato.  One useful function would be to help provide an 
additional line of insulation from responsibility when politicians have to prospectively deal with a 
scalding hot potato – a means of dropping a cool dollop of sour cream on the potato by saying “we 
didn’t make a decision, and it was so important we didn’t even want the experts to do it by 
themselves.  We had real people help us make the decision.”
289
 If legislators decide that there is a high probability of an exogenous shock dramatically 
increasing the salience of a particular issue, they may find the alternatives as desirable as the 
existing procedural mechanisms to oversee the bureaucracy.  In both cases, the goal is to ensure 
that the output of the regulatory process redounds to the legislators’ benefit.  Cf. Kathleen Bawn, 
Political Control Versus Expertise:  Congressional Choices About Administrative Procedures, 89 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995)(developing a formal model highlighting legislators’ interest in 
designing procedures forcing agencies to make technically sound decisions that balance competing 
interests as legislators intended). 
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group is strong enough to sway the policy, legislations might see a political payoff 
in telling the electorate that the public will be more involved in these decisions.290
Suppose, in still a third scenario, that legislators and bureaucrats promote 
reforms in regulatory democracy as a means of allocating political responsibility –
even when there is some short-term (or even longer-term) personal political gain 
for them from maintaining the status quo.  This is unlikely but not impossible.  It 
is unlikely because political constraints give legislators a reason to support the 
existing arrangement instead of some more elaborate approach to participatory 
democracy in the regulatory state.291  But change under this scenario is possible 
because those political constraints do not always overwhelm (at least in principle) 
countervailing impulses to pursue reforms in regulatory democracy.  I have 
argued above that some of those impulses could arise from the possibility that 
changes in regulatory democracy could be popular.  What is also possible is that 
legislators and agency policymakers would just be curious to know what reforms 
in regulatory democracy can reveal.292  “What would a group of unaffiliated 
outside expert think of this?” might wonder a legislator asking an agency to use 
the corrective approach.  An agency official might wonder if deliberating citizens 
share her intuition about the need for an adequate margin of safety in drinking 
water regulations governing the permissible concentration of arsenic.
None of the preceding scenarios guarantee success in reforming regulatory 
democracy.  In the meantime, some things resembling the corrective approach are 
290 Cf. Hugo Hopenhayn and Susanne Lohmann, Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of 
Regulatory Agencies, 12 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 196, 109 (1996)(using a formal model to 
demonstrate the implication that interest-group “information providers may have incentives to 
deceive the political recipient of their signals in order to manipulate her decisions”).  Indeed, 
politicians may seldom be in a position to ascertain whether interest groups are providing accurate 
information about agencies.  Sometimes politicians will be able to learn what they need just by 
knowing that certain interest groups are opposed to a regulatory policy, because the interest group 
opposition makes enough of a difference to an electorate outcome.  But where interest groups are 
not powerful enough to offset the electoral benefits of a particular policy, then politicians may 
prefer to have some independent mechanism to inform them about what the larger public thinks of 
specific regulatory policies. 
291 See infra Part IV.a.
292
 Some agency lawyers I interviewed expressed just such curiosity, and the data I discuss in Part 
II belie the notion that agency lawyers would simply care about the views of powerful interest 
groups (particularly those that they regulate).  As Wilson notes in his exhaustive discussion of 
empirical studies of government bureaucracies through the late 1980s:
Clearly, some distinctions are in order.  The influence of outside interests on an agency 
will depend, in the first instance, on the way those interests are arrayed in the agency’s 
environment.  To oversimplify, a government agency can occupy one of four kinds of 
political environments.  It can confront (1) a dominant interest group favoring its goals; 
(2) dominant interest group hostile to its goals; (3) two or more rival interest groups in 
conflict over its goals; or (4) no important interest group.  Which kind of environment 
they face will shape the forces working on operators as they try to define their tasks.
Wilson, supra note__ at 76.
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already in use, such as negotiated rulemaking, blue-ribbon commissions, and the 
selection of political appointees from constituencies that are impacted by an 
agency’s regulations.  On occasion politicians can use these tactics to supplement 
the political mechanisms of the APA.  What is unsatisfying about these 
approaches is that, unlike the corrective approach I have described, there is no 
explicit discussion of what interests are likely to have a big stake in the regulation 
but lack the sophistication, interest, or ability to overcome collective action 
problems.  Which means, by and large, that these approaches fail to address the 
endogeneity of sophistication and interest.
CONCLUSION
Conventional wisdom limns the regulatory state as a setting for expert 
decisionmaking and conflict between sophisticated organized interests.  
Laypeople are supposed to lack the time and intellectual ability to think about 
effluent standards, civilian nuclear power licensing requirements, alternative 
energy sources, or financial information disclosure policies.  Regulation by 
referendum seems like a ludicrous parody of what the regulatory state should be.  
At the same time, it also seems unrealistic to force legislators to make all the 
major regulatory decisions themselves.  So legislators continue making broad 
delegations of legal authority, agencies keep on regulating, and regulatory 
democracy continues relying on organized interest groups to shape and comment 
on regulations affecting our lives.
This article trains empirical and analytical attention on democratic 
participation in that system.  It sought to scrutinize assumptions about how the 
current system works and why it is legitimate.  My empirical study scrutinizes 
three regulatory rules, involving financial privacy, nuclear regulation, and 
campaign finance.  I show that at least some of the intuitions that would support 
complacent acceptance of the status quo turn out to be wrong.  Laypeople and 
unofficial groups try to participate in legal and policy arguments relating to the 
regulations under which they must live, but agencies often seem to disregard even 
those public comments directly relevant to the legal and policy questions at issue.  
Organized interest groups may help advance similar arguments, but sometimes 
even the members of the lay public who participate harbor different concerns 
from those raised by any organized interest group.  What’s more, existing 
regulatory democracy is demand driven, so it does absolutely nothing to involve 
people lives are touched by regulation but who decided not to comment on the 
regulation.  
Much of this would be beside the point if the public’s sophistication and 
interest in regulation were impossible to change, or if changes in the 
sophistication of participants were unlikely to have any effect on agencies.  Yet 
the opposite appears to be the case:  the public’s sophistication and interest can 
change depending on how their opinion is solicited. If no one asks them, many 
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members of the public will have no opinion at all, even if the regulation will 
affect their interests or if the regulation merits some degree of majoritarian 
deliberation.  If they are asked without being given a chance to learn about the 
regulation or an opportunity to think about it, their answers will be worthless as a 
barometer of more considered judgment.  All of this should limit the tendency to 
assume a lack of public capacity or desire for nuanced thinking from public 
silence about regulation, or from participation in the regulatory process by 
sending in a simple form letter.  Silence and form letters reflect some preexisting 
distribution of attention under current regulatory democracy.  There is nothing 
inherently optimal or ideal about that distribution.  There are practical and 
equitable ways of changing it.  Finally, preliminary analysis of data from the three 
case studies support a (plausible) theoretical conclusion that agencies are likely to 
be more influenced by sophisticated comments.
The impact of these potential changes, and of still other possibilities, will 
no doubt be even better understood with additional empirical research.  Projects 
could compare differences in regulatory democracy across a still larger set of 
regulatory contexts.  Research could also analyze (among other things) qualitative 
differences in how people find out about and become interested in regulations, 
who comments, what lawyers reviewing comments do, what alternative 
mechanisms for public involvement agencies use, and how regulations evolve in 
response to public engagement.   This agenda would also encompass detailed 
experimental studies showing when and how members of the lay public can 
absorb the greatest degree of complex information about regulations, and 
precisely how this changes their views.  In the meantime, the process of 
rethinking regulatory democracy can enrich not only regulatory policy but our 
sense of how (and how much) people can participate in their own governance.  
The regulatory state is more than just a convenient mechanism for solving the 
practical problem of regulation and incorporating scientific insights.  It is a 
vehicle for experimenting with novel democratic arrangements that honor both the 
legal mandates generated through representative politics and the technical, 
scientific knowledge that regulatory issues demand. 
The kind of participation that conventional regulatory democracy produces 
may serve the practical designs of legislators and organized interests.  It lets 
politically powerful interest groups get what they want from government.  It helps 
representative politicians align the outputs of the regulatory state with the 
concerns of those who can most obviously affect the politicians’ careers.  It 
allows regulators to forestall the wrath of critical constituencies.  Nonetheless, my 
empirical analysis emphasizes just how far removed such participation is from 
many defensible accounts of what democracy should deliver.  The rest of this 
article has discussed the possibility of a far richer conception of regulatory 
democracy – one that allows for correcting gaps in representation and deficits in 
sophistication.  I have sought to show that such a conception is legally feasible, 
administrable, and desirable.  Without it, the regulatory state will remain shackled 
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to the imperfections of representative democracy and pluralist politics, unable to 
serve as a stimulating setting for practical experimentation on how to integrate 
democratic participation with expert technical knowledge.  A principled defense 
of the current approach must therefore rest either on an idealized conception of 
representative politics and interest group politics, or on a sense that no changes to 
regulatory democracy are politically feasible.  Both of those positions need to be 
defended, and many such defenses are far from satisfying.
APPENDIX:  METHODS AND DATA
A. Case Selection and Analysis
My choice of case studies was informed by several considerations.  I wanted to 
include both regulatory matters that tend to receive more attention in the scholarly literature 
(involving safety and environmental policy) as well as some that receive less attention (like 
regulations explicitly designed to enhance law enforcement and national security).  I also 
sought regulatory agencies that were quite different.  In light of these factors and my own 
substantive interest and expertise in particular areas, the three agencies I studied came to 
include two multi-member commissions (the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 
Federal Election Commission, each with quite different internal procedures and institutional 
responsibilities) and one agency within a cabinet department (the Treasury Department’s 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network or FinCEN).293
There is at least some reason to believe that many members of the public could have 
more than a passing interest in financial privacy, campaign regulations, or nuclear power 
regulation.  Though not all regulatory rules address matters of obvious public concern, neither 
are these three regulations unusual in addressing matters that are both important and likely to 
be controversial.  I could have just as easily chosen (and may in future work evaluate) 
regulations involving firearms ownership, land use, ergonomics, or water quality.  Finally, I 
chose regulations that had not provoked any direct legislative response.294  In the meantime, 
the regulations I analyze here provide a broad snapshot of the regulatory mosaic across the 
federal government.  While I do not claim they are a representative sample of regulations, 
hundreds (if not thousands) more likely fit many features of the ones I describe here.
In the course of developing my case studies, I analyzed the legal aspects of the 
regulatory program in question as well as the empirical aspect.  My legal analysis covered the 
statutory mandate governing the regulations, placed in the larger context of the agency’s legal 
293
 This is not to say that the regulations I chose are particularly distinctive when compared to other 
regulations issued by the agencies in question.  For each agency, there are plenty of regulations 
that generated both smaller and larger numbers of public comments.  They are not necessarily the 
most important regulations (where importance is measured in any defensible sense).  Each of the 
agencies has responsibility for regulations that generated more than the meager media coverage 
these received. 
294
 As I note earlier, few regulations actually provoke direct legislative oversight or amendment.  
This raises at least some questions about the most superficial version of the argument that 
legislative involvement in the regulatory process is what makes the regulatory state legitimate.  
Whether the lack of legislative involvement here arose because of the legislature’s success in 
designing procedures to police agencies (which seems more likely) or because of the legislature’s 
genuine disinterest is not critical to my argument here.
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responsibilities.  This sheds light on the sorts of considerations that an agency may bring to 
bear in developing the regulations.  Under what I consider to be the most plausible reading of 
the doctrine on this issue, the statutory factors can also interact with the concerns raised in 
comments to establish the factors that the agency had a responsibility to address in the 
development of its rules.  In each case, I considered at least some of the feasible alternatives 
the agency could have implemented given the extent of its discretion under the relevant law.  
My empirical analysis then focused on analyzing the comments during the notice and 
comment process.  In particular, I sought to discern the comments’ sophistication, the general 
issue that the comment addressed (particularly those that were relevant under the statute 
involved), and the extent to which the comment mentioned a concern that was (at least 
partially) addressed by a change that the agency made in the regulation.  Together the legal 
and empirical analysis shed light on who participates in the notice and comment process, how 
they participate, and ultimately how public participation shapes regulatory policy.  What 
follows describes the rest of my methodology.
B.  Measuring Sophistication
Comments reflect not only a set of substantive views.  They also reveal some 
information bout the presence (or absence) of rhetorical, cognitive, and information 
sophistication.  To measure this, I used a mix of fairly straightforward proxies.  I developed 
an initial list of potential proxy measures by consulting the scholarly literature on cognitive 
complexity.295  I validated and adjusted this list by interviewing 11 lawyers who worked on 
the regulations I analyze here (and on other regulations) and whose responsibilities included 
handling public comments on the regulations.
The resulting qualitative sophistication score constituted the sum of the following 
five factors derived from the interviews with lawyers and from the relevant literature in 
cognitive psychology:  (a) Did the commenter distinguish the regulation from the statute?296
(b) Did the commenter indicate an understanding of the statutory requirement?297 (c) Did the 
commenter propose an explicit change in the regulation provided in the notice of proposed 
rulemaking?298 (d) Did the commenter provide at least one example or discrete logical 
295 See, e.g., Roberta Corrigan, A Scalogram Analysis of the Development of the Use and 
Comprehension of “Because” in Children, 46 CHILD DEV. 195 (1975)(associating sophistication 
with the provision of examples and separate arguments justifying a specific position); Shawn W. 
Rosenberg, The Structure of Political Thinking, 32 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 539 (1988)(distinguishing 
among different modes of political thinking, but emphasizing that these different approaches all 
depend on differentiating between general and specific rules and reasoning from certain core 
abstract premises).
296
 This category is meant to distinguish between comments that primarily address the scope of the 
underlying statute from comments that recognize in some way that the agency cannot legally 
abrogate its responsibility under the statute and must therefore issue regulations of some kind.
297
 Whether or not the commenter distinguishes the regulation from the statute in a comment, there 
is the question of whether the commenter understands the scope of the statutory requirement.  For 
example, a commenter might simply use the comment to complain about a statutory requirement 
that allows further flexibility for the sharing of financial information among banks and with 
government in the absence of much individualized suspicion.
298
 The notice-and-comment rulemaking process seems to have as a major premise that people can 
provide feedback that could result in changes in a given regulation.  It seems logical to think that 
the chances of achieving such an impact are heightened when the commenter provides a specific 
recommendation for a change in (or for maintaining a particular aspect of) the proposed rule.  In 
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argument for why the commenter’s concern should be addressed?299   (e)  Did the commenter 
provide any legal, policy, or empirical background information to place the suggestions in 
context?300  These categories were meant to shed light on the extent of the commenter’s 
information about, and understanding of, the problem faced by the agency.  
Comment length was the second measure, on the theory that longer comments tended 
to provide additional qualitative detail or support for the commenter’s assertions.301
Comments of any length were coded as being at least one page long.  Any fraction of a page 
over a full page counted as an additional page.  I used the total qualitative sophistication as 
the major explanatory variable to assess comment sophistication.  I also tested comment 
length and an interaction term of length and qualitative sophistication.  There was no 
substantial difference in the results.  
C.  Assessing Commenter Concerns
The regulations were quite different as to their substance, so one would expect 
somewhat different kinds of concerns to be raised.  My scheme for coding comments 
accordingly dealt somewhat different categories for each comment.  I read through a large 
sample of the comments (about 200), and assessing the range of issues that commenters raise, 
and matching them back to the issues in the regulation.  Of course, this is not an entirely
scientific process.  It’s entirely possible that others would have picked somewhat different 
categories.  The categories I discerned were, nonetheless, consistent with the process I have 
described above.  I validated these results with agency discussion of concerns raised (though 
not allowing these concerns to drive the final categories).
D.  Measuring Agency Acceptance of Commenter Suggestions
The essence of my strategy for measuring agency acceptance of commenter 
suggestions was to compare the notice of proposed rulemaking with the final regulation.  The 
three final rules published in the Federal Register that I studied all included a discussion 
describing the changes, though in some cases this discussion missed one or more substantive 
changes.  I used a detailed comparison of the proposed and final regulations, further informed 
by the agency’s own description of the changes, as a basis for the analysis – rather than 
relying on the agency’s own description of the changes alone.302  I then coded each comment 
any case, the capacity to ask for such a specific change plausibly reflects a commenter’s degree of 
sophistication about the rule and the underlying statute.
299
 This is meant to assess whether the commenter provided some measure of justification for the 
concerns raised, rather than simply stating the concern without indicating why such a concern was 
important.  No distinction was made between self-regarding arguments (i.e., this is a problem 
because it affects my business in a particular way) and public-regarding arguments (i.e., this is a 
problem because it will make Americans feel like they are constantly under surveillance, which 
will chill free expression).
300
 The key criterion was whether the comment provided at least one page of background material 
separate from any specific concern or recommendation about the regulation.
301
 While there was a mild correlation between comment length and sophistication, there were 
certainly plenty of comments that appeared to have “impact” and were just one or two pages long.  
Indeed, comment length was a weaker predictor of impact than the adjusted sophistication variable 
reflecting the qualitative indicators. 
302
 On the rare occasions where an agency indicated in the relevant Federal Register notice that it 
was uncertain and explicitly seeking comment on whether to keep a particular provision in the 
regulation, I coded the agency’s decision to retain the provision in question as the equivalent of a 
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for whether it included a recommendation or raised a concern that was addressed through one 
of the changes.  I coded the comments both for the total number of recommendations that the 
agency accepted, and also for whether the comment included any suggestion that the agency 
adopted.303
E.  Commenter Identity
I assessed commenter identity by examining the comment itself.  If a commenter did 
not self-identify as a business, organized “public interest” or public membership organization, 
organization representing business, or law firm, then I treated the comment as either coming 
from an individual member of the public or an “unofficial organization.”  Unofficial 
organizations (such as the “San Jacinto Constitutional Study Group”) were those where the 
commenter identified himself as the representative of a larger group, where (a) neither the 
comment nor the stationery on which the comment was printed indicated that the group was 
representing business, (b) neither the commenter nor the stationery indicated that the group 
was a tax-exempt organization, and/or (c) the commenter indicated that the group was 
informal or operated solely in a particular neighborhood.  
Obviously some comments that were coded as being from individual members of the 
public were spurred by the activities of organized interest groups.  Those interest groups play 
a role in informing their members and other segments of the public about the regulation in the 
first place, and may also encourage their members to send in a specific form letter comment.  
I did code comments for whether they appeared to be form letters on the basis of whether 
precisely the same language as at least three other comments.  The interest group strategy of 
encouraging members to send in form letters raises the question of what the groups think they 
will achieve by galvanizing the public to send in form letters.  In part for this reason, the form 
letters are worth analyzing separately from interest group activity because they may have a 
separate impact on the agency (either as a proxy for interest groups to demonstrate their 
political strength, or as a means of conveying intensity of preference to the agency).  The 
letters also reveal the willingness of many individual members of the public to expend time 
and energy on a political activity that is at least as costly as many others that receive more 
routine academic scrutiny (like the act of voting).  A methodology that treated form letters as 
merely reflecting the concerns of an interest group would fail to recognize the difficulty 
groups sometimes face in getting their members (and others who sympathize with their cause) 
to actually engage in political activity, and also the possible independent impact of form 
letters on the regulatory process.  A future study could shed light on these issues by analyzing 
how the presence of form letters impacts regulatory policymaking in a large number of 
regulations.  In the meantime, my analysis codes comments for whether they are form letters, 
but otherwise treats them like any other comment.  Which means it can be analyzed to see 
what sort of person or entity sent the comment, how sophisticated it was, what concerns it 
raised, and whether it includes suggestions the agency actually adopted.
change.  For robustness, I also assessed the impact of excluding these data.  The conclusions I 
report about the impact of sophistication and status as a directly regulated entity on agency 
acceptance of commenter suggestions are unaffected regardless of whether these data are excluded 
from the analysis.
303
 By suggestion, I mean either of two things: (a) a specific request that the agency resolve a 
specific alleged problem in the regulation that was then resolved (in the final rule) in essentially 
the manner the commenter requested, or (b) a more general concern raised by the comment that, 
by the agency’s own admission and in a plausible manner, is substantially mitigated through some 
change in the regulation.
